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Abstract
In 1793 Cornwallis organised the Company’s judiciary 
on a new basis. The salient features of its civil branch 
were the union of executive and judicial authorities at 
the top, the division of those functions in the Districts 
and their allocation to the Collector and the Judge separ­
ately, and the reliance on European agency for carrying 
out nearly the whole of the judicial administration. By 
1831 the picture had changed drastically. The executive 
and judicial functions had been separated at the top but 
combined to a large extent in the Collectors of the Districts, 
and almost the entire original jurisdiction had been dele­
gated to Indian Judges. Structural details had also been 
altered substantially. Two sets of tribunals, the Provincial 
Courts and the Courts of Registers,had become extinct. All 
these modifications came after 1800, on account of the failure 
of Cornwallis’s system, and in the process of evolving a 
structure that would prove equal to the pressure of judicial 
business.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Calcutta had 
been restricted in 1781, in order to remove the grounds of 
conflict between the Court and the Bengal Government. But in 
many respects the Court’s jurisdiction was still not clear.
That the seeds of conflict remained is shown by the subsequent 
history of the Court.
To provide the necessary background to this study of 
the evolution of the civil judiciary in Bengal between 
1800 and 1831» a brief introductory chapter on the pre-Comwallis 
period has been included, whilst in chapters on various elements 
of the Company’s judicial structure it seemed desirable to 
begin by discussing the arrangements made during the Governor- 
General ships of Hastings and Cornwallis. Similarly the chapter 
on relations between the Supreme Court and the Bengal Administration 
opens with an account of earlier conflicts between the Court 
and the Executive.
Preface
Anthony Hammond, the Advocate General of Bombay 
Presidency, remarked in 1830 that the result of Cornwallis’s 
endeavours was ”to sketch the mere outline of the /judicial/ 
system, leaving it to experience, reflection and other 
contingencies, to fill up /the gaps/and to lay the founda­
tion of a permanent judicial establishment”.^
This is a sentiment with which the present writer agrees 
entirely. The foundation of a ’permanent1 judicial establish­
ment in India was completed through a process of consolidation, 
reform and rejection of Cornwallis’s ideas, stretching over 
a period of thirty years. This process began with Wellesley 
in 1800, and culminated with Bentinck in 1831. The first move 
for making a major change in Cornwallis’s arrangements was 
made in the year 1800, when Wellesley began his efforts for 
separating the Sad^ tr Bfewani Adalat from the Supreme Council.2 
It was about the same time that the first impulse towards 
the modification of Cornwallis’s structure was conveyed from
^Hammond to Sir John Malcolm, 20th Jan. 3830, Bentinck MSS,
Pw Jf. 2653.
2/5eneral/ Letter from Bengal to C0urt of Directors, 9th July 
1800, Vol. 40.
London.'*' The process of reform thus begun continued re­
lentlessly for the next thirty years, resulting in the 
emergence of a greatly transformed judicial structure by 
1831. The year 1831 is particularly significant because 
decisions for most of the fundamental changes in Cornwallis’s 
structure were taken in that year. The period 1800-31 forms, 
therefore, a coherent and vital phase in the judicial history 
of Bengal.
The most thorough studies bearing upon ihe evolution 
of the civil judiciary under the East India Company’s ad­
ministration are Dr. B. B. Misra’s The Central Administration 
of the East India Company, 1775-1834 (1959), A. C. Patra’s 
The Administration of Justice under the East India Company 
in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa (1962), and Dr. B. S. Baliga’s 
unpublished London University doctoral thesis on Influence 
of Home Government on land-revenue and .judicial administration 
of Bengal, 1807-22.
Dr. Misra* s work devotes a long chapter to the admini­
stration of Civil justice. It covers a very wide field. One
"^Concerned at the heavy accumulation of arrears the Directors 
desired the Bengal Govt, to take immediate steps for making 
the judicial machinery equal to the demand. General Despatch 
from Court to Bengal, 23rd Harch 1800, paras. 6-8, Vol. 35*
half of the chapter is devoted to the judicial administration 
before 1793, the other to the scheme of 1795, its working, 
its drawbacks and all the changes made between 1800 and 
1831. The narrative presents a compact picture of judicial 
administration during the period reviewed but gives scant 
treatment to the changes made to Cornwallis’s system. Dr. 
Misra’s main sources for the post-1800 period are the 
Judicial Letters to and from Bengal, the Home Miscellaneous 
Series, and a report on the judicial administration of Bengal 
compiled in 1818. Only one volume of Civil Judicial Con­
sultations has been referred to and the Private Papers and the 
Parliamentary Reports of the 1830s do not appear to have been 
used at all. The Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations is the 
fundamental series for a study of judicial administration 
and the present writer has made intensive use of it.
A. C. Patra’s book treats the development of the judicial
system primarily from the point of view of a lawyer. The
changes after 1795 have been described only in terms of the
Regulations incorporating them and the working of the
Company’s Courts has befin studied orifcr through the reported
*
decisions of the S.D.A. The policies guiding the evolution
A series of reports of cases decided by the S.D.A. covering 
■the period 1791-1829 was published in four volumes by W. H.
HcUaghten. J. C. Sutherland published three more volumes 
which carried the * reports* up to 1848. These have been one of 
Patra's main sources.
of the judicial structure, and the reasons why the structure 
took the particular form that it did in 1831, have, therefore, 
been missed* Patra devotes a chapter each to the Sad^r 
Dewani Adalat, the Sadar Hizamut Adalut, the Provincial 
Courts of Appeal and the Courts of Circuit* But the most 
vital part of the structure, the mofussil branch, consisting 
of the District Judges, the Registers and the Indian Judges, 
has been almost entirely neglected*
Dr, Baliga* s thesis concerns primarily the impulses 
to reform supplied from London and those only up to 1822, 
which year does not form any landmark in the judicial history 
of Bengal.
It has been the universal tendency to presume that the 
controversy between the Supreme Court and the Government of 
Bengal was terminated for ever by the Act of Settlement of
1780, which restricted the latter*s jurisdiction, and that 
the Court and the Bengal Government functioned in harmony 
after that. This is not the case. On account of the undefined 
conditions of the Court’s power and jurisdiction it came into 
conflict with the Government on several occasions even after
1781.
The present thesis is an attempt to bridge these gaps 
in the present state of our knowledge of the history of the 
East India Company’s judicial administration.
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Chapter I
ASPECTS OP JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. 1765-1800
Yftiilst the battle of Plassey marks the establishment 
of the Company1s political supremacy in Bengal, the grant 
of Dfewani to them in 1765 marks their accession to ad­
ministrative responsibility. The term DeVani needs eluci­
dation.
Under the Moghul polity the Bengal Provincial government 
was bifurcated broadly into the revenue and military branches, 
called the D&wani and Nizamat respectively. The former was 
under the Dfewan, the latter under the . Provincial Governor, 
called the Nawab or the Nazim. The Nawab was the chief of 
the army and the head of the Executive. Being responsible for 
the maintenance of law and order, he also supervised the ad­
ministration of Criminal justice. The Dlwan was below the 
Nawab in rank, prestige and authority, but in revenue matters 
he was directly responsible to the Emperor. His function was 
to collect revenue and manage the Civil branch of judiciary.
Both the Nawab and the Dfewan were appointed by the Emperor.
The idea behind bifurcating the administrative functions between 
them ms to create a system of checks and balances.
11
The East India Company stepped into the role of only 
the Dewan in 17&5, so as actual situation was 
concerned, the constitutional supremacy of the Emperor at 
Delhi and the traditional superiority of the Nawab over the
Dewan had become a myth. The Emperor had no means of com­
pelling the Company if they stopped paying the tribute and 
the Nawab was merely a figurehead. He had no arny under 
his control and no voice in policy making. He was living as
! a pensioner of the Company.
I In 1765 the Company became the supreme power in Bengal.
i1
But they shrank from undertaking any responsibilities, even 
those which devolved upon them by virtue of their constitutional
i
j  status as Dewan. Instead, they employed two Indian officers,
Mohammad Reza Khan at Murshidabad and Raja Shitlib Rai at Patna 
for discharging the functions of the Diwani on their behalf.
The Nawab still remained the head of the administration in 
theory. His responsibility for the maintenance of law and 
order and the administration of Criminal justice also continued.
Thus arose a very anomalous situation. The Company exercised 
complete control over the Nawab through their Resident who had 
the final say in the policy making, but undertook no responsi­
bility for running the administration. The Nawab had to run 
the administration but had no power to make his authority effective.
This was the scjcalled fDual Government * devised by Clive, 
which resulted in complete chaos in the administration.
The form of judicial administration in Bengal after 
1765, under the management of the Nawab and Reza Khan and 
Shi tab Rai was the continuation of the Hoghul system. The 
highest tribunal of Civil justice at the capital, Murshidabad, 
was that of the D^wan. There were two other Civil Courts 
besides - those of the Darogo Adalftb al-Alea and the kaze^ ul 
kozat or the Head kazef.^ The Civil Court at Patna was pre­
sided over by the Shitab Rai, the Naib D?wan and that at
Dacca by a deputy of Reza Khan who managed the collection in 
2
that area. According to Verelst, a contemporary observer,
ihe Civil judicatures at Burdwan were the Burra AdalQjb, Amte^ n
- - 3Dustoori and Chota Adalat* They also seem to have been pre­
sided over hy officers concerned in the collection of revenue.
The jurisdictions of the Courts described above hardly 
extended beyond the cities where they functioned. Under the
^Govn. Gen.-in-Council to Court, 3rd Nov. 1772, quoted in 
7th Report of Committee of Secrecy, Pari. Branch Colls., 
1772-3, Vol. 7, pp. 324-6.
2Ibid.
3
Harry Verelst-,: Views on the rise... etc. of English Govt, of Bengal. 
1773, pp. 219-20.
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Moghul system the kazees were the traditional Judges in the 
interior. They were appointed over every Pargana and sometimes 
over large villages. They administered both Civil and Criminal 
justice to the Muslims according to the Koranic law. But to 
Hindus they administered Criminal justice only, because in 
Civil cases they were governed by their own laws and customs.
The Hindus residing in the interior settled their Civil disputes 
through Panchayets. The Committee of Secrecy, appointed by the 
Parliament in 1770, to investigate the affairs of the East 
India Company, noticed a report from the Supervisor stationed 
at Rajshahy which stated that kazees had been administering 
both Civil and Criminal justice inihat area. But on a con­
sideration of all the other evidences, the Committee was led to 
conclude that in most areas the local Zamindars had been pre­
siding in both the Civil and Criminal Courts of the interior.^ " 
The revenue cases were decided by the Naib Dfewans, who were
Indian officers employed in different areas by Reza Khan and
— 2Shi tab Rai for collecting the revenue. The Panchayets were a
3
popular agency for arbitrating Civil disputes among the Hindus.
^7th Report of Committee of Secrecy, 1773» Pari. Branch Colls., 
1772-3, Vol. 7, pp. 324-6.
2Ibid.
5Ibid.
Warren Hastings asserted that the judicial authority 
of the Zamindars had no legal basis. They had assumed that 
power"for which no provision had been made by the law of the 
land".1
Hastings's view seems to be correct. Under the Moghul 
astern the P^Qjdar used to be the head of the District ad­
ministration. He must have exercised a control over the kazb^s. 
He was responsible for the maintenance of law and order in 
his territory, and he also exercised a powerful control over 
the Zamindars. Ain-I-Akbari (completed in 1593) provides in-
2struction for his guidance in dealing with refractory Zamindars. 
But with the decline of the power of the Nawab after 1757 the 
internal administration of Bengal was completely disrupted.
As a result both the P^^dars and the kazbfs who drew their 
power from the central authority became weak and helpless.
The Zamindars, taking advantage of this situation, becamee 
all-powerful and independent in their areas. In this process 
they also seized the judicial authority from the kazees and 
made it the instrument of private gain. In Criminal cases the 
fines levied on the culprits became a perquisite of the Zam- 
indar and in Civil cases he became entitl6dl to one fourth 
or one fifth share (called Chauth) of whatever was recovered
■^Hastings's Minute, 7th Dec. 1775, quoted in 6th Report of the 
Select Committee of House of Commons, Pari. Branch Colls., 1782, 
Vol. 14, Appx. 15.
%. S. Jarret, Ain-I-Akbari. 1873, Vol. II, pp. 40-41.
through his agency.
The self-assumed judicial authority of the Zamindars
was, however, acknowledged as a necessary evil. Hastings
himself stated: "The Zamindars ... assuming /sic? that
power for which no provision is made by the law of the land,
but which, in whatever manner it is exercised, is preferable
to a total anarchy .... In effect, the greatest oppressions
of the inhabitants owe their origin to this necessary evil.1*^
Another significant feature of the pre-^722 period was
the interference of Company's servants and their Indian agents
with the judicial administration. The Secret Committee was
told that ever since the establishment of the political
-  *
supremacy of the English in Bengal, the Banias of English
gentlemen had become unrestrained tyrants in the interior.
They not only entirely governed the Courts of justice where-
2ever they resided but often sat in them as Judges.
The Company made its first attempt to improve the judicial 
administration of the country in 1769, by the appointment of
1Bengal Secret Cons., 13th March 1775, quoted in 6th Report of 
Select Committee, Pari. Branch Colls., 1782, Vol. 14, Appx. 15*
2
7th Report of Committee of Secrecy, Pari. Branch Colls..1772-3, 
Vol. 7, pp. 324-26.
* —
Banias were Indian agents employed by Englishmen for conducting 
their private trade in the interior.
covenanted servants, designated Supervisors, in various areas. 
These officers had two functions. First, they were to see 
that the Company received the full revenue collected on 
their behalf by the Dfiwans (Reza Khan and Shitab Rai) and 
secondly, they were instructed to keep an eye on the working 
of the judicial Courts with a view to preventing oppression 
and injustice. But the Supervisors had no direct control 
over the Nawabfs officers or the Zamindars, kaz&fs, or other 
persons who administered justice. If those Judges refused to 
abide by their advice the only course open to the Supervisors 
was to report the matter to the Resident at Murshidabad who, 
in turn, was to urge the Nawab for action. This cumbersome 
process defeated the entire purpose. The successful inter­
ferences of Supervisors, with the Country Courts in the interest 
of justice were.,: therefore, very few and far between. Hence 
the institution of Supervisors failed to bring any improve­
ment in the chaotic state of the judiciary in Bengal.
While the state of the Province deteriorated fast 
under the ‘'dual administration" begun in 1765, the Company did 
not become affluent either, which had been the primary motive 
behind the arrangement of 1765* The yield from revenue was
u.
very disappointing. Within five years of the grant of Diwani 
they faced bankruptcy, to tide over which they had to apply
17
to the Parliament for a loan of £100,000.
Under such circumstances the Company decided to assume 
r ... -
the Dtowani in 1772. This implied the direct management of 
the revenue and the administration of Civil justice. Warren 
Eastings formulated a plan for executing the Dewani functions.
Under it, the Civil judiciaiy in the interior te-s consigned 
to Collectors of revenue. A Civil and a Criminal Court was 
established^. in every District. The Collector was to sit as
Judge in the former. The Criminal Court was to be presided
-  _  -- *
over by the Nawabfs servants, the kazees and Muftis , but
the Collector was also required to supervise their conduct.
Two superior Courts of Civil and Criminal justice were estab­
lished at Calcutta. They were to be known as the Sadfir Dfcwani 
Adalat and Sad^r Nizamat Adalat respectively. The former was 
to be conducted by the Governor-General and his Council. The 
latter was left in the hands of the Nawab and his officers.
It is apparent from the arrangements of 1772 that the 
administration of Civil justice in the mofussil was made a 
subsidiary function of the revenue officer. This in fact was the 
continuation of the system prevailing from before. Hastings 
actually made no innovation in organising the judicial administration
The Mufti expounded the law and the kazee pronounced the judgment.
in 1772. This system survived in essence until 1793 > though
some outward changes were made.
For various reasons the Collectors were withdrawn in
1774.^  They were replaced by six Provincial Councils of
Revenue, established at various Divisional headquarters,
which succeeded to the Collectors' judicial functions. A
Dfewani Adalat (Civil Court) was attached to each Council.
One of the Council members was to sit in this Court by rotation.
In the Districts the Naib Dewans or Amils, who were now re- 
2stored to do the work of collection in lieu of the European 
Collectors, were given authority to decide Civil suits of 
small amount.
In 1780 the judicial functions from the Provincial 
Councils were separated by employing distinct officers to 
preside in the Civil Courts hitherto annexed to them. They 
were designated Superintendents of Diwani Adalftts. But all 
causes concerning revenue were reserved to the cognizance of
For details regarding the withdrawal of Collectors in 1774 
and their reinstatement in 1781, see Chap. IV.
The Naib Dewans were previously employed by Reza Khan and 
Shitab Rai before the assumption cf the Dewaii by the Company. 
They used to collect revenue and decide revenue disputes.
See ante, p. 1 3.
the Provincial Councils. In 1781, the separated Bfcwani 
Adalots were established in eighteen Districts into which 
the territory Tinder the Company1 s management was then organised. 
The Provincial Councils were simultaneously abolished and 
Collectors were restored to all eighteen Districts. Separate 
Judges were appointed to preside in the Dfcwani Adalots of 
all except the four sparsely populated Districts of Chatra, 
Bhagalpur, Islamabad and Bungpur. In those four Districts 
the Collector was also to act as the Judge - as the position 
had been in 1772.^ Even the Collectors of the other fourteen 
Districts were not completely divested of judicial authority.
All cases relating to demands and undue exaction of rent 
and those relating to public revenue were reserved to their 
exclusive cognisance in their own Courts, styled Mal-Adalcits.
In 1787» the Judges were withdrawn from all the Districts except 
Patna, Dacca and Murshidabad. The Collectors were now to 
discharge the judicial functions as well. In 1790, when the 
administration of Criminal justice was also undertaken by 
the Company, the Collectors were also made Magistrates of 
their Districts. Between 1790 and 1793> Collectors of fifteen 
Districts remained Judge, Magistrate and Collector, all in one.
The changes in the judicial powers of Collectors have been 
discussed in detail in Chap. IV, ; *
So far the outlook of the Company had been purely
commercial. In 1772, the administration of Civil justice had
been undertaken primarily because it was a part of the
functions of the Dfcwani and because a better administration
of justice was essential to the prosperity of the people,
on which the collection of revenue largely depended. The
entire judicial policy of Warren Hastingsfs administration
was determined more by this attitude than by any sense of
responsibility of the Government towards the people. The
result had been a subservience of judiciary to revenue.
Hastings’s successor, Cornwallis, who assumed office in 1787,
analysed this situation correctly: “Upon our first obtaining
possession of the Country, it was expected to be rendered
as immediately advantageous as possible.... In the civil
branch of government, all the early arrangements were framed
1
chiefly with a view to mere collection of revenue.”
There had bean nothing like a judicial department until 
1795- All Regulations respecting the administration of justice 
had been passed in the revenue department, although, as Corn­
wallis observed, "Ho two departments of Government can be more
^Minute of Cornwallis, 8th Feb. 1793, para. 27. Bengal Revenue 
Cons., 11th Feb. 1793, No.l.
21
•unconnected than finance and judicial,1
The judicial functions annexed^ to the Collectors after
1772 have been noticed above. All salaries and allowances were,
however, attached to the office of Collector only. They were
paid nothing for their services as Judges or the Magistrates,
which were considered as appendages to their fiscal office.
They were also allowed a commission on the amount of revenue
collected by them. Under such circumstances those officers
were bound to give first importance to their revenue duties.
’’Neither his ^Collector’s/ exertion nor his omissions in the
capacity of Judge meet the public eye, but the least failure
in realising the revenue is immediately noticed, and subjects
his character to imputations besides occasioning a diminution
2
in his commission."
The Zamindars took advantage of this situation. They 
deterred the Collectors from paying heed to the complaints 
of the ryots for undue exaction by alarming them with the 
prospect of failure of collection. The ryots fully realised 
this and therefore looked upon the Collectors as parties 
against them from whom they could expect no redress. The 
feeling of justice being subordinated to revenue had gone so
1
Cornwallis’s Minute, 8th Feb., 1793, para;28, Bengal Revenue 
Cons., 11th Feb. 1793, No.l.
2Ibid.
deep -that as late as 1782 the Zamindars were found insisting
upon their exemption from prosecution in the Courts by
their creditors, on the plea that they were under contract
to collect revenue for the Government.^*
In 1772, most of the lands were let out to the Zamindars
on an annua}, basis and the demand of revenue from them was
fixed on an estimate of the produce assessed by the revenue
officers. The season for making the heavy collection was 
*
short. If the Zamindars were restrained by prosecution in 
a Court of justice, they would not be able to realise what they 
engaged to pay to the Government. "The Government was, in 
consequence, obliged to shut its eyes to what passed in the 
collection of revenue and tolerate what it was not prepared 
to remedy. Interruptions in the collection was the plea for 
this forbearance^
Cornwallis brought about a revolution in the Company’s 
policy by introducing the liberal whig concepts into the 
Indian administration. He started from the basic principle 
that the Government which collected revenue was obliged to 
secure full protection to the rights and the properties
^Minute of Cornwallis, 8th Feb. 1811, para. 29. Bengal 
Revenue Cons., 11th Feb. 1793, No.l.
It was during the two months immediately following the harvest.
of the people against the invasion of individuals on the
Government itself. This protection was to be guaranteed 
by a system of "rule of law11 which was to replace the 
discretionary rule of revenue officers hitherto in force.
A set of Regulations was accordingly framed in 1793» which
sought to define the powers of the Government officers on
the one hand and the rights of the private individuals on
the other. The judiciary was given the role of the protector
and enforcer of 11 rule of law11. This became the fundamental
philosophy behind judicial administration in India for all
time to come. The structure of Civil judiciary erected by
Cornwallis was in the following order:
Sad£r Dewani Adalat
*i
? ...........
Provincial Courts of Appeal
t
»i
Courts of District Judges
i i
Courts of-Registers Courts of Munsiffs
It had two salient features. The first was the exclusion of 
Indians from all situations of trust and responsibility on 
account of their lack of character and ability, the second, 
separation of the judiciary from revenue and executive branch 
of administration. The association of Indians with the judicial
administration was permitted only at the lowest level.
In the Districts the Collectors were completely deprived 
of judicial authority, all judicial powers having now been 
lodged in the Judge-Magistrate. But this principle of 
,T separation of powers11 was not implemented above or below 
the District level. The highest tribunal, the S.D.A., was 
to be conducted by the Executive body, the Governor-General- 
in-Council. The Indian Judgeships in the interior of the 
Districts were to be conferred upon the official and unofficial 
agencies employed in the collection of revenue.^ "
Between 1793 and 1800 the only change of significance 
made in the judicial administration was the revival of the 
system of institution fees on cases, for discouraging litigation. 
This system had been originally established in 1781 by. Hastings 
but was discontinued by Cornwallis for making justice inexpen­
sive. But apprehension of frivolous litigation led to its 
revival in 1795, by Regulation ^XXVIII of that year.
The changes in the form of Cornwallis *s structure as 
well as in its salient features came between 1800 and 1831.
They form the theme of the present thesis.
or details see Chaps. II and VI.
Chapter II
THE INDIAN JUDGES
Origin of Indian Judges under Company1s Administration
After assuming the direct management of the Dfewani in
1772 Warren Hastings organised a Civil judiciary for the 
*
Provinces. The only Indians then allowed a share in the
1
Civil judicial administration rare the Zamindars. They 
were allowed to decide causes up to Rs. 10/- in amount. The 
European Collector was to be the Civil Judge in the Mofussil. 
In 1774 the Collectors were withdrawn from the Districts. 
Indian Officers called Amils or Naib Dfrwans were appointed in 
their place for collecting the revenue. The latter were also
n 2given the authority to decide petty Civil disputes. Judicial 
authority was granted to the Zamindars and the Amils in order 
to make justice in small causes more accessible to the people. 
In 1780 Civil Courts presided over by a European Judge were
This, in fact, was a continuation of the judicial authority 
already being exercised by the Zamindars. Sea'Chap. I.
2
Progs, of President-in-Council, 23rd Nov. 1773.
■&
The administration of Civil Justice was a part of the functions 
-of the Dewan under the Hoghul Constitution.
26
established in all the Districts. The judicial functions of 
Amils ceased. The judicial authority of the Zamindars was 
however extended. By Regulation XIV of 1780 they were authorised 
to adjudicate causes up to Rs. 100/-.
In reorganizing the judicial structure in 1793, Cornwallis 
started from the assumption that Indians, from their character 
and bearing, were incapable of holding any position of trust 
and responsibility. Ee remarked: "I conceive that all regulations
for the reform of that department, /judlcial7,.would be useless 
and nugatory whilst the execution of them depends upon any 
Indian whatever...
As a result the association of Indians with the new judicial
organisation was kept at the lowest level. They were entirely
excluded from the administration of Criminal justice. On the
Civil side provision was made for the appointment of some Indian
2
functionaries for deciding petty disputes. They were to be 
generally classified as !Native Commissioners’. They were to 
be appointed by the S.D.A. on the recommendation of local District 
Judges. Their power was to be limited to causes of personal
^Letter from Bengal, 2nd Aug. 1789, Cornwallis Correspondence, 
edited by Ross, Vol. I, p.548.
^By Regn. XL of 1793.
property not exceeding Rs. 50/- in amount or value. They 
could be employed in the following three capacities:
I As Amb<fcns or Referees, who were to carry out investi­
gations in particular cases and submit their report 
to the Judge, on the latter1s requisition.
II As Salisans or Arbitrators, who were to adjudicate in
a particular case after the plaintiff agreed before the
District Judge to refer his complaint to their arbi­
tration, or if the Judge chose to refer any suit to 
them of his own accord.
III As Hunsiffs, who were empowered to decide cases up to
Rs. 50/- whei^referr^d to them by the Judge or when pre­
ferred directly to them by the parties. Any person 
commissioned as Munsiff became automatically entitled 
to act as Amfe^ n and Salisan as well.
Of the above three officers, the Hunsiffs alone acted as 
regular judicial officials. The Amiens had no power of decision. 
They were only to submit a report after an investigation if 
called for by the Judge. The Salisans could pass a judgment on 
cases submitted to them by consent of the parties or on those 
referred by the Judge. But cases could be referred to them 
only through the agency of the Judges. The plaintiff had to 
repair to the District headquarters to institute his complaint
before the Judge, And once he travelled all the way to the 
Sadar station he preferred to have his dispute settled by 
the Judge or the Register instead of having it referred to 
the Salisan of his locality. The reasons for this tendency 
were correctly analysed by Jilliam Douglas, Judge of Rajshahy.'*' 
The first was the expectation of fairness and impartiality 
from the European Judges. The person seeking redress was led 
to this conclusion by the Pleaders of the District Courts who 
actually acted from self interest.The second reason was the 
desire of subjecting the defendant to the same hardship as 
he himself had undergone in leaving his occupation and going 
to the Sadar Station. Hence very few cases could be referred 
to the Salisans. In 1797, 504 suits referred to the Arbi­
trators by the Judge of twenty-four Pargana^s had to be with­
drawn and transferred to the Register in response to a general
clamour of the suitors to have their suits decided where they
2
were filed, i.e. at the District Court.
The Munsiffs, on the other hand, constituted regular 
judicial tribunals in the interior. Parties were not obliged
^Douglas to S.D.A., 8th Aug. 1798. S.D.A. Progs,, 29th Aug, 1798, 
No. 74.
^Civ. Judl. Cons., 13th July 1798, No. 55.
to repair to the Sadar to institute their complaint before 
the Judge before obtaining a reference to the Munsiff of 
his area. The case, if within Rs. 50/-, could be instituted 
direct before the local Munsiff, who was to try and decide it 
like any other Judge. Hence for the purposes of the present 
analysis of the three classes of Indian Comraissinners, the 
Munsiffs alone have been considered as Indian Judges.
Powers of Munsiffs under the arrangements of 1793.
Although the jurisdiction of Munsiffs extended up to
causes of Rs. 50/-, their authority even within this limit was
restricted in certain ways. In the first place they were to
•&
try suits for money or personal property only. Besides, their 
cognizance ms to be confined to cases against under-renters 
and ryots or cultivators only.'*' By implication all other 
persons were exempt from being sued in tieir Court. Regulation 
VII of 1799 entitled the Zamindars to have the property of 
the defaulting ryots distrained. The Munsiffs were authorised, 
by S.7 of that Regulation, to issue such a process of distraint 
on application from the Zamindars. This provision had been
keen. XL of 1793, S.5, Cl. 6.
-X-
Personal property connotes movable property like cattle, 
crops, trees and other articles, as distinguished from 
immovable property, like lands, buildings, water reservoirs 
etc., which were classified as real property.
introduced to help the Proprietors make timely collections.
The question arose whether the Munsiffs could afford a re­
ciprocal redress to the ryots in cases of undue restraint 
of their property by the Zamindars. On the principle of 
reciprocity, the individual (i.e. the Zamindar) who instituted 
a complaint before the Munsiff, simultaneously rendered himself 
amenable to the same Court, and a Court which afforded redress 
to a Proprietor against his ryot ought not to refuse to hear the 
complaint of the latter against the former. But in spite of 
the ethical propriety 3.5 of Regulation XL of 1795 remained a 
bar to any reciprocal action by the ryots against the Zamindars 
in cases under Regulation VII of 1799* This view was taken 
by J. Melville, the Judge of Jessore, in 1799."^  The S.D.A.,
though refusing to enter into any abstract discussions, did
2
not contradict Melville1s interpretation. But a different 
construction was put on the matter by Arbuthnot, the Judge of
3
Tirhoot. While applying for the sanction of more Munsiffs
^Melville to S.D.A., 12th Oct. 1799, S.D.A. Progs.y30th Oct. 1799,
No.76.
Ibid.
hrbuthnot to S.D.A., 15th Oct. 1799, Ibid, No. 96.
for his District in view of the promulgation of Regulation VII 
of 1799 he assumed that those officers would also provide 
easy redress to the ryots against the Zamindars for injuries 
sustained by undue distraint of their property. Technically, 
the former interpretation of Melville was correct so long as 
Cl. 6, S.5. of Regulation XL of 1793 was not rescinded. But 
the S.D.A. either overlooked or declined to contradict the 
latter assumption of Arbuthnot. The issue was therefore left 
unclarified until 1803, when the jurisdiction of Munsiffs, as 
regards persons, was considerably widened. The Munsiffs were 
also not allowed to enforce their own Decrees or orders. This 
was to be done by the Judge.
Extension of Indian agency (1803-31)«
a) Creation of Sad&r Amfe^ ns and improvement in 
the situation of Munsiffs (1803).
1
As arrears started mounting before the District Courts
the need for a more extended employment of Indians in the
judicial administration was felt. In 1801, acting on an initial
2
proposal from Tufton, Judge of Zillah Behar, the S.D.A. recommended
^See Chap. Ill, pp.137«38.
2
Civ. Judl. Cons., 6th Jan. 1801, No. 11.
the appointment of a new class of Indian Judges in all the
District headquarters.1 They were to he called Sad^r Amfe^ ns,
or Head Native Commissioners, and were to he authorised to
decide causes up to Rs. 200/- referred to them hy the Judge.
The S.D.A. also simultaneously recommended the extension of
the powers of Munsiffs up to cases of Rs. 100/-.
A consideration of this proposal was, however, deferred
hy the Governor General-in-Council, because they decided to
wait for the answer to their interrogatories, before talcing any
decision on issues of judicial reform. These interrogatories
were circulated, in 1801, among the Judges of Provincial and
District Courts. Their purpose was to form an estimate of the
working of the existing judicial structure as well as to obtain
individual opinions on ways of improving it. Question No. 6 ,
ran: "Are you of opinion that it would he advisable to extend
the jurisdiction of Native Commissioners to suits for sums or
2
values exceeding Rs. 50/- ...?"
3
The replies received were conflicting. Of the five 
Provincial Courts three opposed the extension, one favoured it
1Civ. Judl. Cons., 27th June 1801, No. 7.
^Civ. Judl. Cons., 29th Oct. 1801, No.6.
3
The answers are recorded under Civ. Judl. Cons.^8th July 1802,
Nos. 19-75.
and one reserved its opinion. Host District Judges were also 
opposed to any extension of the power of Munsiffs. The reason’, 
for opposing the extension ranged from dishonesty or incompetence 
of those officers to their encouragement of litigation for self
4r
interest. Those who favoured the extension emphasised its 
practical utility in relieving the District Courts. A few also 
acknowledged the superiority of the Indian Judges in making 
bett er assessment of the circumstances of the cases and the 
character of the parties.
■ Among those who favoured the extension strongly were Henry 
Strachey, Judge of KicLnapur, and Uilliam Douglas, the Judge of 
Patna City. Strachey asserted that an Indian of common capacity 
would, after little experience, examine witnesses and investigate 
the most intricate cases Mwith more ability and effect than . 
almost any European” Douglas considered the extension of 
power of Munsiffs to be absolutely essential for expedition of 
justice.^
1Civ. Judl. Cons., 8th July 1802, No. 55.
2Ibid., No. 37.
*
Prom 1795 onwards the Munsiffs were allowed to appropriate the 
institution fees of the suits brought before them. Hence they 
had a natural interest in institution of more suits.
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Prominent among those condemning the Munsiffs and em­
phatically opposing any extension oftheir power were J. Thompson, 
the Judge of Burdwan, and A. Pierrad, the Judge of Purnea.
The former suggested the abolition of Munsiffs altogether because 
they were dishonest and corrupt and therefore, "hurtful to the 
Country".^ The Purnea Judge called the Munsiffs of his District
a "set of miscreants” and charged them with encouraging frivolous
2
litigation for increasing their income.
The S.D.A. were convinced of the absolute necessity of retaining 
3
the Indian Judges. But apparently,.in view of the majority 
opinion against the extension of the powers of the existing Indian 
Judges (the Munsiffs), they modified their former proposal.^ The 
idea of extending the power of Munsiffs was dropped altogether.
The scheme of creating a new order of Indian Judges, however, 
stayed though it was now proposed to give them a smaller juris­
diction than that originally intended (i.e. Rs. 200/-).
The modified proposal was passed into Regulation XLIX of 
1803* It provided for the appointment of one Head Commissioner
^Civ. Judl. Cons., 8th July 1802, Ho.45.
^Ibid., Ho.56.
^S.D.A. to Govt., 19th April 1803. Civ. Judl. Cons., 5th May 
1803, Ho.5.
"^See ante p. 5^,
(to be designated Sad^r Amb^n) for each District. They were
authorised to decide cases of personal or real property up to
Rs. 100/- in amount or value, which might be referred to them
*
by the Judge for trial. \-Jith a few exceptions cases against 
any Indian could be referred to the Sadjir Ami^n. British sub­
jects of European descent, European foreigners and Americans 
were expressly exempted from their jurisdiction. Like the 
Munsiffs, these officers were not authorised to enforce their 
own decisions. Even their processes were to be issued under 
the signature of the District Judge or the Register.
The Sad$.r Ame^ns had been created as a superior order of 
Indian Judges. They had more power than the Munsiffs but less 
independence. They could not receive cases directly. Their 
processes, were to.be issued under the signature of the European 
officers. In fact it was intended to maintain a close super­
vision over the conduct of all the Indian Judges. The com­
parative independence of Munsiffs (in receiving cases direct 
and issuing their own processes) was based upon convenience^.
If the parties had to come all the my to the Sadar station to 
institute petty complaints, the main purpose behind the establish­
ment of Munsiffs would be lost. The Munsiffs were allowed to issue
Those were cases in which he himsglf or his relatives or de­
pendants or Vakeels or officers of his Court were personally 
interested.
their own processes because the alternative would be extremely 
impracticable and dilatory.
Though the pecuniary limit of the jurisdiction of Munsiffs 
was left unchanged Regulation XLIX of 1803 made a significant 
change in their jurisdiction with regard to persons. Under 
Regulation 1CL of 1793 their jurisdiction had been kept confined 
to certain specified classes of persons.^ This situation was 
improved by the above Regulation. Row only those cases in 
which an European foreigner or an American was a party, or those 
in which the Munsiff. himself, his relatives or a.dependant 
or the Vakeels or officers of the Court, had a personal interest, 
were excluded from their cognizance. -Cases against all other 
persons (including the Zamindars) were now made triable by them.
b) Law Officers made Sadftr Amfe^ ns (1805)
The agency of Sad^ ir Amiens worked advantageously in re­
lieving the District Courts. During 1805, 7160 suits were re-
2
ferred to them out of which they decided 6393. The continuing
3
pressure on the District Courts made the authorities look for
^See ante p .29 .
2
1.0. Library. Pari. Branch Colls. 1832, Vo. 77, Table in 
Appx. V, No.16.
3See Chap. Ill, p.137-8.
more aid. A further expansion of the Indian agency was the 
easiest and the cheapest solution.^ In 1805, therefore, it 
was decided to multiply the number of Indian Judges. By Re­
gulation XV of that year all the existing Law Officers of 
the District Courts were constituted ex-officio Sadar Ameens.
One Hindu- and one Muslim Law Officer, called Pandit and 
Maul^i respectively, were attached to every District Court.
Their function was to expound the laws from the holy scriptures, 
when called for by the Judge to do so, on a particular case. They 
were to discharge this.new.function in addition to their duties 
as Law Officers. Their powers were to be the same as the other 
Sadar Ameens.
The Law Officers had been respected functionaries in the 
judicial department. They enjoyed a fixed salary inom the Govern­
ment. Prom their experience of sitting in the Courts, witnessing 
the proceedings and interpreting the laws, they were generally 
considered well suited to act as Judges. They might even have had 
plenty of time to spare because their services as Law Officers 
were required by the Judge only when a particularly complicated 
question of Hindu or Mohammedan Law arose.
Regulatinn XV of 1805 also authorised the appointment of 
one or more Sadar Ameens in a District, whenever found advisable,
Because the Indian Judges were not paid any salary by the Govern' 
ment; they derived their income from institution fees. (See 
below, p. 84 )
in addition to the Law Officers. After 1805, the Law Officers 
were called £ad^ ,r Amb^ns and those Sad^ tr Ameens who were not 
Law Officers were designated Additional Sadar Ameens.
c) Sadjtr Amiens granted appellate authority (1810)
By Regulation III of 1800, an appeal was allowed to the
Register from decisions of Munsiffs in all causes up to Rs. 25/“<
This authority was withdrawn from the Registers in 1803. Ly
RegulationXIX of 1803, all appeals from the decisions of
Munsiffs and Sad^ tr Amfe^ ns were made triable by the District
Judge himself. The idea was to keep a direct supervision of the
District judicial officer over the conduct of the Indian Judges.
But the operation of this Regulation led to a large accumulation
of appeals from decisions of Munsiffs on the files of many
Judges.^ In some District Courts they constituted the bulk 
2of arrears.
For example, on 1st Jan. 1809, the number of appeals from 
decisions of Munsiffs pending on the files of some of the 
Judges were: -
Before Chittagong Judge 676
n M Assistant
Judge 710
M Nuddea Judge 996
” Purnea Judge 1,008
" Rungpur Judge 913
1 Midnapur Judge 887
Civ. Judl. Cons.j17th Nov. 1809, No.l.
*Tor instance, of the total of 1,036 suits pending on the file of 
Judge of Rungpur, on that date, 913 were such appeals. Ibid.
It was, therefore, considered necessary to provide some 
relief to the Judges in this direction,* By Regulation XIII 
of 1810, S.11, they were authorised to refer appeals from 
the decisions of Iiunsiffs to the Sad^r Amiens. The latter &■* 
decision on these was to he final unless the Judge-, found 
sufficient reasons to admit a Second or Special Appeal himself.
d) Factors leading to the extension of 
Indian agency in 1814.
The Institution of Indian Judges was being assessed from 
time to tine by the European officers. In 1813, J. T. Shakespear, 
Judge of iTuddea, expressed deep appreciation of the conduct of 
the three Sad^ ir Ambfns of his District. He observed: "... in
such of their proceedings as I have had occasions to inspect, ...
I have had frequent occasions to admire the great perspicuity 
and ability with which their Decrees are drawn out, particularly 
those of Haulvi Uazid, which would do credit to the most ex­
perienced judicial character.... "^
In 1814, R. 0. Uynne, the Judge of Jaunpur, recommending 
the extension of the powers of Sacyir Amiens, remarked:
"... they are, in general, respectable and well 
educated men and are extremely serviceable to the 
community by their superior knowledge of the habits
and customs of the people .... the Head Commissioners 
usually determine a suit within four months of its 
institution /reference/, owing to their superior 
knowledge of Hindu and Mohammedan Law."^
There was no doubt about the usefulness of the Sad£r
Amb^ns. The position with regard to the Munsiffs was somewhat
different. In spite of the fact that they had been accounting
for a large share of the disposal of suits, their utility was
doubted by some. Between 1806 and 1814, three District Judges
recommended their total abolition on grounds of corruption,
2
inefficiency and misconduct. C. Dumbleton, the Judge of 
Gorakhpur, observed: "The low and petty intrigue carried on
in their /Jlunsiffs_^ 7 Courts may be more readily conceived 
than described, ... the District is plundered through their
3
means..."
But on the contrary, their services were appreciated by 
a number of other Judges.
T. Fortescue, the Judge of Allahabad, informed the Government 
that on the average only one-seventh of the decisions of Munsiffs
1
Report of Jaunpur Judge, para. 123 ^ H.M.S. Vol.775, pp. 667-75.
2
They were H. Cornish, Judge of 24 Pargana/s in 1806; C. Dumbleton, 
Judge of Gorakhpur in 1810; and J. T. Shakespear, Judge of Nuddea 
in 1813. Quoted in S.D.A. to Govt. 11th July 1814, Civ. Judl.
Cons. 19th July 1814, Ho.6.
3 1
Report of Alahabad Judge, paras. 62 and 73, H.I-l.S. Vol.776, 
ff. 859-66. *
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were appealed against. They were all referred to the Sadar
Ameens from whose decisions only one-twenty-eighth were
specially appealed to the Judge. In the ultimate analysis
only one-twenty-fifth of the decisions passed by the Munsiffs
were reversed or altered. The Judge regarded such a small
fraction of error as being extremely creditable to the Munsiffs.^
Besides, he remarked, "I think they reach the truth and unravel
the cases, ... better than we can, owing to their superior
2
knowledge of habits and customs of the people.’1 The Judges
c
of Jaunpur and Uuddea expressed identical opinions on the utility 
3of Munsiffs.
Considering the practical problems of judicial administration
the S.D.A. consistently and emphatically advocated the continuation
of these officers. In 1809, they remarked, •......................
"A difference of opinion exists upon the utility of 
the present establishment of Native Commissioners.
But considering the limited number of European 
officers that are, or can be employed in the judicial 
department, it is evident that without the aid of 
the inferior judicatures, it must be utterly impossible 
to provide for the complete administration of Civil 
justice...”4
"^ Report of Allahabad Judge, paras. 62 and 73, E.M.3. Vo"L.776, 
££. 859-66.
2Ibid.
3H.H.S. Vol. 775, rf. 176 and 667.
Civ. Judl. Cons.,17th Nov. 1809, No.l.
In 3814,referring to the recommendations for the abolition 
of Munsiffs,’1'the S.D.A. contended that it would defeat one 
of the principal objects of the arrangements of Cornwallis, which 
was to provide against the inconveniences and expenses of
2
parties in going a long way to the Sadar for legal redress.
They asserted that a fair trial had not been given to the 
Munsiffs yet, because it was wrong to expect honesty and up­
rightness from a class of Judges so long as their remuneration
3
was most inadequate and uncertain.
It was indeed absurd to fliink of abolishing the Munsiffs.
The already overburdened District Courts would have been over­
whelmed with petty suits and a large number of people would 
have gone without legal redress, if the Munsiffs were not retained. 
The situation actually called for a further expansiondT the powers
of Indian Judges. The arrears before the District Judges had been
4 mgradually mounting. More aid was required. The easiest means
^Oee ante, p. ^ q
^S.D.A. to Govt., 11th July 1814, Civ. Judl. Cons., 19th July 
1814, ITo.6.
5Ibid.
4
The number of pending causes on the files of the District 
Judges at the end of 1805 was 15,291. By 1811 it had accumulated 
to 20,541. Pari, Branch Colls^Vol. 77, Table in Appx V, No. 16.
of bringing relief to the District Judges would be to place 
more causes within the jurisdiction of the Sad^ Lr Amiens and 
ITunsiffs. Their numbers could be increased without any
in­
significant financial liability to the Government. The
only obstacle to a large increase in the powers of the Indian
Vi
Judges was a doubt in, their competence. But there could be
v_V'
no objection to a gradual enhancement.
A series of judicial reforms /wasi adopted by the Bengal 
Government in 1814 with the object of making the judicial 
machinery equal to the demand. Under this scheme the powers 
of Indian Judges were enhanced. By Regulation XXIII of 1814, 
the pecuniary limit of the jurisdiction of Munsiffs was raised 
to Rs. 64/- and that of the Sad^r Amfc^ ns to Rs. 150/-
e) Directors* plan of 1814, and its consideration
Prom 1814 onwards strong pressure was exerted on the Bengal
Administration by the Directors for the expansion of the agency
of Indians in judicial administration. The Directors* attitude
on the issue had largely been moulded by Thomas Munro, whose
ideas had a very strong influence both on the Board and the
1
Court between 18G8 and 1815. Munro advised the Directors:
A detailed discussion about Munro’s influence at London has been 
presented in Chap. IV, p. 207.
•w-
The only financial liability that the Government incurred on 
-account of the Indian Judges was a small establishment allowance 
which was granted to the Additional Sadar Ameens after 1805.
See below, p. 96.
MAs much as possible of the administration of justice should 
be thrown into the hands of Natives, and the business of Euro­
pean Judges should rather be to watch over their proceedings
and see that they execute their duty, than to attempt to do
all things themselves.The Directors were also influenced
in favour of extending the participation of Indians by Iienry
2
Strachey, a former Bengal civilian.
In 1814- the Directors forwarded a scheme of judicial re­
forms to the Bengal Government. It was based upon the idea
that the expansion of Indian agency was the only possible way
3
of making the judicial machinery equal to the demand. ’’Double 
the number of Zillah Judges would do little more than 
palliate most feebly, the evil /of accumulation of arrears/.
The Directors were also motivated by the political consideration 
of strengthening the loyalty of Indians to the Company’s Govern-
Munro to Court in 1813. Selection of Papers from records of 
E.I. House. Vol. II, p. 1C5. Quoted in B.S. BaligQ, ’’Influence of 
Home Government on Revenue and Judicial Administration in Bengal”, 
Unpublished London Ph. D. thesis^1955.
2Strachey’s opinion bn Indian Judges (see ante ,.*p.33* ) was
quoted by Directors . Judl. Despatch to Madras, 29th April 1814, Vol.
pp. 302.
3
Judl. Despatch, 9th Nov. 1814, para. 55, Judl Despatches from 
Court of Directors to Bengal, Vol. 3. (Henceforth only the 
.volume numbers of the above series have been quoted.)
Ibid.
ment and preventing discontent by giving them a larger share 
in the administration. Recommending the employment of Indian 
Judges in the administration of Criminal justice, they observed, 
”... there are considerations of general policy which would 
strongly recommend a liberal admixture of native with European 
authority in the Magisterial department, as in the other de­
partments of civil administration.”^
The salient features of the Directors’ plan were as 
follows; -
I Heads of Villages (known as MQmdals, Patwarees or Gomashtas)
were to be constituted village Munsiffs for deciding petty 
Civil disputes,
II At least four Indian Judges of a superior order were to be
employed in every District. They were to be designated
District Munsiffs. One of them was to be stationed at the
Sadar station and the other three were to be distributed 
in the interior. They were to have original jurisdiction 
in causes up to Rs. 200/- and appellate jurisdiction over 
cases decided by Village Munsiffs and Panchayets. These 
Judges were also to have Criminal jurisdiction in petty 
offences.
^Judl. Despatch, 9th Nov. 1814, para. 161, Vol. 3«
Ill The system of Panchayet or assembly of Indian jurors 
for settling disputes was to be officially organised*
The Village and District Munsiffs were to be authorised 
to asserable the Panchayets, for deciding a case, with 
the consent of the parties.
The Bengal Government had already enhanced the powers of 
the Indian Judges^ prior to the arrival of the Directors’ 
despatch. But those reforms apparently fell short of the 
Directors’ suggestions. In 1816, the Directors pointed this 
out to the Bengal Administration and desired them to malce the 
changes suggested under the Judicial despatch of 9th November 
1814.2
But before considering whether to adopt the Directors' 
suggestions, the Bengal Government called for the opinion of the 
S.D.A. on 1heir practicability. The latter forwarded the proposals
to the Judges of Provincial and District Courts and called for
3
their views. After receiving their replies the S.D.A. submitted
4
a report to the Government. On the proposal for the appointment 
of Village Munsiffs, the S.D.A. reported that, while none of the
See ante, p«43*
‘SJudl. Despatch, 10th April 1816, Vol. 4, pp. 39-40.
3
Circular letter of S.D.A. to Provincial and District Courts, 
23rd Nov. 1813. Civ. Judl. Cons., 24th March 1820, Nos, 48-50.
4
S.D.A. to Government, 9th March 1818, Papers on the Judicial 
system of Bengal, Reg (?l) 197.
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Judicial officers had favoured the idea, several had strongly 
objected to it. The greatest objection was that it would be 
impossible to exercise a proper control over such a huge number 
of petty tribunals, scattered over thousands of villages.^
Besides, it was argued that the impartiality of the Village heads 
could not be relied upon in any cases between the Zamindars of 
the area and the ryots. This was because these village authorities 
(i.e. Hundals, KuWwidttins and the Gomashtas) were directly subordinate 
to the Zamindar for whom they collected rent. Thus, people could 
never have confidence in their impartiality. The S.D.A., there­
fore, doubtdd the expediency of vesting the Village Heads with 
any regular judicial authority. As the idea of appointing a 
superior class of Munsiffs in the interior largely depended on the 
creation of the village Munsiffs (whose decisions the latter were 
to revise) the S.D.A. decided against that proposal too.
In 1818, the Bengal Government also called for a report from 
the Madras Administration on the working of the new judicial
system established there in 1816, in conformity with the Directors'
2
suggestion. The report from Madras revealed that in the two 
years since the establishment of village Munsiffs in 1816 (by
^In 1816 there were 150,748 villages in the 28 Districts of Lower 
Provinces (Bengal, Bihar and Orissa)) which gave an average of 5,823 
villages per District. Vide report of J. Shakespear, Superintendant 
of Police for Lower Provinces. Jud.1. Cons.^7th llov. 1817, Ho.12.
2The plan recommended to Bengal had also been sent to Madras. Vide 
Judl. Despatch to Madras, 14th April 1814.
Regulation V of 1815 of Madras Government) -thafr the 32,228
i.
village Munsiffs in that Presidency had disposed of 10,744 causes..
There had also been a general opposition among the judicial
authorities in Bengal to the establishment of Panchayets on an
official basis. One of the senior District Judges, Henry
Shakespear (judge of Rajshahy) remarked: ”1 am of opinion that
the Panchayet can never be established to form an integral part
of our judicial system, ... although I am in favour of every
encouragement being held out to the natives, to submit their
2
disputes to its investigation and adjustment.” The S.D.A. 
advised that the encouragement to be given to the Panchayets 
should be indirect. Ho statutory provision should be made for 
the same. The Panchayets which were organised on an official 
basis in Madras (under Regulation VII of 1815, of that Presidency) 
had not been successful either. Between 1816 and 1818, Pan­
chayets had been called only 457 times by the Village and 
District Iiunsiffe. In theory Panchayets could be assembled by
^Madras Report recorded under Civ. Judl. Cons.524th March 1820,
Nos. 52-55.
2
Quoted in the report of S.D.A.
3
Madras Report referred to above. Civ. Judl. Cons.^24th March 1820 
Nos. 52-55. The Panchayets did not gain in popularity even later 
Between 1822 and 1827, village Panchayets disposed of 199 causes 
and the District Panchayets, 215. Report of Madras Sadar Adalut. 
Civ. Judl. Con^, 15th June 1830, Hoc. 7-10.
all the 32,328 Village and 95 District I-Iunsiffs. The figure 
of only 457 assembles showed that the Panchayets were summoned 
very rarely.
In view of the S.D.A.’s opinion and the Madras report the 
Bengal Government shelved the proposals for creating Village 
Munsiffs, Superior Indian Judges and an officially regulated 
system of Panchayets.
The Directors too, though remaining convinced of the nedd 
of expanding the Indian agency, seem to have abandoned their 
specific proposals of 1814. It is particularly interesting to 
note how they transformed their views on the question of Pan­
chayets. This change was apparently influenced by the objections 
of the Bengal authorities and the failure of Village Munsiffs 
and Panchayets in Madras. Thus in 1827, when the Board expunged 
a certain paragraph from the draft (ho. 424) of a Judicial 
Despatch to Bombay, containing certain observations ag^ainst
Panchayets, no less than eight Directors dissented from the
the paragraph in question by arguing strongly for the unsuitability
were that the ancient system of Panchayets was a device for ad-
Board*s interference. 1 N. B. Sdm0nton€and H. G Tucker defended
of the Panchayets. The main premises of Edmo s arguments
^Court Minutes, 14th Feb. 1827, Vol. 134, pp. 623-29.
ministering justice in the absence of regular tribunals 
established by the Government. The Panchayet was an occasional, 
not a fixed, court, acting under no fixed code of laws, and its
members were continually changing. Under such a tribunal there
could be no security for a regular and impartial administration 
of justice.
Tucker recalled that the object of the arrangements of 1793 
had been to interpose, between the Government and the people, 
an independent authority which could decide issues between them 
'’fairly and fearlessly’1. He argued that it was vain to expect 
that the Panchayet, an assembly of natives as it was, couP 
guard the rights of the subjects against the encroachments of 
the Government and its officers.
■ Tucker*s reasoning seems to have been based, upon the wrong
assumption that the Panchayets were to function as an alternative 
to the established Courts of justice. He failed to realise that 
the Panchayets could very well function as a subsidiary branch 
of judiciary for settling petty disputes. It might never be re­
quired to provide protection against official oppression. That 
job could be left to the regular judicial tribunals.
The Panchayets remained a dying -institution in Bengal. In 
1830 R. D. Mangles, the ex-Deputy Secretary of the Judicial 
Department in Bengal, informed the Parliamentary Committee of
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enquiry that the Panchayets had not been of much use in
any part of the Bengal Presidency,^
The Panchayets had been in common use during the Nawab's
2
administration. This was noticed by Holwell in the 1750s, In 
1775, the Parliamentary Committee of Secrecy also bore evidence
3
to their popularity. In fact, the Panchayet, as a system of 
adjudicating Civil disputes and minor offences among the 
Hindus, was an institution of great antiquity. It survived 
the Muslim and Moghul administrations because of their general 
non-interference with the village communities and the customary 
system of adjudication among the Hindu rural population. The 
village communities retained much of their corporate character 
and acted as instruments of justice particularly under conditions 
of anarchy and lawlessness "when no government existed outside
4
the village capable of giving authority to Court or Judge
Under the Moghul Government Courts presided over by secular
Judges like the Dfcwan, the Mir *Adls, and the revenue officers
functioned only in the urban areas. Kaz&^s were the only judicial 
-
'Holwell, India tracts, pp. 205-4.
L
Evidence of Mangles, 4th March 1830, Pari. Papers, 1830,
Vol. 6, pp. 40-41.
3
7th report of Committee of Secrecy, 1773, Pari. Branch Colls., 1782, 
Vol. 7, pp. 324-25.
4
Henry Maine, Early History of Institutions, pp. 389-90. Quoted 
from B. B. Misra, op.cit., p.223.
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officers employed by the Government in the interior. But 
the kazbes applied the Koranic laws only. Hence the Hindus 
could not approach them for the decision of their Civil 
disputes, which were guided by their own distinct laws, 
customs and usages. The Zamindars who usurped the judicial 
authority from the kazfe^ s were expected to decide the cases 
of both Hindus and Muslims according to their respective laws 
and usages, upon the advice of Brahmins and kazi^s, but 
people could have little confidence in their justice. These 
self-constituted Judges had adopted the custom of appropriating 
a chauth. which was one-fourth or one-fifth share of whatever 
was recovered through their Courts.'*' Such justice, therefore, 
besides being expensive was likely to be vitiated by the selfish 
interest of the Zamindars. Hence the Hindus preferred to 
continue settling their differences through the gatherings of 
their kinsnen.
The situation was greatly changed after the Company took 
over the administration. Courts of various grades presided 
over by professional judges and acting upon fixed rules and 
procedure were distributed throughout the Province and were 
thrown open to Hindus and Muslims alike. The Panchayets were
1
See Chap. I, p.14.
casually constituted tribunals. Their members were continually 
changing. They acted upon no fixed principles or laws and 
their members were most amenable to pressure from the powerful 
persons of the locality. Their justice was often crude, and 
tribal in concept.^ Under these circumstances a general pre­
ference forihe Company’s Courts naturally developed among the 
rural population, even though it meant a sacrifice of time and 
money. In spite of its inadequacy the Company's judicial 
system marked a distinct advance over the indigenous institutions.
There could be another plausible reason for the de­
cline of Panchayets. Under the previous Governments the rights 
of the individual villages were guaranteed only by public 
opinion enforced by the collective will of the village community. 
Hence the individual was made to depend completely upon the 
latter for protection. This position was entirely changed
■^lany instances were reported by the Judges of the Panchayets 
either having failed to do justice, or having acted in the 
most arbitrary and tyrannical manner.For example, in Bundelkhand, 
the settlement of boundary disputes by Panchayets was frequently 
attended by armed clashes resulting in loss of several lives 
which again opened fresh sources of disorder and bloodshed. 
Instances were reported by the Judges of Allahabad and Ramgarh*, 
of prominent persons of the village assembling to try women accused 
of witchqamft and assuming in their own persons "the character 
of prosecutors, magistrates, judges, jury and executioners."
Judl. Letter, 22nd Feb. 1827, paras 26-60, ...
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under the Company's rule. The rights and properties of in­
dividuals were now protected by a set of Regulations to 
which all were equally subject. Those Regulations were to 
be enforced through a system of Courts whose decision had 
the full backing of the governing authority. The establishment 
of the "rule of law" liberated the individual from his de- 
pendance upon the corporate authority of the village community, 
fostered the growth of individualism in society, and infused 
a common desire among people to have their rights tested 
and confirmed—by a Court of law.
a device for administering justice in the absence of regular 
tribunals established by. Government, therefore, holds a good 
deal of truth.
The revival of Panchayets under proper supervision and 
as an integral part of Company's judiciary could have been 
very beneficial. By settling the numerous petty disputes 
on the spot they could bring great relief to the existing 
judicial tribunals. Besides, Ram Mohum Roy asserted that:
"... it is the only system by which the present abuses
-* C.'ee ante p. 49*
above observation^- that the Panchayet was
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consisting of perjury, forgery and corruption, can be removed.1 
But the system could be revtred only by the following measures. 
In the firstplace it had to be organised on an official 
basis. The Panchayets had to be given the full support 
and backing of the Government. But this alone was not 
enough. It was also necessary to make it obligatory for 
the inhabitants of a locality to settle certain kinds of 
disputes through this agency or go without legal redress.
So long as it remained optional for the parties to resort 
to the Panchayets, there would be a tendency in them to 
resort to the Courts to which they had now become accustomed.
It was because of the absence of this element of compulsion 
that the system failed to gain popularity in Madras
^Evidence of Ram Mohun Roy before Srliamentary Committee, 19th 
Sept. 1831. Pari. Papers 1831, Vol. V, pp. 726-36.
in spite of the official backing.
f) Increase of Powers of Indian Judges (l82l)
Though the new judicial agencies suggested by the Directors
in 1814 were not created, the authorities in Bengal had not
been against an extension of powers of the existing Indian Judges.
In 1815, Lord Hastings, the Governor-General, had observed that
the jurisdiction of Sad^ tr Amiens could be safely enlarged to
the limit cognisable by the Registers (i.e. up to Rs. 500/-)
because their decisions were not only easily amenable to the
District Judges’ revision but could be said to be passed under
2
the latter*s own vigilance. But nothing was immediately
done. ^
In 1821, 1/. B. Bayley, the Chief Secretary, advocated
an increase of the powers of the Indian Judges on account of
3
the shortage of European officers. He remarked that:
*Even with the contracted powers at present vested 
in the native judicial officers, most essential 
assistance is acknowledged to have been derived from 
them.... Of the chief defects at present incident 
to the judicial administration, a great part may 
be remedied by the employment of natives to a 
sufficient degree ..."4
Lack of the element of compulsion was actually nominated^one 
of the reasons for the unpopularity of the Panchayets in Madras. 
Report of Madras Commission for revision of judicial system, 
recorded in Civ. Judl. Cons.^24th March 1820, Nos. 52-55*
2
Hastings's Minute, 2nd Oct. 1815, Papers on the Judicial 
system of Bengal^Reg (71) 197.
(cont.)
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Bayley proposed the enhancement of the jurisdiction of 
'Munsiffs to Ss. 150/- generally, aid that of specially qualified 
Sad^ ir Amiens to as.. 500/-. The Sadar Ameens were to be 
authorised to issue their own orders and execute their own 
Decrees as well as those of the Munsiffs referred to them by 
the Judge for execution. The Law Officers were to be authorised 
to decide petty criminal cases on reference from the Magistrate. 
All these proposals were accepted by.t&e Governor-General-in- 
Council and enacted in Regulations II and III of 1821.
g) Enhancement of Powers of Sadjr Amtv\s (1827)
The Directors had ceased to insist on the adoption of 
the arrangements suggested by them to the Bengal Government 
in 1814. But their basic views about the extension of Indian 
agency as the only solution to the problems of judicial ad­
ministration remained unchanged. In 1824, they came out 
with a fresh proposal for transferring the entire original 
jurisdiction to the Indian Judges, leaving the European officers
(cont.)
3
Memorandum of Bayley, 1st Jan. 1821. Civ. Judl. Cons.?19th Jan. 
1021, No. 22. He showed that the working strength of European 
judicial officers in Bengal was much below the required number 
of 191. The number actually employed in 1821 was only 156. Of 
these, 14 were absent on leave, and 8 on special missions.
Bayley remarked that the number of European officers actually 
functioning in the judicial department, at any one time, seldom 
exceeded 130.
"rIbid.
only to try appeals from their decisions and to exercise a 
general supervision over their conduct.^ They argued that 
the existing system of restricting the powers of Indian 
Judges to suits up to Rs. 5G0/- only was wrong because a 
suit of Rs. 500/- may be ’’more difficult to decide and with 
reference to the circumstances of the litigant parties, of
2
more importance than a suit involving ten times that amount".
Cornwallis’s idea of not entrusting Indians with 
positions of responsibility still held a strong influence 
in Bengal. As the above proposal involved a fundamental change 
in the system adopted by him, the Amherst Government were 
hesitant to implement it. They argued that the existing 
system had not been originally framed with a view to such 
an extensive employment of Indians in the judicial department..
In fact, even the extent to which the Indians were thOnhbeing 
employed had not been contemplated. In 1793 it was thought 
that except for petty disputes and matters of inferior importance,
^Judl, Despatch, 23rd July 1824, $&£*■& -IQ,_Vol. 6..-'
Ibid.
3
Judl. Letter, 5th Oct. 1826, paras 7-9* Judl. Letters from 
Bengal to Court of Directors, vol. 10 (hance forth only the 
volume numbers of the series have been mentioned).
the agency of European officers would be adequate. This 
arrangement had not operated to develop a class of Indians, 
qualified by education, experience and influence in the society, 
for holding situations of high responsibility in the judicial 
department.
The successful transfer of almost the entire original 
jurisdiction to the Indian Judges during Bentinch’s admini­
stration only proved that the conservatism of the Amherst 
Government had been ill founded. It is true that the system 
of 1793 did not contemplate any drastic increase in the powers 
of Indian Judges. But practical necessities had already 
forced many modifications in Cornwallis’s structure. The 
powers and functions of Indian Judges had been enlarged in 
1803,-1814 and in .1821. . The. transfer of the entire original 
jurisdiction would be in keeping with the trend already 
established. It would certainly mean a major compromise of 
Cornwallis’s system. But it was necessary for the Bengal 
authorities to discard traditions and lean more on practical 
solutions for their judicial problems.
The majority of the Judges of S.D.A. also opposed such a 
vast increase in the powers of Indian J u d g e s T h e i r  argument
^S.D.A. to Govt., 18th Hay 1827. Civ. Judl. Cons.;12th Sept. 
1827, Nos. 20-25.
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was the same as that of the Government. The only exception
was Alexander Ross, the fifth Judge. He favoured the idea
because the Indian Judges were already accounting for 95 .per cent
of the disposals.^ But the Government were not inclined to
accept Ross!s advice.
Nevertheless, a provision was enacted by the Bengal
Government for increasing the powers of Sad£r Amb^ns. By
Regulation IV of 1827 the O.D.A. was authorised to vest the
Sad^r Amfc^ ns, upon the recommendation of the District Judges,
with special powers to try cases up to Rs. 1,000/-. This was
done both to pacify, to some extent, the Directors in their
demand for the extension of the Indian agency, as well as for
expediency. The number of cases between Rs. 500/- and Rs. 1,000/-
2on the files of many Judges had been heavy. In a large number 
of Districts the assistance of Registers was also not available 
due to the shortage of European civil servants. Authorisation 
of one or more Sad^ tr Am^ns in the District to try causes -. .
"^Ross’s Minute, enclosed in SVDvA* to.:Govt., 18th May 1827. Civ. Judl. 
Cons.?12th Septl 1827, Nos. 20-25-
‘Tor example the number of such cases on the files of some of the 
Judges on 1st July 1827 was as follows: Allahabad - 137;
Kanpur - 197; Ghazeepur - 14-7; Chittagong - 102; Mymensingh - 
100; Tirhoot - 295; Patna - 158, and Gorakhpur - 147. Civ. Judl. 
Cons.;12th Sept. 1827, No. 25.
^See Chap. Ill, pp. 152-3.
up to Rs. 1,000/- would relieve the Judge1s file end make up 
for the absence of.the Register.
Regulation IV of 1827 also removed the restriction on 
°adar Ameens trying causes in which a British subject, a European 
foreigner or an American might be a party. In fact this was 
done in response to a demand from some European residents of 
the interior themselves.^
h) Bentinck!s reforms - 1831
With the arrival of Bentinck the stage was set for some 
revolutionary changes in the judicial structure of Bengal . 
Bentinck had no hesitation in sacrificing tradition for the 
sake of economy and practical needs. His approach was that of 
a practical refQraer. He fully agreed with the Directors* 
suggestion of transferring the entire original jurisdiction 
to the Indian Judges. Replying to a correspondence from William 
Astell, Chairman of the Court, on the subject of extending the 
Indian agency, Bentinck wrote: nI entirely agree with you on
the subject of native agency. I have been always of this opinion 
.... We can not govern the Country without them. The most we
On 17th April 1826 a petition had been presented to the Government 
by Messrs. MerCer, Thomas Rush and other European residents of 
Sillah Fatehgurh, representing against the inconveniences they 
had to suffer in recovering their debts, on account of the Sadar 
Ameens not being authorised to take cognizance of their cases.
Civ. Judl. Cons.; 12th Sept. 1827, Mo. 13*
^/Europeans/ can attempt is control.Nevertheless, Bentinck 
appears to have started with an unfavourable opinion about 
the quality of Indian judicial officers. His friend, J. Young, 
remonstrated with him on this point: ”1 have never ceased to
ruminate on some ihings which fell from your Lordship on Saturday. 
One, in particular, both surprised and grieved me. It was the 
very contemptible opinion you expressed of the natives as
—  2
Munsiffs and Sad|ir Ameens.1 But his prejudice seems to have
been short-lived. In 1331, he justified mailing a large extension
of the powers of the Indian Judges, saying:
”... being fully satisfied that native probity and 
talent may immediately be; found ... in abundance to 
justify the introduction of the present system I 
should have deemed myself criminal, had I any longer 
delayed to concede to the people of this country, a 
measure so eminently calculated to facilitate their 
access to justice...”3
Later hexrote to Charles Grant;
”rj'e make a prodigious boast of our liberality in 
now giving the native Judges of the first instance, 
a salary of Rs. 400/- per month, while your wretched 
Vriter has as much. There will be no want of ablest 
and most virtuous men /lndians7"if only proper increase 
of salary is held out."4
^Bentinck to Astell, 8th June 1829. Bentinck MSS.
2J. Young to Bentinck, 4th July 1830. Bentinck MSS. 
5Judl. Letter, 15th Sept. 1831, paras. 13-15, Vol. 15. 
^Bentinck to Grant, 22nd Dec. 1832. Bentinck MSS.
The detailed plan for the extension of the Indian agency 
was, once again, formulated by 'I. B. Bayley. It was incor­
porated in Regulation V of 1831. Its salient features were 
as follows:
I. The pecuniary limit of the jurisdiction of Munsiffs was 
now doubled (to Rs. 300/-). They were now, for the 
first time, allowed to take cognizance of causes for u real 
propertyas well. They were prohibited, as before, from 
entertaining suits for personal damages, those instituted 
as Paupers, and those in which a British Subject, an . 
European foreigner or an American may be a party. The 
Munsiffs were not given authority to try suits for personal 
damages because their cfecision called for a greater dis­
cretionary authority than it was considered safe to en­
trust to them. They were not allowed to take cognizance 
of cases of British Subjects, Europeans and Americans because 
of the danger of their being swayed by the prestige and 
influence which the latter enjoyed in the Mofussil. But 
the restriction on their trying suits instituted in forma 
paupris appears to have had no valid reason. This 
reservation had originally been made because the source 
of income for the Indian Judges was the institution fees. 
Since it was now decided to provide a fixed salary for
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the Munsiffs,^ there seemed no justification for that re­
striction being continued. The Munsiffs were now given 
the power to try suits for real property but they were not 
allowed to take cognizance of cases concerning lakheraj or 
rent free lands. The reason for this restriction was that 
the value of rent free lands being assessed at eighteen times 
their annual produce, few suits would come within their cog- 
niz’able limit of Rs. 300/-.
A significant provision concerning the Munsiffs was the 
withdrawal of the option to the parties of instituting before 
the District Courts suits that were within the competence of 
Munsiffs. Suits cognizable by Munsiffs now had to be instituted 
before the local Hunsiff (under S.7 of Regulation V of 133l) 
unless the Judge saw some special- reasons to make.an exception . . .
This was done to prevent the growing practice of rich plaintiffs
compelling poor defendants to attend the District Courts just
3
for the sake of harassing the latter.
"Tor the emoluments of Indian Judges see below, pp.93"94*
2
Marginal note on the resolution of Governor-General-in-Council 
on the .proposed changes in judicial administration (n.d.). Bentinck 
MSS Co
Ibid.
jjs. m  Folder No. Pw Jf. 1828, Nottingham University Library.
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II The Sad^r Amfe^ ns were empowered generally to try causes 
up to Rs. 1,000/-. Regulation IV of 1827 had provided 
for such extension to specially chosen Sad^r Am’te^ ns.
But that provision had been very sparingly used.'*' Now 
the grant of increased powers to Sad^r Amb^ns was not 
left to the discretion of the District Judges. By S. 15
of Regulation V of 1831, the authority granted to the Sad^ .r 
Amb^ns by Regulation IV of 1827 to try cases in which 
British Subjects, Europeans or Americans might be a party, 
was withdrawn. Ho reason for this was assigned in the 
contemporary discussion. Prom the vehement opposition 
that the proposal for a revival of authority of superior 
Indian Judges to try cases in which Europeans were concerned 
. received .in 1856 from. the.Europeans.of Calcutta,^ .it may , 
be conjectured that the thinking of Calcutta Europeans 
might have been behind the withdrawal of that authority 
in 1351.
III A new class of superior Indian Judges was created. They 
were Principal Sad^r Amfc/ns, with jurisdiction on cases
^Judl. Letter 18th Aug. 1830, Vol. 12, pp. 455-56.
2
Ninute of Hacaulay,(no date.),: ' ■, Pari. Papers. 1837-58,
Vol. 4t, pp.219- 20 •
"^ The appointment of a superior class of Indian Judges with powers 
similar to Registers (i.e. over suits between Rs. 5C0/- and 
1,C0C/-) had originally been suggested by the Directors in 1828. 
Judl. Despatch, 23rd July 1828, para 23*> Vol. 7.
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between Rs. 1,CC0/- and R9. 5,000/-. Every District 
was to have one Principal Sad^r Anfe^ n. These officers 
were to supply the gap created by the abolition of Re­
gisters, provision for which was now made. The Principal 
Sad^r Imipns were also subjected to the same restrictions 
as the Munsiffs and Sad^ ir Amiens with regard to trial of 
causes in which Europeans were concerned.
It had been intended to transfer nearly the whole 
original jurisdiction to the Indian Judges and reserve 
the entire appellate jurisdiction for the European District 
Judge. Hence the former authority of Sad^ ir Amte^ ns to try 
appeals from decisions of Munsiffs was withdrawn. The 
Principal Sad^ -r Amfc^ ns were also constituted as a court 
of primary jurisdiction. Only when the District Judge 
found his file clogged with appeals from Munsiffs and Sad^r 
Amiens, could he refer some of them to the Principal Sad^ Lr 
Ameyfen^ and that too after seeking the permission of the S.D.A. 
The original jurisdiction of the Principal Sadjir Ame^n was 
limited to Rs. 5»000/- because Bentinck preferred a gradual 
extension instead of a'f suddsi and violent change1*.^
^Resolution of Governor General-in-Council, Bentinck MSS,
Polder no. Pw Jf. 1828, Nottingham University Library.
In 18p8,_ybhe pecuniary restriction on the jurisdiction of Principal 
Sad^r Amb^ns was withdrawn and they were authorised to try suits 
irrespective of amount or value.
Qualifications of Indian Judges:
a) Munsiffs
It had been laid down by Regulation XL of 1793, which 
initially established the Indian branch of judiciary, that in 
the selection of Munsiffs preference was to be given to Zamindars, 
Suberkars (i.e. Managers of Estates of disqualified landlords) 
and to the Tehsildars or Sejawals (who were officers employed 
by the Government for collecting revenues from .khas lands, i.e. 
the lands not settled with any private individual). This prefer­
ence, in favour of Landlords and Managers of revenue, was with­
drawn by Regulation XLIX of 1803, which laid down character and 
ability as the only criteria for selection. In 1814, a class 
preference was again sought to be established. By Regulation 
XXIII of that year it was provided that preference '-was to be 
given to kazj^s, in the selection of subordinate Indian Judges.
Under the system of 1793 no remuneration was provided for 
Munsiffs. Actually the Indian Commissionership was intended to 
be a subsidiary occupation for those profitably employed other­
wise. Hence for supplying these posts a search had to be made 
for persons who would not look for the remuneration from these 
offices, but only to their respectability. The landed aristo­
cracy and those managing the collection of revenue were expected 
to answer this description best. Another consideration might
have been to continue the Civil judicial authority of the 
Zamindars.^ in the new set up. The notion of allying powerful 
Indians with Government might also have worked. Accordingly, 
the semi-official (the Zamindars etc.) and the official (Tehsildars 
and Sejawals) agencies employed in the collection of revenue 
were preferred as Munsiffs. Cornwallis had withdrawn the
2
judicial authority of the Collectors at the District level 
on the principle of 'Separation of Powers'. But that principle 
does not seen to have descended further down.^
The withdrawal of the preference in favour of Zamindars 
and revenue officers in 1803 might have been made for several 
reasons. First, the post of Munsiff had been made remunerative 
In 1795. This precluded the necessity of seeking persons with
other established sources of income.............
Secondly, on practical considerations, most District Judges 
had already kept the selection open to some other kinds of persons 
too, like kaz&Js, respectable inhabitants and former ministerial 
officers of the judicial Courts, etc., rather than confine their
Zee ante, pp. 25-26.
2
Zee Chap, IV, pp. 1 61 — 2 •
3
There was no 'Separation' even at the top. The Company’s highest 
tribunal', the Z.D.A., was to be conducted by the Governor- 
General-in-Council. Zee Cliap. Vi, p-2~5’^ )
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choice to Zamindars and Managers of revenue. In Zillah
Chittagong, for example, twenty-one Munsiffs were appointed
w nThe
in 1795, who were all kazfc^s.^ /difficulty of forming compact 
jurisdictions with the Zamindars (because they were so unevenly 
distiibuted) and the absence of Tehsildars and Sejawals in 
that district (because there were no unsettled klias lands there) 
were advanced by Judge Thompson as the reasons for not appointing 
either. The fitness of Zamindars to be Munsiffs was also in 
doubt. T. Brook, Judge of Beerbhoom, refrained from recommending 
any Zanindar for the commission because he thought that very
This can be deduced from the list of recommendations (recorded 
in the proceedings of the S.D.A.) submitted by the several District 
Judges to the S.D.A. for the appointments. In very few Districts 
were the appointments made exclusively from the Zamindars and 
revenue officers. Such Districts were Mymensingh, Purnea, Ramgarh 
and Tirhoot. In the rest of the Districts the selection had been
mm
primarily from kazkfs, respectable inhabitants, former ministerial 
officers etc.
2S.D.A. Progs., 16th April 1795, No. 49. Under the Moghul system 
the kazees were Civil and Criminal Judges. Besides, they drew 
and authenticated deeds for transfer of property and mortgages 
and conducted religious ceremonies like marriages and adoptions.
But the judicial authority of the kazfe^ s in Bengal declined 
after the weakening of the Nawab's power (See Chap. i). Between 
1772 and 1790, some of the superior kazb^s were employed as 
Judges in the District Criminal Courts. Their judicial functions 
were formally abolished by Regulation XXIX of 1793.
few of then would hesitate in converting the judicial
authority for private gain.**- The nomination of such
unworthy men, he stated, would not only increase the business
of the District Judge by engaging a good deal of his time
in correcting their decisions, but would also open a source
of ^  fraud and peculation'*' in the Mofussil. James Pat tie,
the Judge of Burdwan, considered the Zamindars unsuitable
for that employment because the majority of suits cognizable
by them would be those in which they themselves or their
2dependants would have a direct or indirect interest. Some
of the Zamindars who were commissioned as Munsiffs were found
to have abused their authority. One such examplewas Prithvi
Chand, the Zamindar Munsiff of Parganah Umbaur, in Bhagalpur
District. He had resorted.to the practice of manipulating
to get fahe complaints instituted against persons who incurred
his displeasure and then passing the Decree against the latter.
He had also been seizing the persons or properties of persons,
3pretending that to be within his authorised powers.
h.D.A. Progs., 21st Kay 1795, No. 27.
^S.D.A. Progs., 23rd April 1795, No. 11.
J^. Fombelle, Bhagalpore Judge^to S.D#a., 20th April 1799^ 
S.D.A. Progs.y 2nd May 1799^ Ho. 15.
The institution of Munsiffs was also gradually ceasing
to be a subsidiary occupation. It was becoming a full time
profession. Already the number of causes disposed of by
the Munsiffs in some of the Districts indicated that they
must have been almost fully occupied with that function alone.^
2In 1803 it was decided to reduce the number of Munsiffs.
This would mean the distribution of a greater load per Munsiff. 
And that in turn would demand more time for this function.
This could be a very valid reason for not prefering the 
revenue servants, the Tehsildars and Sejawals, for the appoint­
ments, because their revenue duties would not leave enough time 
for undertaking the additional assignment.
It has not been possible to trace the actual effect upon 
the recruitment of Munsiffs of the stipulation in Regulation 
XLIZ of 1803 that preference should no longer be given to 
Zamindars and revenue officers. The appointment of Indian 
Judges was vested with the S.D.A. The detailed correspondence 
concerning the selection of Munsiffs is, therefore, solely to 
be found in the S.D.A. Proceedings. And that series of records
^*or instance, the average disposals per Munsiff in some of the 
Districts in the month of June 1796 were as follows;
Jessore - 63; Rajshahy - 30; Bihar - 60; Ghazeepur - 37; 
Huddea - 35; S.D.A. Progs.530th Sept. 1796, Ho.16.
is available only up to 1801. Only a few scattered appointments 
are incidentally mentioned from time to time in the proceedings 
of the Government.
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the 
practical effect of opening the employment to all persons of 
character and ability was to exclude the revenue servants com­
pletely and reduce the number of Zamindars in the rani: of 
Munsiff, and increase the preference for persons otherwise un­
employed. Those who would fit best into this category were 
respectable inhabitants by descent,- education and wealth, former 
ministerial employees of judicial Courts and persons belonging 
to the hereditary learned classes such as the Maulvis - or Bralimins . 
It is quite likely that a number of Zamindars were also retained 
as Munsiffs■because better substitutes answering to the require­
ments of character and ability could not be found. Their em­
ployment had not been prohibited by the above Regulation. 
Availability would also be an important factor determining the 
choice.
In 1814 it was ruled that, subject to their ability, prefer­
ence was to be given to the ParganaX and city kaz&fs for selection 
as Munsiffs. The main intention behind this provision was, perhaps, 
to improve the monetary situation of the Munsiffs. In spite of 
of the reduction in their number in 1803 (which could be expected
to improve their income by distributing a greater share of 
cases per Munsiff) the average income derived by them from 
the institution fees had been pitiable.^ By combining the 
office of kaztl with that of Munsiff, it could be hoped that 
the joint income from the two offices would provide them an 
adequate income. Besides^the Tcaz&^s, as a class, had some back­
ground of legal experience which made them preferable to others, 
like the Zamindars, having an extra source of income.
In 1825 H. Shakespear, an officiating Judge of S.D.A., 
observed in the course of a minute on the qualification of
judicial officers that the Parganah kazd^sand Munsiffs were very
2
frequently the same persons. As the appointment of Munsiffs
*
was still not made by the Government the official judicial 
consultations rarely make aiy mention of their qualifications or 
antecedents. It has not been possible to discover exactly what 
kinds of persons were actually appointed to those situations in 
the period following 1814. All the same, it has been possible 
to check the correctness of Shakespear’s above statement. In 
1828, as a preliminary to reforming the office of Munsiff, the
■^ See below, pp. 89-90.
2
Committee of Public Instruction to Government, 17th March 1825. 
Civ. Judl. Cons.y22nd SeptI 1825, No. 15.
In 1814 that function was transferred to the Provincial Courts 
in order to relieve the S.D.A. of a portion of its Miscellaneou 
duties.
Government had called for a report on the income derived
by these officers from their employment as Munsiffs, and
from the kazfe^ships. The returns from the "various Provincial
Courts give the exact number of Munsiffs who were also kazfefs.^
Of the 111 Munsiffs in the Calcutta Division, only fifteen
held the additional employment of kaze^. In 1795, all twenty-
— r- 2
one Munsiffs of Chittagong had been kazc/fes. In 1828 there
were fifteen Munbiffs functioning there. Only five, or thirty
-  t - 3
per cent of them, were kazte^ s. In Murshidabad Division 
twenty-six out of 136 Munsiffs were kaz&^s, in Barailly only 
seven out of seventy-three, and in Benares only two out of 
seventy-four. The highest proportion of kazfe^ fs employed as 
Munsiffs was in the Patna Division where thirty out of seventy- 
nine, or approximately 37 per cent of the Munsiffs were kazfe^ s.
It is obvious from the above figures that Shakespear’s 
statement that Munsiffs and kazfe^ s "were very frequently the same 
persons" is not born out by facts. The ignorance of a Judge of 
S.D.A. about the personnel of Munsiffs indicates that the Com­
pany’s highest tribunal had almost ceased taking any interest 
in those appointments, after that function had been delegated to
^The reports from the Provincial Courts are recorded under Civ. 
Judl. Cons.,12th Oct. 1830, Mo s. 14-44.
2S.D.A. Progs.727th May 1795, No.3.
Civ. Judl. Cons*, 12th Oct. 1830, No. 27.
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the Provincial Courts in 1814.
The reason for kazb^s not having been given a general 
preference in the selectins must have been that their 
situation ms gradually getting dislocated. Their loss of 
judicial authority must have greatly reduced their consequence.
Their other extra-religious functions (like drawing and
^ from
authenticating deeds), the gratuities / which formed a major 
source of their livelihood, were also usurped by the Zamindars 
in some areas'!' Most kazb^s were now reduced to the position 
of priests performing marriages and other religious cere­
monies . Under these circumstances most of them were left 
without any significant income. T. Fortescue, the Judge of 
Allahabad, remarked in 1814: "The functions of kazi^s have
almost solely subsided... , their former name and influence 
have both sunk to the lowest pitch...” Hence, combining 
the office of kazb/£s with that of Munsiffs would neither 
bring an addition to the latters1 prestige nor to their income.
In Benares Division only two kazb^s were appointed Munsiffs. 
The reason given by the Provincial Courts was that most kazees
"4)acca Provincial Court to Govt., 13th June 1828, Civ. Judl.
Cons., 12th Oct. 1830, Ho. 27.
^Fortescue to Govt., lot Sept. 1814, H.I1.3. Vol. 776,
ff. 659-666.
* — —
The kazfees were prohibited from demanding any fees for such services 
(by Regn. XLVI of 1803), but they were allowed to receive the con- 
sideratinns voluntarily submitted.
of the Parganajts (sub-divisions of the Districts) had left 
their stations and taken up residence in the cities, in search 
of a better livelihood. Though officialy those persons still 
continued to be the kaze^s of their respective Pargana^s their 
dities were being performed, by proxy, by others.^
In general, therefore, only those kazfe^ s seem to have been 
preferred for the appointments who were available at their 
station and were earning a sizeable income from that situation.
The reason for the employment of a higher percentage of kazi^s 
as Munsiffs, in the Patna Division, was exactly the same. For 
instance, in Zillah Behar, many of the Parganah kazfefs enjoyed 
a small fixed salary from the Government and also earned some 
income from fees. They had all been appointed Munsiffs. The 
net income (salary and fees) of some of the kazb^s (for example
those of Hulasganj, Jehanabad and Baur) considerably exceeded their
1 2 emoluments from the Kunsiffship. In Shahabad District seven
out of ten Munsiffs were also kazbes. Most of them derived
3
considerable income from that office.
$enares Provincial Court to Government, 13th June 1828. Civ. Judl. 
Cons.j12th Oct. 1830, No. 43.
2
Civ. Judl. Cons.; 12th Oct. 1830, No. 42.
'■’ibid.
The selection of Munsiffs in the post-1814 period continued 
to be kept open to all classes of persons inspite of the class 
preference laid down by Regulation XXIII of 1814. Kazffs 
were appointed where they were available and where the union 
of their office with that of Munsiff was expected to improve 
the latter’s income. Th6-' position regarding employment of 
kazfe<jG as Munsiffs must have been very nearly the same between 
1803 and 1814. The low income of the office would not usually 
attract men of education and talent. Hence while making the 
appointments the Judges must often have compromised standards 
with availability.
The variety in the selection is borne out by a couple of
isolated instances of these appointments, incidentally referred
.to in the official, consultations. In 1818 Ayodhhya Prasad, a
former Persian Mohurrir (writer) of Benares City Court, was
appointed Mnnsiff of Pargana.. Sundah in-the District of Gorakhpur.
In 1826 one Khundkar Muzeebuddin was nominated Sadar Munsiff
of Junglemahal. The latter had never held any public employment.
He had been educated in the Calcutta Kadarsa, was versed in
2
Mohammedan law and read both Persian and Bengali. In 1828,
^Civ. Judl. Cons.jl4th Aug. 1811, H o .11.
2
Civ. Judl. Cons., 22nd June 1826, No.38.
Danwar Singh, a small Zamindar, was functioning as Munsiff
at Chatra in the District of Ramgarh.^ He was described as
the most efficient Munsiff of that District. In Zillah Behar
2
too there were a number of Zamindars acting as Munsiffs.
An instance of a Government Pleader having been appointed 
Munsiff is also found. He was Maulvi Ghulam Ibrahim, the 
ex-Government Pleader of Mymensingh who was appointed the 
Munsiff of Thana (Police jurisdiction) Hetrokona in 1825.^
But such instances of a Pleader being selected Munsiff were 
very rare. In 1632, Holt Mackenzie, a distinguished ex­
civilian of Bengal, stated that seldom "if at all” were
4
Indian Judges selected from the Pleaders. Lack of confidence 
in, and respect for, the Pleaders in general must have been 
the reason for not establishing a link between the Indian Bar 
and the Bench. Ram Kohacn Roy stated in 1831 that the Pleaders, 
particularly of the District Court, were ’’treated as an inferior
5
caste of persons”.
^Civ. Judl. Cons., 12th Oct. 1830, Mo.42.
Ibid.
3
Judge of Mymensingh to Government, 21st April 1825. Civ. Judl. 
Cons., 27th March 1826, Mo.17.
4Evidence of Holt Mackenzie before Parliamentary Committee of 
Enquiry, 16th March 1832. Pari. Papers 1832, Vol. 12, pp. 15-16.
5
Evidence of Ram Mohan Roy, 19th Sept. 1831. Pari. Papers 1831. 
Vol. V, pp. 728-29. J
Hhen the office of Sadjir Amfe^ ns was created in 16C3, no
specific qualification was laid down for it. The appointment
was made open to all persons of ability and character. ITo
change was made in this criterion for the rest of the period
under review. Like that of Munsiffs, the appointment of Sadjir 
— *
Amfc^ ns was also originally vested with the S.D.A. on the
District Judge's recommendation. In 1814 this duty too was
transferred to the Provincial Courts. Hence, once again, it
is not possible to discover in detail the numbers or qualifications
of the Sad^r Amb<|ns that were appointed in the period following
1803- Prom 1817 the Bengal Government adopted the practice
of compensating those Additional Sad^r Am'fe^ ns whose incomes
averaged below Rs. 100/-* per month in spite of. their, reasonable
efforts in disposing of cases.^ The recommendations forwarded
from the District Judges to the Government (through the S.D.A.)
for compensatinn to individual Sad^ .r Amb^ns give some idea
of the type of persons who were holding those posts. In 1824,
the Sadar Ameens were made regular salaried servants of the 
2
Government. Sanction of Government now became necessary for
■^ See below, p. 97 •
2
See below, p. 100.
■ft "
Prom 1805 11 Additional Sadtr Ambers” because from then onwards 
the Law Officers became Sad^ .r Amb^ns, see ante, p. 37.
every appealtment. Hence after that date their selection was 
recorded in the official consultations, from which full details 
are available concerning their experience and qualifications.
In general, the selection of Additional Sad$ir Ame^ns was 
made from those who had formerly held ministerial offices of 
Peshkars, Hazirs and Sheristedars in the Provincial or District 
Courts, and ft*om persons of recognised academic attainments. 
Sometimes ex-Hunsiffs were also selected for the post. But 
such appointments were very rare. The system of promotion had 
not come into being in respect of Indian Judges. Hot one in­
stance of a Pleader having been appointed Sad^r Amfe^ n is to 
be found. The reason which must have weighed against their 
selection as I-lunsiff would have advocated even more strongly 
against their recruitment to a superior rank. A few city kazi^s 
were also appointed.
Selection of Additional Sadjir Anfc^ ns was not confined to 
Indians only. A few Anglo-Indians and Europeans were also 
appointed. In 1814, Peter Turnbull, son of an Englishman by 
an Indian wife, was acting as the Additional Sad^ tr Amfc|n of 
the Suburbs of Calcutta.^* In 1823 one Henry Cooper had been 
functioning in the same capacity at Ghazeepur, and another,
^Civ. Judl. Cons.j 12th Jan. 1816, Ho. 2.
Benjamin Bartjat Hurshidabad. James Riley was acting at
2 -r-
1-Iymensingh and Kerklots at Burdwan. After the Sadf,r Amb^ns 
were made salaried servants in 1824, a number of Civil 
and Assistant Surgeons, posted in the Districts, were nomin­
ated to hold the office of Additional Sad^ ir Amb^ns as an 
extra duty. For example, in 1825, the Assistant Surgeon 
of Zillah Behar (Henderson) was appointed Additional Sad^ tr 
Amb^n cf that station.^ In 1826 Richard Shaw, Assistant 
Surgeon of Shahabad, was appointed Additional Sad^r Amb^n for
4
that District at his own request. In the same year, Reynolds,
5
the Assistant Surgeon of Dinagepur, was appointed likewise.
In 1828 J. Morton, the Civil Surgeon of Zillah Rungpur, was
6similarly commissioned. The extra income from salary for 
the appointment, must have, been the attraction for the Surgeons, 
who were lowl^paid. Like the Law Officers, the Surgeons too 
must have had sufficient leisure to undertake this additional
^Annual Report for 1823, Civ. Judl Cons.^ 10th 1-Iarch 1825, Ho. 20.
2Ibid.
■5
Civ. Judl. Cons., 19th Jan. 1826, No.11.
^Civ. Judl. Cons., 31st Aug. 1826, Nos 6 and 7.
5
Civ. Judl. Cons., 5th Oct. 1826, Nos. 5 and 6.
Ibid.. lios. 14-16.
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occupation. As to legal training, they had none. But neither had
many of the Indians who were recruited. The expectation of
the British educated surgeon1s ability to apply the Regulations
and form reasonable judgements was probably the justification
for his selection. His efficiency was never doubted. On tie
contrary, Jachson, the Judge of Behar, reported to the Government
that Assistant Burgeon Henderson was the most efficient of the
four Sadjir Anb^ns of his District and the local inhabitants had
more confidence in him than in the three Indians acting in the
same situation.^
In 1805 the Law Officers were constituted ex-officio Sad^ lr 
2
Anib^ ns. The duty of a Law Officer was to expound the laws 
applicable to the cases (mainly of inheritance and succession)5 which 
had to be decided in accordance with the Hindu or Mohammedan Laws. 
They were, therefore, required to be versed in the laws of their 
respective religions. Their knowledge of the Hindu and Mohammedan 
Canons was certainly a very desirable qualification in deciding 
cases of inheritance and succession. But this very asset tended 
to become a disqualification when they were called upon to decide 
cases not governed by the religious laws. This was particularly
^Jackson, Bfihar Judge to Government, 15th Jan. 1828. Civ. Judl.
Cons.jplst Jan. 1828, Ho.26.
2
See ante, P-37.
true of some of the Muslim Law Officers who tried to decide
all cases according to their religious convictions rather than
in conformity with the Regulations or''justice, equity and
good conscience11. For example, in 1828, the Judge of Behar
reported that although Cayfulla was a very able Muslim Law
Officer of his Court, the latter1s decisions as Ead^r Amkfn
were deeply influenced by his religious prejudices and were,
therefore, often objectionable.^ Mohammad Mazid, the Maulvi
Sadjir Amb^n of Bhagalpur had refused to grant interest to
the creditors because it was repugnant to the doctrines of
Koran, in spite of the latter's being entitled to it by the 
2
Regulatinns.
These reasons led the Government to discontinue the^rstem 
of constituting Law Officers as ex-officio Sad^r Amb^ns. It 
was provided by Regulation V of 1831 that only those Law 
Officers were to be appointed Sad^ .r Amb^ns who were found fit 
to hold the latter assignment.
c) Principal Sadftr Ambfeis
For Principal Sadar Ameens, too, no statutory qualification 
was prescribed. The office: , was open to Mnatives of India of
2*
Resolution of Governor-General-in-Council, ICth Oct. 1830.
Civ. Judl. Cons., 12th Oct.1830, No.80.
1 r
JCiv. Judl.Cons.,31st¥ J a n .1828, N o .26 .
any class or description11. ^ Nevertheless, the selection of 
these Judges was made mostly from Indians with a sufficient 
amount of experience as Sadar Ameens.
Remuneration of Indian Judges 
a) Hunsiffs
No remuneration was provided for the Munsiffs under the 
arrangements of 1793 because they were intended to be re­
cruited from classes who had other sources of livelihood.
Respect fvrjthe office .was the only incentive offered. But 
it was realised soon that some monetary consideration had 
also to be provided. In several Districts none offered
to accept the office due to the lack of any pecuniary ad- 
2
vantage. Hence in 1795,- when the system of institution . . 
fees was revived (by Regulation XXXVIII of that year) it 
was provided that the Munsiffs were to receive the entire 
amount of institution fees (varying between two and five 
per cent of the amount or value of the case) in suits 
decided by them or adjusted by Razeenamah . By Regulation
^Regulation V of 1831, S.17.
2S.D.A. Progs., 16th April 1795, Nos. 49-52.
3
The fees on institution of causes had been abolished by Cornwallis 
on the benevolent consideration of making justice inexpensive .
Razeenamah = petition of compromise.
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XIII of 1810 a provision was ms.de for the refund of in­
stitution fees to the parties in cases adjusted by Razeenamah.
The entire fee was to he refunded if the compromise petition 
was filed before the completion of Pleadings, and half i£ 
after the culmination of that process. This enactment had 
been made in pursuance of an instruction from the Directors.^
Its purpose was to save the time of the Courts by encouraging 
mutual adjustments. The rule was initially made applicable to all 
the Courts including those of the Indian Judges. The Ilunsiffs
2were badly affected by its operation because a large proportion
of the suits disposed of by then consisted of adjustments by
Razeenamah. The S.D.A. had already protested against making
the above provision applicable to Ilunsiffs, saying "the measure
would hit■the-Hative Commissioners particularly hard as it........
would deprive them of a considerable portion of their already meagre 
3
income".
After the promulgation of this Regulation the I-lunsiffs 
naturally started discouraging adjustments'^ Razeenamah. While • 
in tie year preceding the promulgation of the Regulation adjustments
■^ Judl. Desoatch, 25'th Awril 13C6, para 6, Vol. I. 
)
'or details see below, p. 108.
>0Resolution of S.D.A., 6th Dec. 1806. Civ. Judl. Cons.jllth Dec. 
1806, ITo.9*
"by compromise had formed nearly 60 per cent of their total 
disposal, in the year following 1810 the percentage fell to about 
twenty-seven.^ But even 27 per cent was a high enough figure to 
make a substantial cut in their incomes, which depended entirely 
on tie institution fees. In 1814 the Judge of Burdwan reported to 
the S.D.A* that one conscientious Munsiff, Ghulam Imam of Pargana 
£atilpur, had resigned, stating that his income had been so much 
reduced by the operation of Regulation XIII of 1810 that he could
not support himself unless he discouraged the parties from filing
  2
razeemamahs - an offence he would not commit. In 1814 the
average income of the nine Munsiffs of Zillah Allahabad did not 
exceed Rs. 9/- per month.^
The S.D.A. always subscribed to the opinion that the improve­
ment of the financial position of the Munsiffs was the key to 
the reform of the office, which was so vital to the judicial ad­
ministration. Better remuneration would attract better men to 
the office and, at the same time, reduce the incentive to cor­
ruption. In 1809 they suggested:
MA radical defect in the existing system [of Hunsiffs7~ 
would be remedied by allowing the Commissioners a 
sufficient fixed salary, instead of the inadequate 
and precarious compensation now received by them from 
institution fees, which is supposed to occasion the 
institution of numerous suits that would not be brought 
forward, if the Commissioners had no interest in 
promoting them.f1^
^See below, pp. 107“9*
Q
Burdwan Judge to S.D.A* (n.d.), Civ. Judl. Cons., 17th July 1814, 
Ho. 6, Appx. I.
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They reiterated the above argument more emphatically in 1814,
and recommended that if a fixed salary could not be provided
for them, they should be employed in some additional duties
for which they may receive a compensation. They also called
for the abolition of the provision regarding the refund of
2
institution fees, in respect of the Indian Judges.
The S.D.A.’s efforts bore fruit. Though the Bengal Ad­
ministration was not yet willing to incur the financial liability 
of paying a fixed salary to more than five hundred Munsiffs 
they endeavoured to improve the income of those officers in 
some other ways. The following provisions of Regulation XXIII
of 1814 were calculated to have that effect: 
were
1. Indian Judges/conceded the full amount of institution 
. . fees, or thevalue of.Stamp Duty substituted for in­
stitution fee$ in all cases disposed of by them, whether 
by decision on merits or adjustment by Razeenamah
(cont.)
^Report of Fortescue, illlahabad Judge, 1st Sept. 1814. H.M.S.
Vol. 775, $£. 859-66.
^S.D.A. to Government, 3rd Nov. 1809. Civ. Judl. Cons.?17th Nov. 1809, 
No. 1.
^S.D.A. to Government, 28th June 1814, Civ. Judl. Cons.} 19th July 
1814, No.6.
^Civ. Judl. Cons.y17th July 1814, No.6.
(cl. 2.S.49 of the Regulation). Regulation III of 
1810 was thus made inoperative in respect of Indian 
Judges.
II The jurisdiction^ of Munsiffs was enhanced to include 
causes up to Rs. 64/-. This would bring more causes 
within their competence and accordingly make a pro­
portionate increase in their income from fees.
III Provisions were made for some additional employments 
for Munsiffs. They could be employed in attachment or 
sale of property in execution of Decrees, and in de­
livering formal possession of lands, houses or other 
real property in fulfilment of Decrees. For both 
services the Munsiffs were entitled to receive
one anna per rupee of the total value of the property 
conveyed. They could also be engaged for local in­
vestigations in cases (pending before the District 
Judge) relating to adjustment of accounts in revenues 
or mercantile transactions, or those concerning bound­
aries of lands or rights of ways, and in all questions 
relating to local rights and usages which might not
See ante, p. 45•
Regulation XXIII of 1814, 3.8. Cl. 1.
be easily determined without an investigation on the 
spot. For these jobs too the Ilunsiffs were to receive 
a suitable remuneration determined, by the District 
Judge.
IV Lastly, provision was made for combining the office 
of kaz&e with that of MunsiffR
The plan for improving the income of Munsiffs by generally
joining the office of kasfc^  with theirs could not be imple-
2
mented effectively,while the other provisions for improving
the income of Ilunsiffs were, in practice, offset by another .
rule (s.13, Cl. l) of the same Regulation, which restricted
the cognizance of Ilunsiffs to suits whose causes of action
had arisen not more than one year before their institution.
This clause had been-intended to guard against excessive and ■ ■
frivolous litigation in the Courts of Munsiffs. In effect it
caused a sharp decline in the number of suits instituted before
3
them and a proportionate decline in the number disposed of.
Their income from fees was consequently much reduced. Certain 
reports from the Districts showed that in spite of the provision
■Regulation XXIII of 1814, S.G, Cl. 1.
p
'"For details see ante, pp. 74“'76.
See below^pp. 109-10.
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| made in 1814 for the increase of emoluments of Munsiffs,
! i
| their income remained pitiable. The Judge of Bundelhhand in­
formed the S.D.A. that during the twelve months between August 
1815 end August 181b the income of fourteen Ilunsiffs of his
i
i 2
I District had averaged Rs. 6/2 per month. From this amount
! they were expected to maintain an establishment of Clerks and
Peons, and also provide for their own subsistence. The Judge
| of Rajshahy reported that during 1015 the average income of
ii 7
| eighteen Munsiffs of his District had been Rs. 15/- per month.^
i A great inequality prevailed in .their incomes. Some Ilunsiffs
; earned up to Rs. 60/- per month, but many not even Rs. 15/-.
The restriction of one year was withdrawn for this and 
other reasons in 1817. By Regulation XVII of that year the 
cognizance of Munsiffs was extended to suits whose causes of 
action had arisen no more than three years prior to their in­
stitution. This produced an immediate effect. The number of
^S.D.A. too Government, 9th March 1813. Papers on the Judicial 
system of Bengal^ Reg (71) 197.
2
Bundelkhand Judge to S.D.A., 9th Nov. 1816. Enclosed in S . D . A .fs 
letter to Government, 9th March 1818. Papers on Judicial system 
of Bengal^ Reg (7l)l97.
^Rajshahy Judge to E.D.A., 25th June. 1816. Ibid.
suits instituted and decided before the Ilunsiffs nearly 
doubled, between 1817 and 1820.^
In 1323, in reply to a query circulated by the g.D.A. 
among the District Judges, it was revealed that Munsiffs 
were commonly being employed in sale of properties and
2
delivering possession of lands in the execution of Decrees.
In Zillah GcTakhpur the provisions for the additional employ­
ment of Munsiffs seem to have been very extensively applied 
with the result that most of the Munsiffs of that District
3
had been deriving a considerable income from those sources.
Some of them even earned more from these : avenues than from 
deciding cases. For example, during the three years 1825,
1826 and 1827 the total income of the Munsiff of Silcriganj 
had averaged Rs. 108.4 per month. This amount had been made ■ ■ 
up by the average monthly income of Rs. 65.8 from the additional 
employments and only Rs. 42.6 from the fees. Likewise, 58 per cent 
of the total monthly income of the Munsiff of Hunjhauly, during 
the same period, came from the additinnal sources.
See below, p. 111.
^Civ. Judl. Cons.^15th May 1825, N0o.
^Report of A. M. Bird, Gorakhpur Judge (n.d.), Civ. Judl. Cons., 
12th Oct. 1850, No.42.
It may therefore he assumed that the income of Munsiffs 
generally improved after 1817. But a great inequality existed, 
nevertheless, in the individual earnings of these officers.
'This was caused by the variation in the judicial business 
from area to area. For example, the Munsiff of Thakurgaon 
in the District of Dinagepore had earned, on the average, Rs. 250/- 
per month during the years 1826, 1827 and 1828, while most of 
the other Munsiffs in the same District earned even less than 
Rs. 50/- per month.^ In Behar, the net income of the Munsiff 
of Gaya averaged Rs. 100/- per month while that of the Munsiffs 
of Eulasganj averaged only Rs, 30/- per month. The Munsiff 
of Arrah, in Zillah Shahabad, earned Rs. 162.7 per month on 
the average, that of Barun in the same District only Rs. 7.5.
In 1828 there were 539 Munsiffs in Bengal. In 1830 it was 
decided to retrench those Munsiffs whose incomes from institution 
fees averaged below Rs. 50/- per month.^ Under the operation
5
of this rule the number of those officers was reduced to 222.
^Civ. Judl. Cons.., 12th Oct. 1830, 170 . 31.
2Itid.. Ho.42.
^Ibid.
^See below,p. 94-
5
Report of Law Commission on ’Native Judicature’, 17th May 1843, 
para. 38. 1.0. Reg. (71) 153.
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This indicates that before 1831 more than half the Kunsiffs
had been earning less than Rs. 50/- from institution fees.
The answer to this inequitable situation was the institution
of a fixed salary. The S.D.A. had from the beginning advocated
that measure'!’ The Directors, too, considered the grant of
an adequate allowance the best means of improving the quality
of Indian Judges. In 1824 they wrote:
"... when wo place the natives in situations of trust 
and confidence, wo are bound under every consideration 
of justice and polity to grant them adequate allowances.
4e have no right to calculate on their resisting 
temptations, to which the generality of mankind,in the 
same circumstances would yield.
In 1825 the I-iunsiffs of Rungpur were allowed a fixed salary
of Rs. 50/- per month besides a monthly allowance of Rs. 20/-
for keeping an establishment.^  This, however, was done on an 
experimental basis. The allowances were to be continued only 
if the Ilunsiffs maintained proper diligence. It was feared 
that the institution of a fixed salary would make the Indian 
Judges slacken in their disposal of suits. But it was not con­
sidered that so long as their income depended on the number of 
suits disposed of, there existed the opposite danger of those 
officers deciding suits in haste without proper deliberation.
1-gee ante, pp.86-87.
2
Judl. Despatch, 23rd July 1824, para 13, Vol. b.
I
"Civ. Judl. Cons.j3rd Nov. 1825, Do. 7.
However, it was finally resolved in 1830 to grant a fixed
salary of Rs. ICO/- per month to all the Munsiffs.'*' This
reform was in keeping with the simultaneous enhancement of
the powers of the Ilunsiffs. Besides, the undiminished exertion
of the Sad^ .r Amfe^ ns after the institution of a fixed salary
2for them in 1824 might have reduced the apprehension among
the authorities of slackness in the Indian Judges. But the
Government was not willing to incur any heavy financial liability
on account of payment of salaries to the Munsiffs. The idea
cent
was that about %  per/of the charge should be covered by the 
income from institution fees which would now be received by 
the Government. Accordingly it was resolved to revise the 
establishment of Ilunsiffs following the rule that those I-Iuns iff- 
ships of which the incomes from institution .fees, averaged 
below Rs. 50/- per month were to be abolished and their juris-
3
dictions combined with one or more of the adjoining Courts, 
b) Sadftr Amfc^ ns
When the office of Sad^ ir Ame^ns was established in 1803 
the system of remuneration was kept the same as for the Munsiffs,
"^Resolution of. Governor-General-in-Council, 10th Oct. 1530, paras 
6-12. Civ. Judl. Cons.; 12th Oct. 1830, No.80.
^See below, p. 1 1 2 .
3
Resolution of Governor-&eneral-in-Council, 10th Oct. 1830, 
paras. 10-12. Civ. Judl. Cons., 12th Oct. 1830, No. 80.
that is the retention of the institution fees.^ In 1805 
the Hindu and Muslim Law Officers were made Sadfir Ame^ns.
a , ,
They were already receivnny^fixed salary of between Rs. bC/- 
and Rs. 90/- per month from the Government. They too were 
to receive the institution fees. This created a big; gap between 
the incomes of Law Officer Sad^ ir Amfc^ ns and the full time 
Sadar Ameens who had to depend entirely on the institution 
fees. It might have been thought that the latter, being 
able to devote the whole of their time to the job, would be 
able to dispose of enough cases to earn an adequate income 
for their own subsistence as well as for maintaining an 
establishment. But this was not so. Prom 1803 petitions
T* *
poured in from the Sadftr Arnfe^ ns of various Districts com­
plaining of the inadequacy of their income in relation to their 
expenses, and praying for a grant of establishment allowance.
The Sadjir Amfe^ n of Mymensingh stated that his income from
the institution fees in the preceding six months had averaged
Rs. 34.5 per month, while he was required to keep an establishment
2 V
costing Rs. 75/- per month. The Sadjfa* Amfe^ n of Dacca Jelalpur
I^Jnder Regulation XIXL of 1803.
2
Civ. Judl. Cons., 21st Sept. 1804, Ho. 2.
After 1805 they became Additional Sad^r Ameens.
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stated his average income to be only Rs. 48/- per month when
his establishment alone cost Rs. 80/- per month.^ Similar
representations were received from the Additional Sad^ ir Amfe^ ns
2
of Behar, Dacca City, Rungpur, I-Iyniensingh and Jessore. Im­
pressed by the genuineness of the grievances the Bengal Govern­
ment granted a fixed allowance to the Additional Sadjh? Amfe^ ns 
for the exigences of keeping an establishment. The amount varied 
from Rs. 40/- per month to Rs. SO/- per month, depending upon 
the size of the establishments considered necessary by the
local District Judges.J ........
The enactment of the Regulation of 1810 regarding the refund
of institution fees in cases adjusted by Razeenamah affected.
*r*. *the income of Sad^ .r Amfcpns too. A sizeable proportion of the
suits was being settled by-that mode■even after the enactment of 
the above Regulation.
It has been noticed above that in 1314 this provision was 
made inapplicable in respect of Indian Judges. The jurisdiction 
of Sad^ ir Amfc^ ns was also extended up to Rs. 150/- by Regulation
^Civ. Judl. Cons., lltli April 1805, ITos. 8 and 9.
^Civ. Judl. Cons., 16th ilay 1805, No. 10.
/ibid.
4 0 / 1Bor example during 1811, 17.5 /o of the total disposal by Sadf.r 
AmiTTfcns had been by adjustments. Oee below, pp.
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A'AIU of 1814. It the same time provision was made for seme 
additional remunerative employment for those officers hsnfor 
the I-Iunsi'ffs. Under 3. 76 of Regulation X'CIII of 1814 matters 
of accounts or of us ageJ-could be referred to the Additional 
Sad^r Amb^ns for their investigation and report. For this 
they mere to be paid a suitable fee determined by the Judge.
The first two reforms mere calculated to increase the incomes 
of Sad^r Amiens in general, the last, that of Additional 
Sadjtr Antons in particular. On the expectation that the 
Additional 3 ad Jar Amb^ns would non have an .adequate income, 
both for their oira subsistence and for maintaining an establish­
ment, the Government decided, in 1816, to discontinue the 
establishment allowances granted to the Additional Oad^ .r Amb^ns 
after 1803.^ But it, was . ruled,, at the same time, that in 
instaaices where the income of an Additional Sad^r Anb^n might 
average below Rs. ICO/- per month, in spite of his reasonable 
exertion for disposal of suits, those officers were to be 
compensated by the Government to the extent of raising their 
average earnings to Rs. 100/- per month. Fromifie recommendation
^Judl. Letter, 4th July 1817, Vol. 6.
2Xbid.
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forwarded by the S.D.A. to the Government for such compensation,
it is revealed that during 1822, nineteen Additional Sadftr
Anbfns had earned less than Rs. ICO/- per month on the average.'1'
The total number of Additional Sad^r Amb^ns employed during
2
that year was forty-two. This indicates that in spite of
the measures of 1814 the earnings of about • one half of
the Additional Sad|.r Amiens had been below Rs. 100/- per month,
/
during that year. In the following year (1823), too, eighteen
out of forty-one of those officers had to be compensated
because tieir incomes had been less than Rs. 100/- per month.^
One hundred and thirty Sad^r Aniens(including both Law
Officers and Additional Sad^ tr Amb^ns) were employed during
4
the years 1821, 1822 and 1823. The average of fees annually 
received by then amounted to Rs. 114,098/-.  ^ On thisbasis 
the monthly income of each of the 130 Sad^ lr Amb^ns averaged
1Annual Report for 1822, Civ. Judl. Cons.j 23rd Lee. 1823, Nos. 10-21.
^Civ. Judl. Cons., 18th March 1824, Ho. 7.
■^ Annual Report for 1823, Civ. Judl. Cons.^ 10th March 1823,
ITos. 21-28.
4S.D.A. to Government, 6th Feb. 1824, para 2. Civ. Judl. Cons.^
18th March 1824, No. 7.
5-ibid.
a little over Rs. 73/- per month. It is not stated whether 
the figure of Rs. 114,098/- includes the income from the 
additional employments provided for the Additional Sad^ ir 
Amb^ns under Regulation XXIII of 1814. Presumably it does, 
or else that income was so meagre as not to deserve any mention. 
No evidence is available for the additional employments of 
the SadJ.r Anb^ns in the post-1814 period. Official enquiry was 
made regarding the additional employment of Munsiffs,^* but 
no mention is ever made of the additional employment of Sad^ h? 
Amb^ns.
In 1824, the S.D.A. made a strong plea for granting a
—  2
fixed salary to the Sad^ ir Amo^ns. The Bengal Government 
readily acquiesced in the proposal in view of the importance 
that this office had acquired in the judicial administration of
T
the Districts. It was resolved topay fixed salaries to the
Sadjlir Amb^ns (in lieu of the fees) from 1st May 1824, according
4
to the following scale:
See ante, p. 91•
2
S.D.A. to Government, 63th Peb. 1824, para 3. Civ. Judl. Cons.j 
18th March 1824, No. 7.'
Ibid., Ho. 8.
Civ. Judl. Cons., 18th March 1824, Ho. 8.
I All Law Officer Sad^r Amfc^ ns (irrespective of their 
power) were to receive a fixed allowance of Us. 100/- 
per nonth besides their salary as Law Officer.
II Additional Sad^ tr Ame^ns vested with the- special power 
(to try suits up to Rs. 500/-) under Regulation II
of 1821, were to receive a salary of Rs. 140/- per 
month.
III Additional Sadjir Amiens without special power (i.e. 
trying suits up to Rs. 150/- only) were to draw Rs. 100/-
per month. ■ ■
In addition to salary, all Sad^ Lr Antjfns were to get a 
fixed allowance of Rs. 30/- per month for the expenses of 
keeping an establishment.
The fixation of salaries on the above scale and the 
establishment allowance must have made a tremendous improvement 
in the situation of Sadar Ameens. The certainty of a good income 
must also have added a great deal to the prestige of the office.
In 18 pi the powers of all the Sad^’r Amb^ns were made equal. 
Hence the disparity between the salaries of Additional Sad^r 
Amb^ns with special power and those without it was removed.
The Law’ Officers ceased to be ex-officio Sad/.r jjne^ ns. If
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selected for the appointment, they too were to draw the same 
salary .of Rs. 25o/- per month, including establishment 
allowance^ as tho other iad^r Amb^ns, for this job.
The Principal Jad^r Anb^ns wore provided with a salary 
of Rs. 4G0/- per month, which was quite respectable.
Humber and Dlstrlbution ox Indian Judges: 
a) I;^ pnp;iff_s
According to Regulation RL of 1793 the distribution of 
Ilunsiffs was to bo such that no one would have to travel, more 
than five hos (about ten miles) to reach a Ilunsiffs tribunal.
A minimum scale was thus laid down. Ho limit was, however, 
fixed for the appointment of more than one Ifunsiff within
the same-radius of-ten-miles. For this reason, the District........
Judges, in general, did not bother about limiting the number 
of Ilunsiffs. A large number of Ilunsiffs were, therefore, 
commissioned in the years following 1793. For example, in
Zillah Jessore alone 134 Ilunsiffs lad been initially appointed,'*'
2 3 4 5in Rungpur 98, in Tipperah 83, in Midnapur 43, and in Purnea 41.
^S.D.A. Progs., 8th June 1797, Ho. 37.
^S.D.A. Progs., 8th April 1795, Ho. 7. 
h.D.A. Progs, 16th April 1795, Hos. 73-75.
Abid., Hos. 73-75.
•D.A» Frogs., 6th April 1797, Ho. 33.
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in twenty-two Districts for which detailed figures are available
1
622 Ilunsiffs were appointed between 1794 and 1797. This gave 
an average of twenty-eight Hunsiffs per District. It was im­
possible to maintain an efficient supervision over such a large 
number of Ilunsiffs. Besides, with a number of them functioning 
in the same area, great confusion over jurisdiction often ensued. 
For these reasons their number was reduced in 1803 by more than 
one half. A new rule for the distribution of Hunsiffs was adopted 
by Regulation XLIX of 1803, which remained in force until 1831.
It laid down the general scale of one Nunsiff per Thana or area
■ft
of Police jurisdiction. Exceptions could be made under special 
circumstances by appointing more than one Hunsiff in the same 
Thana or by putting more than one Police jurisdiction under one 
Hunsiff. In actual practice the latter exception seems to have
F igure compiled from the recommendations for appointments re­
corded in the proceedings of S.D.A.
** *“There was no uniform system of distribution of Thanas either. 
Variations existed from District to District. For example, in 
Zillah Chittagong the average area covered by each Thana was
196 square miles, in Hooghly 133 square mles, in Jessore 343
square miles, in Rajshahy 188 square miles, and in Hymensingh 583 
square miles. The nopulatinn under the control of each also 
accordingly varied. The Thanas of Hymensingh had, on the average, 
a population of 121,222, those of Jessore 78,906, of Chittagong 
46,720, of Burdwan 91,352. Data compiled from a table of areas 
and population of the Districts of Bengal, presented In Pari. Branch
Colls.", 1832, Vol. 77, Appx V, ho. 1.
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been more frequently made. The total number of Ilunsiffs
commissioned in Bengal fell considerably short of the total
number of Thanas. In 1825 there were 539 Hunsiffs^ in the
forty-six Districts which gave an average of 11.7 Hunsiffs
per District. The total number of Police jurisdictions,
2
at the same time, was 828, making an average distribution of 
eighteen per District. As the Government did not pay the 
Ilunsiffs it bad no financial inducement to keep their number 
low. The purpose behind keeping the number below the permitted 
level ms to provide a better distribution of income per Hunsiff,x 0 x
Nevertheless, the scale of one Hunsiff per Thana was very
nearly followed in the Calcutta and Patna Divisions. In the
former there were 120 ^unsiffs in 162 Police jurisdictions,
• ~ 3
in the latter 79 in 101 Thanas. In most Districts of Patna 
Division the number of Hunsiffs exactly coincided with the 
number of Police jurisdictions. For example, Behar had
eleven Hunsiffs for eleven Thanas, s|hahabad ten for ten and
* — —
Sarun had fifteen for the same number of Thanas. The small
ratio was kept down by the figures of Barailly and Benares
"^ Civ. Judl. Cons.jl2th Sept. 1827, No. 20.
2,
Figure obtained from the Deports of the Provincial Courts on 
the establishment of Hunsiffs, recorded in Civ. Judl. Cons.y. 
12th Get, 333C, Nos. 14-43.
■'ixLd., Nos. 14 and 43*
■x-
Dr. B. B. Ilisra has stated the number of Hunsiffs in Sarun, in 1828,
teen
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Divisions. Barailly had only 74 Ilunsiffs fcr 179 TIia.naa, and 
Benares had 79 Tor 174.
b) Gael fir Ancons
According to Regulation AUa of 1809 one Sad^ ir Anb^n could 
be appointed to each District. In 1805 all the Law Officers 
wore constituted ex-officio Sad|.r Amb^ns and provision was 
made by Regulation XV of 1805 for the appointment of as many 
Additional Sadftr Amb/ns in any District as were considered 
necessary. This rule of distribution survived for the rest 
of the period under review. The number of Law (officer Sad^r 
Ambjbns can be easily assessed by multiplying the total number 
of Districts (44 in 1805) by two.^ But only for the.period
after 1817 is it possible to discover the exact number of
............. t .......... 2 .........................
Additional Sad£r Asians employed. Prom 1817 the evidence is
1
In the years following 1805 all the Law Officers may not always 
have been functioning as Badjir Amb^ns. Bor example, in 1816, 
neither of the Law Officers of the Patna City Court was acting as 
Sad£r Ambjfen. The Hindu Law Officer was considered unfit for tie 
assignment and the Muslim Law Officer was unwilling to undertake 
the office. Patna City Judge to Patna Provincial Court, 12th 
Dec. 1816; Civ. Judl. Cons.y10th Jan. 1817, Ho. 19.
After 1816 there were 46 Districts in Bengal. The established 
strength of Law Officer Sad£r Ame^ns fluctuated between 88 and 
90. Civ. Judl. Cons.^Bth March 1824, Ho. 7.
2The reasons have been dealt with earlier, see ante -p. 79.
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available in the recommendations for their compensations and
in a report of the S.D.A. on the issue of instituting a fixed
salary for them. During 1820 there were thirty-five Additional
Sad^r Anb^ns functioning, during 1821 forty-one and during
1322 forty-two;'3' on the average about forty of those officers
were being employed in the forty-six Districts. Many Districts
were without any Additional Sad^ .r Amc^n. In 1822 there was
2no such officer in twenty out of the forty-six Districts.
In 1824 the Oad^ ir Amb^ns were granted- a fixed salary. The 
total number of those officers then was 130. The number of 
Additional 3ad£r Amb^ns still remained flexible. About ten 
more such officers (including some Civil and Assistant Surgeons) 
were added to the establishment between 1824 and 1330, so that 
by, 1331 the total number of. Sadjtr. Amb^ns would be. about 140.
Horfclng of the Indian Judges
In 1827 A. Ross, Judge of S.D.A., presented a statement 
showing that during 1825, out of a total of 154,563 suits 
disposed of by the company's tribunals, the Hunsiffs and the
^S.D.A. to Government, 6th Heb. 1824, Civ. Judl. Cons.18th March 1324, 
Me. 7.
2
Annual Report for 1822, Civ. Judl. Cons.y 23rd Dec. 1823, Hos. 10-25.
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8adJ.r Amb^ns had accounted for 147,268.  ^ This meant that 
19 out of 20 disposals had been iiade by the Indian Judges.
But even earlier the proportion of suits disposed of by 
them had been nearly as high. On account of their large 
number, acquaintance with the language and customs, and 
less formal proceedings, the Ilunsiffs in particular were able 
to dispose of a very large number of suits from the very begin­
ning. During 1797, 194 Ilunsiffs of Jessore disposed of 64,067
2
causes, or about 485 cases each. This gave an average monthly 
disposal of forty causes per Hunsiff. The average was about 
the same- for Ilunsiffs of Behar, Dacca City, Ghazeepur and
ITuddea, for June 1826.^ During 1800 the Ilunsiffs accounted
cent ,
for 95 per/of the total disposal. The number of Ilunsiffs was
reduced in 1805, but their reduction was, to an extent, com­
pensated by the employment of Sad^ .r Amfe^ ns from that year 
onwards. The share of Indian Judges in the total disposal re­
mained the same. During 1805 Ilunsiffs and Sad^ ir Ante^ ns accounted
1Civ. Judl. Cons.;12th Dept. 1827, ho.20.
2
?rom a table in Judl. Despatch, 8th Dec. 1824, para 18, Vol. 6.
hiv. Judl. Cons.,14th Oct. 1796, No. 12.
A
Judl. Despatch, 3th Dec. 1824, para 18, Vol. 6.
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for 92 per cent of the net disposal, during 1810, 86 per
cent during 1815, 89 per cent, and during 1820, 90 per cent.'*'
As per Ross's above statement they accounted for 95 per cent
of the disposals of 1825- During 1830 their contribution was 
2
93 per cent. The average of the above averages is' 91 per 
cent, which may be taken to represent roughly the overall 
share of disposals by the Indian Judges between 1800 and 
1830. It is clear that the Indian Judges bore the brunt of 
the judicial administration in the Districts.
Apart from the feature that the Indian Judges accounted 
for most of the disposals there were a few interesting trends 
that influenced the working of the Indian Branch from time to 
time. They are described below.
Regulation XIII of 1810 had provided for the refund of
t
institution fees in all cases adjusted by Razeenamah. ' As 
this affected adversely the income of the Indian Judges they 
discouraged such settlements. Whilst in the nine months preceding 
the promulgation of the above Regulation (between Oct. 1809
Percentage calculated from table of disposals presented in 
Pari. Branch Colls. 1832, Vol. 77, Appx. V, No. 16.
2
Civ. Judl. Cons., 31st May 1831, Nos. 7-11.
and July 1810), 74>911 suits had been adjusted by Razeenamahs
in the Courts of Munoiffs, in the nine months (Aug. 1810
to I-Iay 1811) following the promulgation the number fell almost
by half to 37,880.^ The number of adjustments was further
2
reduced to 32,830 during 1313. Thus Regulation XIII which
had been designed to encourage settlements by compromise had
the reverse effect in the tribunals of Ilunsiffs. The S.D.A.,
after receiving the reports from the District Judges on the
issue, concluded that the reduction of adjustments in the
Ilunsiffs1 Courts ' after the promulgation of Regulation XIII
of 1810 had been caused by: "... the influence of the Native
Commissioners gTlunsi which was before used to promote adjust-
3
ments^being subsequently used to prevent them.1'
The Sad£r Amfc^ ns who -functinned at the Sadar stations 
under the eye of the District Judges bad little chance of preventing 
Razeenamahs to any considerable extent. Nevertheless, the fact 
that there was no increase in the number of compromises before
"^ S.D.A. to Government, 5th Sept. 1811. Civ. Judl. Cons.p 17th Sept.
1811, No. 11.
^Civ. Judl. Cons.^ 19th July 1814, No. 6.
■^ S.D.A. to Government,. 5th Sept. 1811, Civ. Judl. Cons.^l7th Sept.
1811, No. 11.
#
As a result of Regulation XIII of 1810 the number of adjustments 
by Razeenamah in the provincial Courts, and in the Courts of District 
Judges and Registers^immediately increased over that of the pre­
ceding years. But in the Courts of Sad.^ r Amelias there was no such 
tendency. During the nine months preceding the promulgation of tho 
Regulation, 22,118 suits had been adjusted by Razeenamah in these (cont.
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them suggests that those officers might have exercised some 
influence against an increase of compromises.
The provision for refunding institution fees was rescinded 
in respect of Indian Judges in 1814 for this reason, and to 
improve their income. The matter has not been pursued in 
the subsequent consultations^hence it is not known whether 
the number of compromises increased after 1814.
By Regulation XXIII of 1814 (S.15) the cognizance of 
Hunsiffs was restricted to those suits whose '’causes of action’^ 
had arisen not more than one year before their institution. 
This Regulation came into effect from 1st Reb. 1815. It 
instantaneously reduced the number of institutions and con­
sequently the number of disposals before the Hunsiffs’ Courts. 
The following table illustrates this point.^
Year ITo. of suits instituted Ho. of suits decid.ed
  before Hunsiffs _________  by Hunsiffs _
1814 125,491 152,466
1815 74,420 * 95,955C *
1816 52,590 72,055
1817 60,048 68,983
k'
1Judl. Despatch, 8th Dec. 1824, Vol. 6, pp. 482-87.
* (cont.)
Courts. In the nine months following, the number slightly 
decreased to 2,085, Civ. Judl. Cons.jl7th Sept. 1811, Ho.lT
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The lead of disposals over institutions in these four years 
ate up a major portion of the arrears before Ilunsiffs’ Courts. 
77,768 causes were pending at the end of 1814. Only 29,795 
were pending before them at the end of 1817
The above restrictions , which had been intended to discourage 
excessive litigation in the Ilunsiffs’ Courts, not only reduced 
the number of cases in those tribunals but also caused admini­
strative problems and public incovenience. ’-The S.D.A. reported 
that;
"l/hilst it /the restriction of one year/reduces the 
number of suits cognisable by the local Courts of 
the I'dmsiffs, it produces a corresponding increase 
of small causes in.. the Sill all Courts...
The local inhabitants were inconvenienced because they were 
now obliged to undertahe the trouble and expense of resorting 
to the Sadar for settling their petty disputes, if their cause 
of action had arisen more than twelve months preceding. The 
Judge of Debar transmitted three petitions, signed by 116 
respectable inhabitants of that District, against the restriction 
of one year. They stated that the restriction "involved the sub­
jects of the Government in the greatest distress. The period of 
one year is very inconsiderable and is generally taken up in
^Civ, Judl. Cons.^ 5th Hov. 1819, Ho. 15A.
n
t_Civ. Judl. Cons.^Jth July 1317, Ho. 12.
Ill
p re mis e s and s t ipul at i on s ". 1
Certain of the senior judicial officers lihe doss and
Iiarjoribanhs were critical of tliis provision and recommended
ibs abolition.2
flic rule restricting the cognisance of Ilunsiffs to suits 
whose causes of action arose not more than one year before 
their institution was therefore revised in 1817. By Regulation 
XIX of 1817 their cognizance was extended to suits of up to 
Its. 64/- whose causes of action had arisen not more than three 
years prior to their institution.
The effect of this change was instantaneous, as the
following table illustrates:^
Year Suits instituted Suits decided
  before Hunsiffs by Ilnnsifs
1818 ' 82,412 77,-326
1819 95,505 91,324
1820 108,684 103,167
In 1824, the Sad^r Amb^ns were'granted a fixed salary.
The system of remunerating them by the institution fee for
^Behar Judge to Patna Provincial Court, 13th Peb. 1817. 
Civ. Judl. Cons.^4th July 1817, ITo.12.
^Civ. Judl. Cons.j4th July 1817, Bo.12.
^Judl. Despatch, 8th Dec. 1824, Vol. 6, pp. 482-87.
the cases disposed of by then was discontinued. The authorities
had apprehended that becoming assured of a fixed income the
Sadfir Amb^ns might slacken their exertions. There was, however,
only a slight fall in the disposals by the Sad^ JLr Amfe^ ns during
1825, the year following the institution of a fixed salary
for them. Luring 1824 they had disposed of 44,880 causes,
during 182 5y 44,430.^
The Bengal Government attributed this reduction to the
?
institution of a fixed salary. But the figures for tie following 
years completely falsify this claim. The number of suits 
disposed of by those officers was:
Luring 1825 - 44,430
" 1826 - 45,041
 » ■ 1827 - 45,986 ............ ........
Hence the institution of a fixed salary can not be said 
to have had any detrimental effect on the performance of the 
Sad fir Amb^ns.
Until 1351 the exercise of the authorised powers of the 
Sad^r Anb^ns was left to the discretion of the District Judges. 
The Sadfir Amb^ns had no authority to receive suits on their own.
^Oiv. Judl. Cons.26th Jan. 1830, Nos. 10-15.
‘hTudl. Letter, 50th Aug. 1827, Vol. 11.
Statement ’A 1 to the Annual Report for 1828, Civ. Judl. Cons.y 
26th Jan. 1350, hos. 10-15.
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They were only to try those cases which the Judge chose to 
refer to then. One of the notable features of the period 
under consideration is the general reluctance among the District 
Judges to nahe full use of the powers granted to the SaA*r 
Anb^ns. The following examples would illustrate the point.
By Regulation III of 1810, S. 11, the Sad^ Lr Amb^ns were 
authorised to try appeals from the decisions of Hunsiffs. But 
the Judges refrained from mailing any extensive use of this 
provision. The 3.D.A. reported in 1814 ■ that in spite of their 
files being heavy, Judges of most Districts had abstained 
from Deferring any considerable number of appeals from the. 
decisions of I-lunsiffs to their Sadar Ameens.^ The only exceptions 
were the Judges of Purnea, Patna City and Burdwan, who had been
referring most of the appeals-from the decisions of Hunsiffs to
— 2the Bad^ ir Amfcjbrfs.
At this, the Government desired the S.B.A. to circulate an
instruction requiring all those District Judges,whose files
may have more than 220 suits, to refer all appeals from the
—  3
decisions of Ilunsiffs to their Sad^r Ame^ns.
^Civ. Judl. Cons.^19th July 1814, Ho. 6.
2Ibid.
^Government to 3.D.A., 28th June 1815. Civ. Judl. Cons.328th June 
1815, Ho. 2.
But James Stuart, a Judge of the S.D.A., opposed this
proposition.^ He advocated that a portion of such appeals
must be retained on the files of the Judge and the Register,
to enable the European officers to keep a -watch over the
conduct of the hunsiffs. This was a sensible approach. The
other Judges of S.D.A. concurred with Stuart and the Govern-
his
ment also conceded the wisdom of/reasoning. An order was
accordingly circulated in 1816 to the District Judges directing
them to retain a fraction of appeals from Ilunsiffs on their
otui files end cn those of their Registers."*
The tenor of the above instruction seems to have been
followed in tie succeeding period. Prom the statements cf the
number of appeals retained on the files of Judges end Registers
annexed to the Annual.Reports.for .1820 onwards, it appears
cent
that only 5 to 7per/of those appeals were annually kept on
4tho files of the Judges and Registers. The rest were obviously 
being referred to the Sad^ .r Ane^ns.
I^linute of Stuart, 2pr& Sept. 1815. Civ. Judl. Cons.j 24th Oct. 1815 
Ho. 17.
2Ibid, Ho. 18. ... '
'Civ. Judl. Cons^lCth Jan. 1817, Ho. 9.
A
‘percentage calculated from the Statements marked ’H*, enclosed 
in the Annual Reports of 1S2C; to 1850.
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By Regulation II of 1821 selected Gadfir Amb^ns wore 
authorised to be vested with the power of deciding causes 
up to lbs. ICC/-. Under this provision at least one Bad^r 
dnb^n in eveiy District was vested with tlie h specialv power 
by 1024.  ^ On enquiry it vac discovered that during 1G27 
in nine of the Districts for which the actual figures were 
available, the Judges had retained a large number of suits of 
less than Rs. 500/- on their own files.^ The Vice-President- 
in-Ccuncil apprehended that on further enquiry many more 
Judges would be found to be following tfcs " same practice.
They regretted this tendency and observed: "Such a practice, 
if carried to any considerable extent, must of course, render 
nugatory every attempt to relieve the Judges* files by enlarging
the powers of the ITative Judges.” ■ ; ■ ............
By Regulation IV of 1827, the fad^r Amb^ns were further 
authorised to be vested with the power to try causes up to 
Rs. 1,000/-. But once again, this enactment remained ineffective 
due tothe reluctance of the Judges to make use of it. The
^The total number of specially empowered Sad&r Amb^ns in 1824 
was 65. Civ. Judl. Cons.j18th March 1824, Mo. 7.
2 .
xinnual Report for 1827, Statement !R*, Civ. Judl. Cons.j3rd March 
1829, Mos. 32-37.
*5
Government to O.D.A., 3rd March 1829, paras 8 and 9, ibid. Mo. 37.
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Bengal Government wrote to the Directors in 1850:
"Be were in hopes that this inconvenience paucity 
of Registers/ would have "been remedied in some 
degree .... by the operation of Regulation IV of 
1827, which gave the Judges the_power of transferring 
to specially nominated Sad$tr Amb^ns, suits to the 
amount of Rs. 1,00C/-. Pew of the Judges, however, 
availed themselves of their services and we are sorry 
to observe an apparent  ^disinclination among Zillah 
Judges to entrust Native Officers with extended 
powers authorised to be vested in them.,rJ-
fo take a concrete example, the Judge of Rajshahy had 150 suits
of between Rs. 500/- and 1,C00/- on his file, on 1st July
2 ~1850. One of the Sa&^r _*ne^ ns there had been especially
empowered to try suits up to Rs. 1,CGC/-. But not a single 
suit of more than Rs. 500/- had ever been referred to him.^
The above phenomenon was apparently the result of a feeling 
of distrust towards the Indian Judges, which in turn was 
'largely the legacy of Cornwallis's thinking.
■^Judl. Letter, 18th Aug. 1850, Vol. 12, pp. 455-56. 
^Civ. Judl. Consul 6th Nov. 1850, No.9.
Abid.
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Chapter III 
THE DISTRICT JUDGES
Origin
The judicial administration <f the Company "began in 
1772, but the separate institution of District Judges did 
not come into being until 1780. Between 1772 and 1780 the 
civil judicial administration had been consigned first to 
the Collectors and then to the Provincial Councils of Revenue.^"
In 1780 separate officers, with exclusively judicial functions, 
were appointed by the Government to preside in the Civil Courts 
attached to the six Provincial Councils. They were called 
"Superintendents of Dfewani Adaluts". This was the origin 
of District Judgeship. In 1781, under a plan of judicial re­
form formulated by Sir Elijah Impey, the area under Company 
administration was divided into eighteen Districts and a Civil 
Court was set up in each. In fourteen of these Courts similar 
separate judicial officers were to preside, but they were now 
to be designated "Judges” instead. In the remaining four Districts
^See Chap. IV, pp. 157-8*
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the Collectors were to act as Judges as well. In 1787 the
office of District Judgeswas abolished in all except the
Districts of Patna, Hurshidabad and Dacca. Their functions 
were transferred to the Collectors.^
Finding a combination of revenue and judicial functions 
repugnant to the principle of Reparation of powers’, Cornwallis
District Judges were reappointed to the twenty-six Districts 
into which the territory under the Company’s administration 
was now organised. To provide for the new territorial ac­
quisition, and for the sake of administrative convenience, 
additions and modifications were subsequently made in the 
above establishment of Districts. In 1795 the Benares Division 
was brought under the Company's administration. It was divided
pur. A District Judge was naturally placed over each. In 1797
a new District was carved out of the area under the existing
District of Dacca- Jelalpur. It was to be known as the District 
*
of Backerganj. This was done because the vast area that the
1
For a discussion of the reasons for this change see Chap IV, pp.1b9-60.
2
This change is considered in detail in Chap. IV, pp. 161-2.
Dr. B. B. Ilisra has stated that in 1797 two1' new Courts were 
established at Backerganj and Dacca-Jelalpur. But in fact only 
one new Court was established. The Court of Dacca-Jelalpur had 
already been functioning since 1793. B.B.Misra,Cenfrral Admir 
of the East India Company,p .266•
withdrew the judicial authority of the Collectors in 1793 2
into four Districts Jaun-
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District of Dacca-Jelalpur originally covered was unmanageable 
for one Judicial and one Revenue Officer. Seven Districts 
were formed in 1803 > in the territory ceded by the Nawab of
firCudh. In 1805 the area surrendered by the Pe^ swa and Daulat
Rao Sindhia was organised into six Districts under Barailly
Division. A District Court was established at Cuttack in
the same year. In 1806, for the- sake of economy, the Murshida-
bad Sillah Court was abolished and its jurisdiction was divided
between two neighbouring Districts, Hurshidabad City and Beer-
bhoom. In 1814 two new Districts were created by rearranging
the territories around Calcutta.
As a result of all the above additions and alterations,
by 1830 there existed under the Bengal Presidency a total of
forty-six District Courts, twenty-seven in the Lower Provinces,.
*
eighteen in the Western Provinces, and one in Cuttack.
The extent and population of these Districts, over which 
the Judge had to dispense, or supervise the administration of, 
justice were extremely varied.'*' To take a few examples, the 
District of Ramgarh had a huge area of 22,430 square miles and
These figures are based on a survey made in 1822 by F . Shakespear, 
the Superintendent of Police of the Lower Provinces. Report 
printed in Pari. Branch Colls., 1832, No. 77, Appx. V, No. 1.
See map.
a populatinn of 2,252,985* Rajshahy had nearly twice that 
population (4,087,155) over only about one-fifth the above 
area (3,950 square miles). Behar (modern Gaya) had an area 
of 5,235 square miles and a population of 1,340,610. Sarun 
had 1,464,075 inhabitants over 5,760 square miles. Burdwan 
had 1,187,580 inhabitants in an area of 2,000 square miles.
Patna was the smallest District of all. It had an area of 
only 667 square miles and a population of 255,705*
The size and population of tie District had a natural 
beaiing on the business before its Civil Court.
Powers and Functions
Cornwallis had intended to make the Judge the central
and dominating figure in the District. He was to be the
Magistrate of his territory. He was to manage the police and
he ms to be the Civil Judge of his realm. In the latter
capacity he was not only to dispense justice himself but also
to control and supervise the conduct of all the other subordinate
agencies of judicial administration in his District. In short,
he was responsible for the distribution of justice to every
one who lived within his jurisdiction. The Judge's Court was
*
to have a European establishment of a Register and an Assistant,
*
In 1814 provision was also made for employment of additional 
Registers in the Courts where it was considered necessary.
See b e lo w  p p .
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and an Indian establishment of one Hindu and one Muslim Law 
Officer besides a host of such servants as clerks, writers, 
administrators of oaths and Peons. The Register and the 
, Assistant were to assist the Judge in running his office.
The former was also to help the Judge in the disposal of Civil 
suits. The Law Officers were there to aivise the Judge on 
questinns relating to Hindu or Mohammedan law.
The local jurisdiction of the District Judges' Courts 
was, according to Regulation III of 1793 > to extend to all 
places within the limits of the Zillah or city where they 
operated. Certain exceptions were, however, made. Thus,in 
Zillah Cuttack, the estates of certain Rajas were made immune
tf«A ,
from the jurisdiction of^local Judge's Court. So were the
territories and Jajeers (Estates) in.actual possession of
2
several Chieftains. Their jurisdiction in respect of persons 
extended over all Indians as well as Europeans, not being
3
British subjects, residing outside Calcutta. All British 
subjects, except King's Officers and Covenanted Civil Servants 
of the Company, who took residence beyond a radius of ten miles
1By Eegn. XIX of 1805.
^By Eegn. VTI of 1816.
3By Eegn. Ill of 1793, Ss. 7 and 9.
from Calcutta, were required to execute a bond rendering them­
selves amenable to the local Judge’s Court in all Civil suits 
instituted against them by Indians or Europeans alike, provided 
the amount or value of the suit did not exceed Rs. 500/-.^
A special privilege in respect of the amount or value of the 
suit was granted to the khasias and other tribal people living 
on the border of Zillah Sylhet. The reason was that the British 
traders used to make regular purchases of chunam (lime) and 
other articles from them. Those transactions often involved 
sums exceeding Rs. 500/-. Hence,to save those tribes the 
trouble of repairing to Calcutta for settling their claims of 
more than Rs. 500/-,it was provided by Regulation I of 1799 that 
they could institute their claims against the British subjects, 
irrespective of the amount, before the Judge of Sylhet.
In 1794 T. Brooke, Judge of Burdwan, sought instruction 
from the S.D.A. whether a British subject, residing ii Calcutta, 
who had extensive business transactions in the I-Tofussil, should 
also be required to execute the bond (making himself amenable 
to the local Judge’s Court) under Regulation XXVIII of 1793.^
1By Resn. XXVIII of 1793, Ss. 2-8.
2
Burdwan Judge to S.D.A., 11th June 1794. S.D.A. Progs.?24th 
July 1794, Ho. 7.
Brooke thought that as the intention of the Regulation was to 
provide protection to Indians against injury or oppression 
committed by any British subject, persons of the above description 
should also be required to ezecute the bond and make themselves 
amenable to the Mofussil judicature. But the S.D.A. held that, 
Linder the meaning of Regulation XXVIII of 1793, only those 
British subjects could be required to ezecute the bond who 
actually lived under the jurisdiction of a District Court and 
not those who merely had trading connections there.^ The S.D.A. 
also considered such a step unnecessary as the transactions 
of such British subjects must be carried on in the Mofussil 
through agents who would always be amenable to the local Judge's 
Court for all their acts.
In 1805 ¥.7. Kagsie, Judge of Nuddea, reported to the
Government the case of one John Farquhar, who had refused to
sign the required bond after taking residence in Nuddea as the
2
-Company's Salt Agent. T^he Juvdge held the view that,as Farquhar 
was neither a king's officer nor a covenanted servant of 
the Company, he could have no exemption from submitting to the 
jurisdiction of the local Court. The Government agreed with
1S.D.A. Progs., 24th July 1794, Ho.8.
2
Civ. Judl. Cons., 18th April 1805, No. 11.
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the Judge and ordered Farquhar to sign the bond or leave his
situation and quit the District.1
In 1813 by St. 53-:^eo. III*j Cap. 155*;C1.VII, the system 
of making a British subject amenable to the Mofussil Courts 
by a bond was made redundant. By tie Act all British subjects
m
who were inoccupation or possession of any immovable property, 
or who were carrying on any trade.or business in any part 
of British India at a distance of more than ten miles of
Calcutta*, were made generally subject to the Civil jurisdiction
of the local District Judge. This Statute was intended to 
facilitate legal redress for Indians against British subjects.
It had two specially significant features. First, it withdrew 
the exemption of king's officers and covenanted servants of the 
Company from being amenable to the Mofussil Courts. Secondly, ■ 
even those British subjects who resided in Calcutta, but had
t
trading or other establishments in the ii|6rior, were made liable 
to the District Court under whose jurisdiction such establish­
ment existed.
By Regulation III of 1793 the District Judges were empowered 
to take cognizance of Civil suits of any nature. Their juris­
diction had no pecuniary limit. By Regulation XIII of 1808 a 
pecuniary limit of Rs. 5,000/- was put on the District Judge's 
jurisdiction. Suits above that amount were made cognizable in
^Civ. Judl. Cons., 9th May 1805, Nos. 15-16.
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the first instance by the Provincial Courts. By Regulation 
XIX of 1817 parties^were given the option of instituting suits 
of between Rs. 5,GC0/- and Rs. 10,000/- in the local District 
Judge’s Court instead of in the Provincial Court. This was 
done for the convenience of those parties who night find it 
difficult to repair to the Divisinnal headquarters for pro­
secuting their claims. In 1831 it was decided to abolish 
the Provincial Courts. Hence by Regulation V of that year all 
causes of above Rs. 5>000/- were transferred back to the 
original jurisdictionif the District Judge. But at the same
time causes of less than Rs. 5,000/- were made cognizable
2
in the first instance by the Indian Judges. More than 90 per cent 
of'the causes fell under the latter limit. Hence in 1831 the 
District Judge’s tribunal virtually ceased to be a Court of 
primary jurisdiction.
Among the Civil causes cognizable by the District Judges 
there was a class specially known as Summary suits. They were 
suits connected with complaints for forcible dispossession from 
lands,crops, or water courses, and for arrears or undue exaction
■^ The reasoiB for this change have been dealt with in Chap V. pp. 2 21-2* 
2
See Chap. II, pp.6 5 - 6 6 .
of rent. These were distinguished from the regular suits because 
they were required to be disposed of with top priority and by 
a Summary process, that is without the formal procedure of 
pleading, answer, reply, rejoinder etc. This process was 
evolved because the peace of rural society and the collection 
of revenue both depended on a speedy termination of such disputes.
Besides their original jurisdiction, the District Judges 
were given the appellate authority over the decisions of all 
the subordinate judicial officers of the District, i.e. the 
Indian Judges and the Registers.^ But they were prevented from 
trying appeals from the decisions of those Registers who were 
specially empowered under Regulation XXIV of 1814 (S.9) to try 
cases of more than Rs. 500/-. Those appeals were to go direct 
to the Provincial Courts. The Judges were also authorised to 
try Second or Special Appeals from the decisions of Registers 
on appeals from the Munsiffs and Sadar Ameens, and from the de­
cisions of Sadar Ameens on appeals from Munsiffs.
Under the arrangements of 1851 the appellate authority 
of the District Judges was greatly enhanced. They were now to
^By Regulation XXIV of 1814, S.6.
2 J -  ■ ■■
See 1 b«low p .1 46 .
try appeals from all decisions of the Indian Judges^ who had 
been authorised to try causes up to Rs. 5>000/-.^
Experience and Qualifications
*
After its establishment in 1800 all Civil Servants
appointed to Bengal were required to spend three years in
the College at Ber.t William before commencing their official
careers. The curriculum of the College included a training
in the languages and the laws of India and the study of sciences
and humanities. But no specific rule about the requisite
experience or qualification of Distiict judicial officers was
laid down until 1807. As a result, between 1793 and 1807,
civilians with little or no judicial experience were often
2called upon to act as a District Judge. For example, John Becher 
began his official career in 1781 as Assistant to the Commercial 
Chief at Murshidabad. He subsequently served as Deputy Pay­
master to troops at Rohtas and then as the Superintendent for 
the collection of market duties at Kanpur. In July 1797, he
^See Chap. II, pp.65-66.
2
These examples have been gathered from Dodwell & Miles,
List of Civil Servants in Bengal.
*
'The College was founded by Wellesley for the purpose of providin 
a better training for the Company’s Civil Servants.
was suddenly elevated to the position of District Judge and 
Magistrate of Murshidabad, John Battaye, a Civil Servant who 
began his career in 1792, was appointed Judge of Zillah 
Rungpur, after having served in the situations of a Commissioner 
of Court of Requests for one year, assistant to Collector for 
two years, Deputy Post-Master General and Post-Master General 
for two years, and Collector of Revenue for one year. There 
were many more instances of officers with very little judicial 
experience having been appointed District Judges by the Govern­
ment.
Lord Minto was the first Governor-General to give serious
consideration to the experience of men appointed to District
judgeships. He observed:
M... it can not be pretended that the knowledge 
obtained in the public schools in England and 
in the College at Port William, ... is calculated 
to qualify a young man, without further aid and 
instruction, to discharge the important duties..., 
and to qualify them, in fact, for the responsible 
and arduous situation of Judge and Magistrate.1 ^
To improve the academic qualifications of judicial officers
Minto appointed J. E. Harrington, a Puisne Judge of the S.D.A.
as Professor of Law to instruct them in the principles of
^Minto’s Minute, 3rd Jan. 1807. Civ. Judl. Cons.^3rd Peb. 
1807, Mo. 32.
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jurisprudence.at the Fort William College. And to insure
adequate practical experience for the prospective Judges,
he decided to separate the judicial branch of service from
2
the revenue branch. Civilians, after completing their
initial training in the College of Fort William, were to
make a choice between joining the judicial or the revenue
branch of service. Those choosing the judicial line were to
be attached to the S.D.A. and S.W.A. at least for one year
3
before being posted out in the Districts as Registers.
livery six months these Assistants were to be examined in
their knowledge of the Laws and the Regulations, the practical
duties of Judges and Registers, and the general principles
of jurisprudence. They were also required to prepare reports
4
of cases adjudged by the S.D.A. and S.IT.A. This was for . .
giving them an idea of how cases were tried and decided.
To prevent those trained for the judiciary from changing 
over to another department and thereby wasting their legal 
knowledge and training, the Minto Government decided that once
■\judl. Letter, 7th April 1807, paras. 81-83, Vol. I.
2
Minto acknowledged to have done this on the advice of G. Dowdswell, 
the ex-Judicial Secretary, and H. T. Colebrooke, the Chief Justice 
of S.D.A. Minto to G. H. Barlow, 11th April 1809. Minto MSS.
3
Judl. Letter, 7th April 1807, paras 81-83, Vol. I.
4Ibid.
was selected
an officer/for the judicial or revenue service,^  he was to
1
stay and receive promotions in that department alone.
A change-over was to be allowed only in very exceptional 
circumstances. Thus Minto refused to accept a personal re­
commendation from John Lumsden for transferring T. Richardson 
from the commerce department, in which the latter had a 
very distinguished record of service, to the judicial, stating 
that it would be ”... against the general principle of separation
of revenue and judicial authorities which I think too important
2
to admit of any exceptions”.
The sole idea behind the above arrangements was to provide
a better legal knowledge for those who would become District
Judges. As Minto put it:
”They will pass through the situation of Register 
only, and it is hoped that one year’s attendance 
on S.D.A. and S.N.A., together with some instruction 
in the elements of legal science, ... may afford 
such a preparation fbr the discharge of the first 
duties of that line, and such a foundation for ex­
perience and practice to build upon^as may supply 
a good choice of future ^fudge/Magistrates.
•^ ■Judl. Letter, 7th April 1807, para. 84, Vol. I.
l^*Iinto to Lumsden, 28th July 1808. Minto MSS.
^Minto to G. E. Barlow, 11th April 1809. Minto MSS.
The plan for training personnel for the situation of 
District Judge was provided with a statutory basis in 1814. 
Regulation Xa IV (S.5) of that year laid down that no person 
was to be appointed a District Judge unless he had previously
sistant
Magistrate, for at least three years or had held any other 
employment in the judicial department, or any other office 
implying the discharge of judicial functions for at least 
the same number of years.
The arrangements adopted in 1807 and the rule of 1814 
secured better qualified and experienced persons for the 
situation^, of District Judge^ -. But a strict adherence to the 
provisions was not possible on account of the shortage of 
Civil Servants, particularly after 1820. Even during.Minto*s 
regime two officers, T.J. B. Martin and David Campbell, with 
past services only in the political and revenue departments, 
were appointed Judge-Magistrates cf the twenty-four Pargana^is 
and Eooghly respectively.^ This was done in 1809, only two 
years after the adoption of the principle of keeping the judicial 
service distinct from the revenue line. The rule of 1814 was 
often disregarded between B25 and 1832. In no less than six
u ®
officiated as Assistant Judge, or Register or Joint/As
^Dodwell and Miles, op.cit.
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instances persons without the required experience were appointed
District Judges.^*
The impracticability of a rigid separation between the
revenue and judicial services was pointed out by the Directors 
2
in 1827 and was simultaneously appreciated by the Bengal Govern-
3
ment as well. After 1820 certain enactments had also been
4
passed which ignored the principle of separation of services. 
Besides, the Collectors had been acquiring judicial ex-
5
perience by unking investigations in the Summary suits for rent.
In 1824, they were empowered to pass judgements on such suits.^ 
Henceforth the office of Collector could by interpretation be 
regarded as one implying the discharge of judicial functions 
in conformity with the requirement of experience.byjRegulation 
XXIV of 1814. This position was indirect^ admitted in Regulation 
V of 1825, which authorised the Collectors to be appointed 
District Judges when it was expedient.
These appointments were those of B. Taylor in 1826; ¥. H. Garret 
in 1827; R. Macan in 1828; C. Phillips in 1850; J. Fraser in 
1850, and J. Dunsmere in 1851. Dodwell and Miles, op.cit.
^Judl. Despatch, 51st Jan. 1827, Vol. 6, pp. 57-58.
Judl. Letter, 22nd Feb. 1B27, Vol. 10, pp. 198-99.
These were in particular Regulations IV of 1821 (which authorised 
Collectors to exercise powers of Magistrate or Joint Magistrate) 
and V. of 1825 (which authorised them to act as District Judges).
5
See Chap. IV, pp. 181-2.
°See Chap IV, p. 185*
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The total length of service of an officer promoted to the
rank of District Judge was normally ten or eleven years.1
But, depending upon availability of officers and individual
_ 2
merit, some were promoted earlier. For instance, J. Swing,
G. R. Boddam and J. N. Halhead, all starting their official
careers in 1807* became District Judges in 1814 after only
seven years’ service. W. B. Bayley, a very able officer, who
started his service in 1803, was promoted to the rank of
*
District Judge after six years only, in 1809- On the other 
hand some had to wait longer than the average period of ten 
to eleven years. For example none of the officers appointed 
in 1817 could become District Judges before 1830.
In spite of the arrangements of 1807 and 1814 the ability 
of the District Judges in general remained in doubt. The 
Directors observed in 1824: ’’Your civil servants, unprepared 
by education /±n England/, for the judicial offices, have 
many difficulties to contend with In the exercise of their 
functions...” The Bengal Government replied that lack,of
^Judl. Letter, 5th October 1826, para 2, Vol. 10.
2
Dodwell & Miles, op.cit.
3
Despatch from Court to Bengal, 23rd July 1824, para 35,
Despatches to Bengal, Vol. 96.
*
Bayley had even distinguished himself as a trainee at the Ft. William 
College. On that account a ’’Degree of Honour” wasconferred upon him 
by the Gov. General in 1803 at the time of his leaving the College. 
Report on examination at Ft. William College, 29th March 1803, 
Wellesley Papers, (ed.) M. Martin, Vol. 3, p.66.
English legal training was more than made up for by the 
practical education which the judicial officers of the
1
Company obtained by a long course of service in the interior.
Though there was some truth in the Bengal Government1s
assertion, it could not be denied that the Judges had to
face some practical handicaps in the discharge of their
functions. The depositions of “Witnesses were made in the
local languages, and the proceedings were recorded in Persian.
The Judge needed a perfect knowledge of the local languages
as well as of Persian. The Directors had considered this to
2
be the *’indispensable qualification for a Judge11. Though 
the curriculum of Fort William College included a study of 
the Indian languages and Persian, there seems to have prevailed 
a general gap between academic knowledge and practical pro­
ficiency. In 1809 very few Judges were reported to be able
3
to speak or understand the local languages. This continued 
to be a serioup" handicap for most judicial officers. Ram Mohan 
Roy stated in 1831 that on account of his ignorance in the
1
Judl. Letter, 5th Oct. 1826, para 88, Vol.10.
^Judl. Despatch, 28th Feb. 1805, para 6, Vol. 1.
3
Judl. Despatch, 10th Aug. 1811, para 9, Vol. 1, quoting 
a recent report from Bengal.
local languages, "the Judge is apt to be induced to 
transfer a great part of his business to native officers, 
who are not responsible and who, being ill-paid, may 
bargain justice with self interest.”^
This difficulty was removed to a great extent in respect 
of civil cases by the transfer of all original trials to 
the Indian Judges after 1831, for it was at that stage 
that an intimate knowledge of the local dialects was nec­
essary for the Judge in following the deposition and cross- 
examination. The Courts of appeal decided mostly on points 
of law and cn the basis of the records made at the original 
trial. The European Judges sitting in them could, therefore, 
mange £ven with an academic knowledge of the Indian languages. 
By a series of enactments firom 1835 onwards, Persian was re­
placed by English as the language of record and legal pro­
ceedings. This made things still easier for the European Judges
Working
Administering Civil justice was not the only function 
of the District Judge. He was also the Magistrate of his 
area in which capacity he was to control and supervise the
Evidence of Ram Mohan Roy before Parliamentary Committee of 
Enquiry, 9th Sept. 1831. Pari. Papers, 1831, Vol. V, Appx. 39
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Police, apprehend criminals and commit them for trial to
the Court of Circuit, and try and punish petty offences
h i m s e l f A p a r t  from these functions he had a number
of miscellaneous duties. These consisted of correspondence
with the superior Courts, fulfillment of the letters'
precepts in connection with cases under trial before them,
passing interlocutory orders, executing Decrees, not only
*
of his own Court but also of the subordinate Courts and
the superior Courts, disposing of petitions concerning
the redemption of mortgages and succession to intestate
gstates, and dealing with acts of corruption or misconduct
of Indian judicial officers. These miscellaneous duties
occupied a good portion of the time of the: Judge. Complaints
were often made about their being a serious obstacle to the
2
dispatch of the regular business of trying cases.
In fact, the miscellaneous and Magisterial duties of the 
District Judge absorbed about half his time. a result, 
the time he could devote to the disposal of Civil cases became
^The functions of Magistrates have been enumerated in detail in 
Chap. IV, p. 189.
‘Tor example, complaints were made by T. Brooke, Judge of Hooghly 
in 1800 (Civ. Judl. Cons., 15th July 1800, ITo.7) and in 1814 
by the Judges of Nuddea, Tirhoot and Murshidabad (Home Misc.
Series, Vol. 775, ff. 5, 79 and 169) •
■X- i
Some relief was provided to the Judges in this respect by Regulation
II of 1821. By S.7 of that Regn. Registers were empowered to exe­
cute Decrees of Indian Judges. By Regn. XllI of 13 24, Sadar Ameens 
were authorised to execute their own Decrees.
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very limited. The District Judges were hard worked. They
had to sit in Court for six, eight or often even ten hours
a day, six days a week. But the time they could devote to
the disposal of Civil cases seldom exceeded two or three
days in the week. For example, J. T. Shakespear, the Judge
of Huddea, had been able to devote only two and a half days
in the week to Civil cases in 1813*^ The Judge of Zillah
Burdvan, which was always one of the heavy arrears Districts,
2
could afford only three days in the week for Civil suits.
The rest of his time was spent on Criminal and miscellaneous 
business.
For these reasons the District Judges in general lagged 
behind in the disposal of Civil business. In 1795 the Judge 
of Burdwan alone had 30,000 cases pending on his file. In. , . .
1305 the total arrears of Civil suits before all the District 
Judges x;ere 15,291; at the end of 1815 they were 16,898. The 
figure climbed to 29,963 in 1825,^ and by 1830 it had reached 
27,233.5
^Charge note of J. T. Shakespear, 4th Sept. 1813. Civ. Judl. Cons. 
18th Sept. 1813, ho.2. '
2
Report of V. B. Bayley, Burdwan Judge, 20th June 1814. Civ. Judl. 
Cons.^  12th Aug. 1817, ITo. 18.
3
5th Report of Select Committee of House of Commons, Pari. Branch 
Colls., 1812, Vol. 56, pp. 63-65.
^Parl. Branch Colls.j 1832, Vol. 77, Appx. V, Ho.16.
5
Civ. Judl. Cons., 31st I-Iay 1831, ITos. 7-11.
The District Judges remained unequal to their task
throughout the perioc^mder review. Attempts were made
from time to time to reduce their work load by devising
other agencies, European as well as Indian, to share their
burden. The failure of the District Judges to cope with
*
their business, and the European agencies devised for their 
relief have been studied hereafter, in three phases, 1793-1803, 
1803-14- and 1814-31.
Under the arrangements of 1793, the agencies available 
for the assistance of the Judges in the disposal of Civil 
business were the Registers and the I-lunsiffs. Under Regulation 
XIII of 1793 (8.6) the Registers were empowered to try causes 
up to Rs. 200/- referred to them by the Judge. By Regulation 
III of 1800, the District Judges were also permitted to refer 
to their Registers appeals from the decisions of Kunsiffs in 
cases upto Rs. 25/-. The relief obtained from the Registers 
was considerable. Between July and December 1801 a total of 
6,375 suits had been transferred from the Judges’ files to 
those of Registers.'*' But still the existing aid was not 
adequate. The arrears of pending cases before the then existing
10iv. Judl. Cons., 22nd April 1802, No. 5.
-x-
The Indian agency has been dealt with in the preceding 
chapter.
twenty-eight District Judges were 12,262 in 1802.^ In 
some Districts the arrears before the Judge on 1st January 
1803 were eren higher than the total disposals of the jre-
p
ceding five years. At the same time in Tirhoot, the file
of the District Judge had more pending cases than the
3
aggregate disposals of the past seven years. Concerned at
the heavy accumulation of arrears the Directors had already
desired the Bengal G-ovemment to take immediate steps for 
4
reducing them.
The need for increasing the aid available to the Judges 
was realised. In 1803 the S.D.A. worked out a scheme which
5
was passed into Regulation XLIX of 1803. This sought to 
provide extra relief to the Judges from three directions - 
first, by authorising the appointment by S.d .a . of Sadar 
Ameens, to whom causes up to Rs. 100/- could be referred;^ 
secondly, by extending the original jurisdiction of Registers 
from Rs. 200/- to Rs. 500/- and, thirdly, by authorising
^5th Report of Select Committee, Pari. Branch Colls.,1812,
Vol. 56, pp. 63-64.
2
Such Districts were Behar, Dacca-Jelalpur, Patna, Jessore, 
Beerbhoom, and Tirhoot. Civ. Judl. Cons.p5th Nay 1803, No.12.
On 1st Jan. 1803 the arrears before the J. of Tirhoot were 
2,041. The total number of causes decided in the past 7 years 
(1796-1802) was only 2,040. Ibid.
4
General Despatch to Bengal, 23rd I-Iarch 1801, paras 6-8, Despatche 
to Bengal, Vol. 35.
5Civ. Judl. Cons., 5th Kay 1803, No.12.
6gee Chap. II, pp.34-357
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the appointment of Assistant Judges in ihe heavy arrears 
Districts.
The creation of Sadar Ameens and the enlargement of the 
power of Registers were intended to he permanent features 
of District judiciary. But the institution of Assistant 
Judges was designed, as a temporary relief ox)eration. The 
Assistant Judges were to be appointed, at the recommendation 
Of the S.D.A., by the Government in the Districts T|oro the 
Judges1 files were particularly heavy and were to be withdrawn 
as soon as the arrears before the Judges reduced to manageable 
limits.
The Assistant Judges were to have the same powers as the 
District Judges but they could try only cases referred to 
them by the Judge. As those called upon to fill the situation 
of Assistant Judges were mostly junior Civil Servants with 
some experience as Registers, the practice adopted was to refer 
to them original causes of inferior importance and appeals from 
the decisions of Indian Judges and Registers.^"
The first four appointments of Assistant Judges were made 
to the Districts of Tirhoot, Dacca-Jelalpur, Behar and Patna
’'"Govt, to S.D.A., 5th Dec. 1808, para 5* Civ. Judl. Cons.,
9th Dec. 1808, Uo.2.
City where the arrears before the Judges had been very 
1
heavy. In 1807 all four appointments were withdrawn
2
because the arrears had been substantially reduced.^ But 
no extensive employment of Assistant Judges could be made
on account of the continued reluctance of the Directors
a
to sanction it, for reasons of economy.-
To obviate the objection of increased expenditure the
5S.D.A. advanced a new proposal in 1809. This was to 
authorise those Collectors who had previous experience as 
Registers to act as Assistant Judges. Under the existing 
provisions of Regulation XLIX of 1803 the Assistant Judges 
were to function under the absolute control of the District 
Judges. They were to try only those suits which the Judges 
referred to them. Even their processes and orders were to 
be issued under the seal of the District Judges. The S.D.A. 
thought that the above provisions would be an adequate safeguard 
against abuse, if the Assistant Judgeship was conferred upon
■^ Judl. Letters 30th SeptI 1803, para 25, Vol. 1.
^Judl. Letter, 7th July 1807, paras 5 and 6, Vol. I.
3
This is apparent from the following Judl. Despatches:
28th Feb. 1805, Vol. I, pp. 19-21; 25th April 1806, Vol. I, 
pp. 74-75; 2nd June 1812, Vol. I, pp. 357-88.
A.
‘Eor a detailed discussion of the Company’s finances in this 
period see Chap VI. pp.260.
S.D.A. to Govt., 7th April 1809, paras 14-36, Civ. Judl. Cons.. 
28th April 1809, ITo.l.
u z
the Collector. But Governor-General Minto rejected this 
proposal outright on the ground of its being repugnant to 
the principle of n separation of powers
2
Arrears before Judges in many Districts were still heavy.
hence, in spite of the Directors’ reluctance to approve the
measure, occasirmal appointments of Assistant Judges continued
to be made. In 1809 *\ssistant Judges were appointed in
3
Chittagong, ITuddea, Jessore, Jaunpur and I-Iidnapur. Further 
appointments were made in 1814 to the Districts of liurshidabad, 
the twenty-four Parganas,Sarun, Burdwan, Gorakhpur, Tirhoot,
4
Patna City and Rajshahy. The Assistant Judgeships of Sarun,
Hidnapur and Jaunpur were discontinued towards the end of 1815
5
because the purposecf the appointments had been fulfilled.
In 1814 the office cf Assistant Judge was abolished altogether.
There is no doubt that the Assistant Judges provided sub­
stantial relief to some of the overburdened District Judges 
from time to time. But no extensive employment <f this agency
i
could be made on account of the attitude of Directors.' Besides,
\
“Govt, to S.D.A., 28th April 1809, para 6. Civ. Judl. Cons.,
28th April 1809, No.8.
2
On 1st Jan. 1809 arrears before the Judges in ©me of the 
Districts were: Chittagong - 2166; Jessore - 1661; Purnea - 1211;
ITuddea - 1206; I-Iidnapur - 1156; and Jaunpur - 1028. Civ. Judl. 
Cons., 7th April 1809, No.l.
3
Judl. Letter, 7th April 1809, para 69, and Judl. Letter, 21st 
Aug. 1809, para 11, Vol. 2.
^Judl. Letter, 50th Jan. 1815, Vol. 3, pp. 149-50.
mfrom the very beginning this institution was intended to
be a temporary relief operation. The accumulation of
arrears, on the other hand, was a steady and permanent
feature. It was often found that the arrears having been
reduced in a particular District Court, after the employment
of an Assistant Judge, mounted again once that assistance
was withdrawn.^
Regulation XLIX of 1803 had provided two other means
for securing aid to the District Judges - the extended power
2
of Registers and the appdntment of Sadar Ameens. But at the 
same tine it withdrew the authority of Registers to try 
appeals from the decisions of Munsiffs.
It is not possible to calculate howlhr the Judges used 
the extended power of Registers because tie available records 
do not state the number of cases between Rs. 200/- and Rs. 500/- 
that existed on the files of the Judges, or the number of such 
cases that the Judges referred to their Registers. But it is
(coht.)
^Judl. Letter, 2nd Oct. 1813, para 109, Vol. 3*
~?or instance, in Tirhoot and Patna City the Assistant Judgeships 
were discontinued in 1807, because the arrears before the Judges 
had been reduced (see ante p.141 )• But then the arrears in
both Districts accumulated again. By 1812 the Judge of Tirhoot 
hadarrears of 1521, and that of Patna 627. Assistant Judges had 
therefore to be reappointed to both Districts. Civ. Judl. Cons., 
11th ITov. 1812, Ho.4.
2
See ante, p. vi ° \
certain that the relief enjoyed from the additional refer­
ences (i.e. of cases between Rs. 200/- and Rs. 500/-) was 
bound to be offset to a considerable extent by the with­
drawal of the authority of Registers to try appeals from 
the decisions of Kunsiffs. Besides, some of the Registers 
were themselves already overloaded with pending business'^ 
and therefore their ability to absorb the load o.f additional 
references would be very limited.
A few more reforms were made for increasing the aids 
available to the District Judges. By Regulation XIII of 
1808 suits of Rs. 5,000/- and above were made cognizable, in
the first instance, by the Provincial Courts. But such 
2
cases were few. Hence, the relief to the Judges from the
operation of this provision must lave been, negligible...........
In the same year provision was made for the appointment 
of Assistant Ilagistrates (by Regulation X of 1808) for pro­
viding relief to the Judge in his Criminal duties.
In 1810 the aid withdrawn from the Judges in 1803 by 
the res^iciin of the authority of Registers to try appeals
^By the end of 1801 a total of 7,231 suits was pending before 
the Registers. The arrears were particularly heavy before the 
Registers of some Districts, viz. in Behar, Burdwan, Backerganj 
and Beerbhoom. Civ. Judl. Cons., 8th July 1802. Nos. 50-81.
At the end of 1805 the arrears before Registers were 9,160. 
Arrears before Registers of some of the Districts were: , Jessore 
- 782; Chittagong - 770; Burdwan - 933; Backerganj - 840; 
Behar - 1,041 and Ilooghly - 840. Civ. Jul. Cons., 1st Kay 1806, 
No. 20.
2S.D.A. to Govt., 7th April 1809, para 11. Civ. Judl. Cons., 28th 
April 1809, No.l.
fron the decision of Kunsiffs was sought to "be replenished
by authorising Sadar Ameens to try those appeals.^ But mo
2extensive use was made of this provision. Hence no significant
relief could be obtained by this measure.
In spite of all the above reforms the District Judges
3
remained unequal to their task. In 1812 the Select Committee
of House of Commons reported:
"Expedients have been resorted to for relieving 
the Judges by enlarging the limits of causes 
referable by him to the Registers and Native 
Commissioners /Indian Judges/.... Something, 
however, is still wanting to complete that system 
of speedy justice, ... which Cornwallis was so 
desirous of introducing...."4
Uorried over the failure of the judicial structure to 
cope with the incoming business, the Directors sent a plan
5
for its reform to the Bengal Government in 1814. Its salient
1By Regn. XIII of 1810.
For details sea Chap. II, p. 115.
^See ante, pp. 137"38*
4
5th Report of Select Committee, Pari. Branch Colls.jl812, 
Vol. 56, p.69*
5
Under Judl. Despatch, 9th Nov. 1814, Vol. 3»
features concerning the District Judiciary were the transfer
of Magistracy from the Judges to the Collectors^ and the
2
extension of Indian agency. Both measures were calculated 
to reduce the load of Judges.
But the Bengal Government had, in the meantime, already 
adopted a series of reforms for making the judicial machinery 
equal to the available business.
For the piecemeal aid of Assistant Judges was substituted 
a more stable assistance through the enlargement of the agency 
of Registers. The ordinary jurisdiction of Registers remained 
the same, over canes up to Rs. 500/-. But under Regulation 
XXIV of 1814j S.9; Cl.6, provision was made for investing 
any of them vitli special powers to hear appeals from the decisions 
of llunsiffs and Sadar Ameens and to try all original suits 
cognizable by the Judge.
The same Regulation also provided for the appointment of 
one or more Additinnal Registers to the District Courts. An 
Additional Register could also be stationed at some place away 
from the District headquarters. Like the other Registers, they
^For a detailed discussion of this change see Chap.'IV, part'll.
^For details of Directors1 plan and its consideration see 
Chap. II, pp.44-49.
too could be vested with special powers.
Under Regulation XXIV of 1814, both the regular and 
Additional Registers were allowed to try only the cases 
referred to then by the Judge. But in 1821 (by Regulation 
II of that year) the Additional Registers stationed away 
from the Sadar were authorised to receive and try on their 
own all original suits and appeals within their competence. 
This was done to save the time of the Judge as well as the 
trouble that the people living under the jurisdiction of such 
Registers had to undergo in instituting their suits before 
the Judge at the District headquarters. Regulation II of 
1821 also provided for the transfer of a portion of the 
miscellaneous duties of the District Judges to the Registers. 
The Additional Registers. holding Court away from the Sadar 
Station were authorised to receive,and dispose of on their 
own, the applications for the execution of Decrees by Indian 
Judges. The Registers holding office at the Sadar station . 
could also be authorised by the District Judges to execute 
such Decrees.
By Regulation IX of 1819T S.8, judicial authority was 
also conferred on the six Registers of the Provincial Courts. 
The Judges of the Districts in which the Provincial Courts 
sat were authorised to refer original suits up to Rs. 5^0/- to
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the Registers of the Provincial Courts for trial. But this
provision was of little effect as the office of Registers
of Provincial Courts was abolished in 1821.^ *
Efforts were made to use fully the extended agency of
Registers in the post 1814 period. During 1815 the existing
Registers of Chittagong, Nuddea, Stawah, Tirhoot, Patna
City, Dacca and Gorakhpur were vested with u special power1*
2
under Regulation XXIV of 1814,S.9. Subsequently, such
investments became a routine affair. By 1828 the number
of Registers vested with special power had rren to thirty,
which was nearly the entire existing establishment of those 
3
officers.
In a number of Districts Additional Registers were
appointed at stations away, from the Sadar.. Initially, five . . . .
such separated Registerships were established at Monghyre,
Futtehpur, Shah j ehanpur, Sindose and Gliazeepur.^ Five
more were established later at places like I'ctldah, Sherpur,
5
Buggorah, Nugwan and Bhagandih.
1By Regn. II of 1821. 3.14.
Civ. Judl. Cons., 14th Feh. 1815, No.4.
,Civ. Judl. Cons., 2nd Hay 1815, ITo.14.
"Civ. Judl. Cons., -9th May 1815, No.15.
.Civ. Judl. Cons., 14th Nov. 1815, No.10.
3
This can be ascertained from the Annual Report.for 1828. Civ. Judl. 
Cons., 26th Jan. 1850, No.19.
4
Civ. Judl. Cons., 12th June 1815, No.15.
5parl. Branch Cells., 1852, Vol. 77, Appx. V, No.l.
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These separated Registerships were virtually inde­
pendent units of judicial administration. They had their 
own establishment of ministerial officers. They had ^ Sadar 
Ameens and Munsiffs functioning within their jurisdiction 
under their direct control. Regulation II of 1821 rendered 
their situation very independent by authorising them to 
receive direct all suits and appeals within their competence.
These officers must have rendered great relief to the 
District Judges, whose activity in respect of the areas 
where these Registers functioned must have been reduced to 
merely a general control and supervision and hearing of appeals.
Additional Registers were provided at a few Sadar Stations 
as well. But such appointments had to be very limited on
account of a great shortage of Civil Servants, which even........
prevented the adequate supply of regular Registers. Only a 
few stations like Allahabad, Barailly, Benares and Saharanpur 
South could have a steady assistance of an Additional Register 
between 1815 and 1851. Such officers were rarely made 
available to other Districts, whose needs were no less pressing, 
and even t h f o r  brief periods only.^ The maximum number of
^Applications for appointment of Additional Registers were fre­
quently made by the District Judges, but most of them were re­
jected by the Govt., particularly in the period after 1820, (cont.)
*
Provision for stationing Sadar Ameens with Additional Registers 
holding Court at separate stations was made by Regn. II of 1821.
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Additinnal Registers entertained at any one tine on the
establishment of the forty-six District Courts was nine,
in 1825.'*' In 1821 there -was not a single Additional Register
functioning in any of the District Courts. In 1831 the
2
number of those officers employed was only two.
The reforms of 1814, nevertheless, showed some encouraging 
results in the initial years of their operatinn. The number 
of pending causes before the District Judges fell from 16,898
3
on 1st January 1815 to 13,875 at the end of 1820. According 
to the S.D.A. the main factors that had contributed to the
above reduction were the extension of the agencies of Sadar
* 4Ameens and Registers.
There was a significant increase in the disposal by the
Registers during 1816, the year immediately following the pro-........
5
mulgation of the Regulations of 1814.
(cont.) on account of shortage of officers. In 1822, seven 
Judges had made requests for such appointments, but all were re­
fused by the Govt. Vide: Civ. Judl. Cons., 13-th June 1822,
Nos. 2 and 3; Civ. Judl Cons., 9th May 1822, Nos. 1 and 2;
Civ. Judl. Cons., 15th March 1822, Nos. 2-4.
"4)ata collected from India Register for the years 1814-31.
2India Register for 1831.
^Parl. Branch Colls., 1832, Vol. 77, Appx. V, No.16.
^Civ. Judl. Cons., 4th July 1817, No.12.
The disposal by Registers was: In 1813 - 4,751; in 1814 - 4,497;
in 1815 - 5,553; in 1816 - 8,886. IJbid.
*The power of Sadar Ameens was extended in 1814 to cases up to Rs.1507- 
in amount or value.
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The extended agency of Registers was more effective in 
aiding the District Judges than the previous agency of Assist­
ant Judges. This is proved by the fact that the District Judges 
were able to dispose of more cases with the help of the enlarged 
agency of Registers during 1815 and 1816 than they could in 1813
and 1814, with the aid of Assistant Judges.-^ The S.D.A. remarked
that only in one respect did the Registers and Additional Registers
vested with special power not fill the gap left by the abolition
1
of Assistant Judges. This was that the Assistant Judges used 
to hear appeals from the decisions of Registers, which the 
existing Registers could not. 3ven this gap was sought to be 
filled later. By Regulation IX of 1819 individual Registers, 
with at least six years experience in the judicial department 
could be,authorised by the Government, to try appeals from.the . 
decisions of ordinary Registers in cases below Rs. 500/-. But 
this arrangement postulated the presence of more than one 
Register in the District which, as stated earlier, could rarely be 
assured. No mention is ever made, in the subsequent con-
^The following table would illustrate the point:
Disposed of by Js. and By Js. and Registers
Asst. Js. and Registers and Addnl. Registers
During 1813 - 1C,173 During 1815 - 9,255
" 1814 - 7,914 " 1816 - 13,484
Total 18,087 Total 22,739
Civ. Judl. Cons., 4th July 1817, No,12.
2Ibid.
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sultations, of a Register trying appeals from the decision 
of his colleague. Hence it is very unlikely that any 
use was made of this provision.
But the extra aid obtained by the Judges from the en­
larged agency of Registers was short-lived. The scheme, success­
ful initially, failed later on account of a great shortage of 
Civil Servants after 1820.^ Hot only were the requests for 
appointment of Additional Registers rejected but frcm time 
to time many Districts had to do without even the regular 
Register. For example, during the whole of the year 1821, 
no Register was present in nine Districts, in another ten 
their services had been available for only a portion of the
year and in four Districts, though the Registers were present,
2
they had been officiating as.Collectors.. .On 1st Hay 1825
3
as many as twenty-two Districts had no Register at all.
During 1825 no Register had been present in six Districts, 
and the assistance of that officer was available only for
4
a fraction of the year in eleven Districts. During 1828
*^ In 1825 the Bengal Govt, was forced to request the Directors 
to supply eighty new officers for meeting the existing demand. 
Public Letter from Bengal to Court, 5rd July 1825, quoted in H.H.S. 
Vol. 550, f.757.
2
Civ. Judl. Cons., 1st Hay 1825, Los. 4-27.
^India Register 1825.
^Civ. Judl. Cons., 29th Dec. 1826, Hos. 24-26.
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twelve Districts remained without any Register for the
whole of the year.'*'
The result of this deficiency was naturally reflected
in the arrears before the District Courts. The number of
causes pending before the District Judges and Registers
on 1st January 1822 was 28,837, an increase of 10,507 over
the number pending on 1st January 18171 During 1821 the
Judges and Registers disposed of 5,108 fewer causes than
2
they had during 1817. Arrears before the Judges were 23,170
3
at the beginning of 1824. At the beginning of 1830 they
/a
had risen to 27,233. r Two more reforms for relieving the 
Judges had been in operation during this interval. They 
were the separation of Magistracy from some of the Judge-
5ships, and empowerment of Collectors to decide Summary suits. 
The net result of both seems to have been absorbed by the 
deficiency of Registers.
Eopes for providing relief to the Judges by extending 
the agency of Registers were given up by 1820. In reply to
^Civ. Judl. Cons., 26th Jan. 1830, No.19.
2
Civ. Judl. Cons., 1st May 1823, No.19.
^Civ. Judl. Cons., 19th Jan. 1826, Nos. 5-11.
4
Civ. Judl. Cons., 31st May 1831, Nos. 7-11.
5See Chap. IV.
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a number of requests from various District Judges for
the appointment of Additional Registers the Government
remarked in 1820:
"In the present circumstances any augmentation 
of the European agency is not possible.111
The S.D.A. observed in 1825:
"Due to there being no Registers in many Districts, 
the relief intended tp be given to the Judges by 
them has been frustrated."2
Of1he arrangements of 1814 for the extension of the 
agency of Registers, the one calculated to bring the greatest 
relief to the Judge was the provision for appointment of 
Additional Registers, whether at Sadar Stations or at 
stations away from the Sadar. A mere enlargement of the juris­
diction of existing Registers was not enough, because in the 
“heavy arrears'* Districts, the Register, like the Judge, was 
often saturated with business and was already making the- 
maximum effort towards disposal. The actual remedy lay not 
in the juggling of jurisdictions between the European tribunals 
of the District but in establishment of new ones. By pro­
viding for the employment of Additional Registers the architects
’'"Govt, to S.D.A., 29 th Dec. 1820, Civ. Judl. Cons., 29th Dec. 
1820, IJo.17.
^Civ. Judl. Cons., 10th March 1825, No.21.
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of the reforms of 1814 had driven in the right direction, 
hut they could not visualise that the paucity of European 
officers would frustrate the entire scheme of providing 
additional relief to the Judges through the agency of 
Registers.
Efforts to provide the required aid to the Judges through 
their Registers having been ineffective, the office of 
District Register was abolished in 1831 (by Regulation V of 
1831), and its place was supplied by a class of Indian Judges 
called Principal Sadar Ameens.^
^See Chap. II, p. 6 6 .
Chapter IV
THE COLLECTORS
Origin and growth of Civil Judicial Functions
The judicial functions of Collectors date back to
the days when the Company only held a Zamindari in the
vicinity of Calcutta. The Zamindar, or landlord, according
to the local tradition, was not only a collector of revenue
but was also responsible for the maintenance of law and
order in his territory. As such one member of the Council
who held the office of "receiver of revenues" was not only
a revenue collector, but also administered both Civil and
Criminal justice in a Zamindari Court. Hoiwell, who had been
the Revenue Collector of Calcutta from 1752 to 1756, held
such a Court and administered justice to the Indians living
under the Zamindary jurisdiction.^ Bolts has also written
about the existence of a Collectors Cutcherry (Court of
justice) ever since the Company had anything to do with the
2
collection of land rent.
^Holwell: India Tracts, 1774, p.20.
2
Bolts: Considerations on Indian Affairs..., p.81.
The problem of distributing judicial tribunals in
the interior arose only after the Company directly assumed
r* «•
the functions of Dfcwani, in 1772. Warren Hastings decided 
upon the simple solution of extending the Calcutta pattern 
of Collectors1 Courts to the mofussil. In all Districts 
a Collector of Revenue was posted who in addition to his 
fiscal functions was to preside in the Civil Court of the 
District. The District Faufjdari AdaltXt or Criminal Court 
was left in the hands of the Nawab!s servants.
Thus, in 1772, the Collector was made the sole repre­
sentative of administrative authority in the interior. . In 
those days of slow communication it was very difficult for 
the central authority at Calcutta to keep a watchful eye on 
the activities of that officer. In the absence of any local 
check there was a great danger of the Collector abusing his 
power for his personal gain. On this consideration, the 
Collectors were withdrawn in 1774 and replaced by thejcollective 
authority of Provincial Councils.’*' Their Civil judicial func­
tions were distributed between the Amil, the Indian officer
^Proceedings of G.G.-in-C., 23rd Nov. 1773- Bengal Rev/. Cons.x 
12th Jan. 1774.
*
According to llughal constitution they were collection of revenue 
and administration of Civil justice.
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now appointed for supervising the collection in the Districts,
and the 6 Provincial Councils, created at various Divisional
Headquarters. The former were to try the petty cases and the
latter those of greater magnitude.
In 1780, the judicial functions of the Provincial Councils
were withdrawn. The Civil Courts attached to them were now to
he presided over by separate officers, known as Superintendents
of Dfewani Adalctts.^ In 1781, Dew.ani Adaluts were established
in the 18 Districts into which the territory under the Company's
2
control was then divided. The Provincial Councils were now 
abolished and the Collectors reappointed to all 18 Districts.
But separate Civil Judges having been already appointed 
their former judicial function was not restored to them except
Islamabad and Rungpur, where it was considered superfluous to 
maintain two officers. Even the Collectors of the remaining 
Districts where separate Civil Judges had been stationed 
were not completely divested of judicial authority. All cases 
relating to demands and undue exaction of rent, and all cases
1Ke.
in/four sparsely populated Districts of Chatra, Bhagalpur,
^See Chapter III, p. 117* 
2-^4o-, p. U 7
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relating to public revenue, were reserved to the CollectorjV 
exclusive cognizance in their revenue Courts, styled 'Mai 
AdalOts'.
The reasons for the restoration of the Collectors in 
1781 might have been twofold. In the first place, it must 
have been in the interest ofCollections as the management of rev­
enue by an individual on the spot could be more efficient than 
that by a centralised system of Provincial Councils. And, 
secondly, the danger of the Collector exercising an unrestricted 
tyranny and abusing his powers for personal gain was now 
lessened, in view of the reduction of his judicial functions, 
as also on account of the presence of another covenanted officer 
at the same place (i.e. the Civil Judge).
In 1787, the District. Judgeships were reunited with 
the Collectorships in all the existing Districts except the 
cities of Patna, Dacca and Murshidabad. Shortly afterwards, 
in 1790 (when the Company's Government undertook the manage­
ment of Criminal Justice as well), Magistracy was also assimilated 
with Collectorships. The Collector thus became the District 
Judge, Magistrate and Collector. The above arrangement had 
been carried out by Cornwallis under instruction from the 
Directors.^ The latter had desired this change primarily for
1
Letter from Court, 12th April 1786, para 7.
economy. They were also influenced by the ;,’one master 
theory */expounded by Sir John Shore. Shore had thought 
that placing a single European officer in the District, 
with all the powers, would be the most suitable form of 
administration for the Indians as they had been used to 
looking up to a single despotic authority for the redress 
of all their grievances.^ Besides, the separation of 
Jtidgeships from the Collectorships, made in 1781, had not 
worked well. The transfer of judicial authority to the 
Judge was not complete. The Collectors continued to exer­
cise authority over the revenue cases. As cases concerning 
ownership and possession of land often involved questions 
of revenue, and vice versa, there were very frequent clashes 
between the Collector and the Judge over jurisdiction. On 
this account the functions of both were obstructed, and the 
GovernoivGeneral-in-Council had to waste a lot of time in
deciding disputes over jurisdiction between the Judge and 
2
the Collector. Hence in 1787 it was thought that, ”... the 
energy and simplicity would be much better consulted by the
1
Remarks on the Adm. of justice etc. by Sir John Shore. Bengal 
Revn. Progs.729th May 1785.
2
Shore to Cornwallis, 15th March 1793. Rev'. & Judl. Cons.-29th 
March 1793* No. 1. '
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re-union of the functinns of Civil Judge|b and Collector"
But a combination of revenue and judicial functions
in the same officer was against Cornwallisfs principle of
separation of powers, and his ideal of establishing a 11 rule
of law" in place of the rule of men. He thought,
"The Revenue Officers must be deprived of 
judicial powers. All financial claims of the 
public, when disputed, must be subjected to 
the Courts of justice, superintended by Judges, 
who from their official situation and the 
nature of their trust, shall not only be un­
interested in the result of their decisions, 
but be bound,/by oath/, to decide impartially 
between the Government and the Proprietors of ^
land, and between the Proprietors and the Tenants."
Cornwallis sought to implement the Whig doctrine of 
reducing the executive role of the Government to the minimum. 
To him power in the hands of the Government and its officers 
seemed bound to be abused. Hence he decided to introduce a 
new oi’der in which things would be regulated not by the per­
sonal discretion of individuals but by the impersonal agency 
3
of laws.
Under the system established by Cornwallis in 1793 > 
separate Judgeships were created for all the Districts and
■^Shore to Cornwallis, 15th Harch 1793* Revn. & Judl. Cons.^
29th Harch 1793j Ho. 1.
^Preamble to Regn. II of 1793-
3
5th Report of Select Committee of House of Commons^ Pari. Branch 
Colls., 1812. Vol. 56, p.18.
the judicial authority of Collectors was completely withdrawn. 
By Regulation II of 1793, the M l  Adalcuts or the Revenue 
Courts formerly attached to the Collector’s office, were 
abolished and the cases cognizable by them were transferred 
to the jurisdiction of the District Judge. The ‘Magistracy 
was also combined with the Judgeship.
There was another factor which facilitated the with­
drawal of judicial powers from Collectors. Cornwallis’s 
’’Permanent Settlement” fixed the demands of the Government 
on the Zamindars on a permanent basis. The Zamindars, in 
turn, were required to fix their claims on their Ryots 
or Tenants on a similar basis by issuing to them Pattas or 
title-deeds.^* Prom this a great reduction of disputes 
relating to assessment of revenues could be anticipated.
At least it could be presumed that the demands and obli­
gations being committed to writing, most revenue disputes 
could be easily decided by the Judges like the other kinds 
of suits. The specialised knowledge of Collectors would no 
more be necessary in the trial of most revenue cases. The 
Regulations of 1793 were to be administered by the new District 
Judge and Magistrate. He was to be the pre-eminent figure 
in the District. His domination over the Collector was firmly
‘•Regn. VIII of 1793.
established by the Regulations. The Collector was made 
amenable to the Judge!s Court if he acted contrary to the 
Regulations‘* He was bound to render assistance and obedience 
to the Judge under pain of penalty. In the following years 
those Collectors who could not be reconciled to the Judges* 
superiority and disputed their authority were fined by the 
Judges and/or reprimanded by the Government.^ In 1794, a 
constitutional issue arose in a dispute between Patterson,
2
the Judge. , and Armstrong, the Collector, of Dacca-Jelalpur. 
Certain dependant'' faiuKdars,} (under-farmers) of MaUja >. Salimabad 
had come to the Sadar Station to complain to the Judge about 
the oppression of their Zamindars. Apprehending that those 
Zamindars might complain of loss of revenue due to their absence 
from the '-Taluks-;, they prayed to the Judge to direct the Zamin­
dars concerned to settle their accounts at the Sadar Station.
The Judge issued the order to the Zamindars. The Zamindars, 
however, did not comply with the order and approached the Col­
lector instead. Armstrong, the Collector, refused to take 
cognizance of the Judge's order. After addressing the Judge
^Between 1793 and 1811 a number of Collectors, such as Armstrong, 
Beane, Leycester and Macarab were fined or chided by Govt, 
for disobedience or disrespect to the Judge.
^S.D.A. Progs^ 24th July 1794^ Nos. 40-44.
quite harshly and arrogantly on the subject he had the 
Tal^ukdars seized by Peons and brought to the Kofussil.
Patterson asserted that the Collector was only to 
receive the revenues. Ee had nothing to do with the internal 
management of estates and all disputes between the landholders 
and the tenants were entirely within the jurisdiction of the 
Judge. The Collector replied that the Judge had no authority 
beyond hearing and deciding the actual causes for revenue 
when brought before his Court. He denied the right of the 
Judge to pass any interlocutory orders or orders pending the 
decision of a cause, if such an order interfered with the 
collection of revenue or the internal management cf the estate.
The S.D.A. not only upheld fully the Judge's stand 
but informed him tiat instead of entering into correspondence 
with the Collector over the justification of his orders he 
ought to have fined the Collector forthwith for disobedience 
under Regulation III of 1793 •
Thus the Collectors were reduced to the position 
that their designation implied. But though their power of 
judicial decision was withdrawn certain judicial functions 
were left with them. They were in the form of investigation, 
distrairtfor default, and execution of decrees passed in 
favour of the Government, in cases connected with land
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revenue."^ * By Regulation XXIV of 1793» the Collectors were
entrusted with conducting investigations into matters relating 
2
to pensions, and into the applications for separation of 
Taluks or small estates from their dependencies on Zamin- 
daries to which they had been attached. They tere also em­
powered to detain or attach or sell the property of persons 
defaulting in the payment of Government revenue.
Besides, by S. 13 Regulation V H  of 1794, the District 
Judges were authorised to refer to the Collectors for report 
and adjustment any matters of account connected with suits 
concerning demands, arrears and undue enaction of rent, or 
any other matters formerly cognizable by the Revenue Courts. 
Jhen such a suit was referred to the Collector for investi­
gation and report the parties and the Vakeels had to appear 
before him for examination before he made his report. It is 
true that the Judge was free to reject or alter the recommenda­
tion of the Collector. But ihe above procedure in many cases 
rendered the Collector the person whose opinion directed the
These Judicial functions of the Collectors were noticed in the 
5th Report of the Select Committee of House of Commons. Pari. 
Branch Coll., Vol. 56, 1812, p.26.
It had been the practice of the previous Govt, (of the Nazim) 
to grant pensions to various^ descriptions of Hindus and Muslims, 
like Muxias, Pandits and Faquirs. This was continued by the 
Company administratinn. y
decision though he did not actually pronounce the judgment.^-
By Regulation V 0^ 1812 all suits concerning distraint or
attachment of property of t*yots, for arrears of rent were
required to be referred by the Judges to the Collector; for
investigation and report. Any party dissatisfied with the
a
decision of the Judge on the basis of^Collectorfs report was
free to institute a regular suit in the Civil Court for a
more formal investigation into the merits of the case.
The delegation of the aforesaid judicial function^ to
the Collectors was, in fact, a concession to the practical
necessity of providing assistance to the District Judges for
a quicker disposal of such suits and also a recognition of the
superior fitness of the Collector, in the investigation of suits
2connected with revenue.
But this dual process of institution and decision before 
one tribunal and investigation by another was bound to be in­
convenient to the suitors and their Vakeels*, nor could it be 
expected to ensure a speedier disposal of those suits. By 1814
^The Directors also made a similar remark in: Judl. Despatch
to Bengal, 9th Nov. 1814, para 78.
2
It may be recalled that all suits connected with rent and re­
venue were to be given a top priority in disposal by the Judges 
They were to be disposed of by a summary process^ leaving the 
party dissatisfied with the Summary investigation to file a 
regular suit. See Chapter III, p. 125-6.
several Judges had complained of those difficulties.
As a reason for his not having referred to the Col­
lector even a single cause in the months of December 1812, 
and January and February 1813, Shakespear, the Judge of Rajshahy 
stated:
M... after the promulgation of the Regulation 
5 of 1812, several suits were referred to the 
Collector for his report; but on the proceed­
ings being returned, a petition was invariabfcr 
presented to the Court by the party dissatisfied 
with the Collector1s investigation, and the Col­
lector not having passed any definitive order 
on the case, I was compelled to go over the 
whole of the papers again, and not only to pass 
my own decision on the merits of the case, 
but in many instances to combat the reasoning 
of the Collector which differed from my own....
Finding that the application of the rule of S.21. 
Regulation 5 of 1812 /requiring all suits for 
distraint and attachment for arrears of revenue 
to be referred to Collector's investigation/ 
took up more of my time than if I had decided 
the cause myself, and considering that the object 
of the Regulation was to relieve the Judicial 
Court, I desisted from making any further refer­
ence to the Collector."^
Fortescue, the Judge of Allahabad, summed up the incon­
veniences of the process in the following words:
”••• /Summary cases/ first occupycthe Court, for some time 
in previous preparation for despatch to that 
officer /Collector/; when they are returned from
^H. Shakespear to S.D.A., 3rd May 1814. Civ. Judl. Cons., 12th 
July 1814, No. 4.
him, one of the parties is sure to allege the 
Collector’s statement, and the Judge must go 
over the matter^ afresh to settle the plaint 
decided absolutely on Collector’s account. In 
the first place much time is consumed by the 
Court in repeated proceedings, without any 
material advantage from the Collector’s labour, 
and second, it would have saved the Judge’s time 
if the Collector had originally the power to 
determine, at once, the dispute, besides, the 
transfer of the suits backward and forward, pre­
vents the regular Vakeels of the Court, if they 
should be employed, from attending to their 
/regulai^business. • • ,f^
The Judge informs the Government further that the Summary
suits (which it had been the intention <f the administration
to dispose of with utmost despatch by giving them top priority),
2frequently occupied 3 to 4 years for disposal.
For similar reasons the Judge of Nuddea recommended' 
that: "Either the Collectors should be empowered to decide 
entirely in these cases, or that their intervention be dispensed 
with.”'* *
A substantial relief could be provided to the Judges 
only by authorising the Collectors to decide upon such suits 
instead of merely investigating and reporting upon them. This
Letter from Allahabad Judge, in answer to Lord Moira’s interro­
gatories, dtd. 1st SeptI 1814. Home Misc. ^eries^ Vol. 776.
Ibid.
3
Answer to interrogatories of Moira by ITuddea Judge. H.II.S.- 
Vol. 775, pp. 168-9, para 36.
was realised soon by the Bengal authorities. The first pro­
posal for investing the Collectors with such powers was 
initiated by the Kin to Government in 1809-"^  This was sur­
prising because Kinto was a firm supporter of the 11 separation 
of powers’* and had been opposed to the granting of judicial 
powers to the Collectors on principle. He had earlier re­
solved to bring about a complete separation between the re­
venue end judicial cervices and had rejected outright a sug­
gestion of the S.D.A. for occasionally empowering the Collectors
2
to act as Assistant Judges. The S.D.A. strongly supported the 
idea of vesting the Collectors with power of decision over
3
revenue suits; the Directors, though they reserved their final
4
opinion on' the issue, found it unobjectionable. But the Kinto 
Government itself turned back on the proposition on the grounds 
of expected expenditures involved in providing for an extra 
establishment for the Collectors in the event of their being
^Letter from Secy, to Govt, to S.D.A., dtd. 22nd July 1809.
Civ. Judl. Cons.j22nd July 1809. No. 2.
2
See Chapter III, pp. ^
3
Half yearly report from S.D.A. Civ. Judl. Cons., 17th Nov.
1809. No. 1. . .
4Judl. despatch to Bengal, 2nd June 1812, para 7, Vol. I.
required to decide upon the Summary suits and also on the 
ground^ of an apprehension of a collision of authority be­
tween the Judge and the Collector, since cases of rent and 
revenue often involved matters of right and possession which 
had to be in the Judge’s jurisdiction.^ Another objection
2
to the above meaaure which the Minto Government stated later,
on a similar proposal from the Board of Revenue, was, that
in many suits originating in Iflias I-Iahal, or the lands directly 
managed by the Government (through the Collectors)^the Col­
lectors might themselves be interested parties, to an extent.
The S.D.A., which maintained a uniform attitude on the question, 
argued that if the Collector’s power of decision wcxS- exer­
cised under the control of the Judged, who would have the dis­
cretion of referring a particular suit to the Collector or not, 
the objection regarding the risk of collision of authority, 
and the one of the Collector deciding a cause in which he him­
self might be an interested party, would fall to the ground.
It would always be at the discretion of the Judge to withhold
the
from the cognizance of,Collectors any suits which he might not
3
think proper to refer to 'him.
^Judl. Letter from Bengal, d£d- 30th June 1813, Vol. 3, p.165.
2
Letter from Judl. Secy, to S.D.A.^dhcL 31st July 1813j Civ. 
Judl. Cons.j31s't July 1813* No. 1.
3
Opinion of S.D.A. on investing the Collectors with the Judicial 
powers recorded in Half yearly Report. Civ. Judl. Cons.. 31st 
July 1813. No. 1. D
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The S.D.A. suggested further,^- that all the judgments 
or orders passed.by the Collectors were to be enforced by the 
Judges, which, in turn, would obviate the necessity of pro­
viding any extra establishment for the Collectors. The S.D.A. 
favoured the extension of the power of the Collectors to 
enable them to decide upon the Summary suits for rent. But 
they wanted the exercise of such a power to be completely 
subject to the discretion and control of the Judges. The 
summary suits were to be instituted before the Judges and then 
referred by them to the Collectors for decision; and again, 
the judgments or orders of the Collectors were to be executed 
by the Judges.
There were two alternatives, either to give an original 
and exclusive jurisdiction to the Collectors to receive and 
try summary suits in the first instance, which in effect would 
have substantially relieved the fudges from botheration over 
those suits, or else to make a limited extension as proposed 
by the S.D.A. It was a choice between making a modest departure 
from Cornwallis's principle, or striking at the very root of 
it by vesting the Collectors with judicial powers Independent of
■^Opinion of S.D.A. on investing the Collectors with Judicial 
powers, recorded in Half yearly Report. Civ. Judl. Cons., 51s t 
July 1815. Ho. I.
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the control of the regular judiciary. But the Minto Government 
kept averse to making any extension of the judicial powers of 
the .Collectors. The only concession they made in this direction 
was to make it incumbent upon the Judges to refer a particular 
class of Summary suits to the CollectonrV investigation. This 
was done by Regulation V of 1812^which has been noticed earlier.
In their Judicial despatch of 9th November 1814 the 
Directors suggested^* the transfer of disputes for demands and 
undue exactions of rent to the M bonafide cognizance" of Col­
lectors, subject to a revision by the regular Courts of justice, 
by way of appeal. This, they thought, would benefit bo'th Zamindars
and ryots. As for the above measure being a departure from
2
Cornwallis’s principles, the Directors argued that such de­
partures had, in effect, been made in the past by providing 
for reference of cases connected with rent to the Collector's 
investigation (under Regulations XVII of 1794 and V of 1812). 
Besides, as the provision of Regulation VIII of 1793» requiring 
the Zamindars to grant 'PattaKsr or title-deeds to their under­
tenants^ had hardly been adhered to, the Directors held that the
^"Judl. Despatch, 9 th Nov. 1814. Vol. J>, para. 93.
2
Ibid., paras 73-80.
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position of the vyots, vis-a-vis (the oppression of) the Zamindars, 
remained unchanged.’*’ The demands over the Tdyots, not having 
been conveyed in -writing, could^and were being^made arbitrarily 
by the Zamindars. It is true that the provisions requiring 
the issue of Pattajfcs remained ineffective. This was due to a 
general reluctance on the part of the Zamindars to issue the 
Patta#, as also a deliberate neglect on the part of* the *r.yots 
to demand it. Actually., neither party wanted to commit the de­
mand or obligation to writing because that would have closed
ft
the door for one to demand more and for the other to claim to 
pay less. Under such circumstances disputes over arrears or 
undue exaction of rent went on adding to the files of the al­
ready overburdened Civil Courts of the District. In the ab­
sence of documentary attestation, their.investigation became 
complicated and cumbersome. As early as 1795 the Judges of 
Burdwan and Beerbhoom had complained of the inconveniences
and delays in the decision of the Summary suits due to the
2
general absence of Patta$s.
It was not clearly stated in the Directors’ despatch
whether they wanted thesuits to be instituted before the Collectors,
■*\Judl. Despatch, 9th Nov. 1814, Vol. 5, para. 75*
^S.D.A. Progs., 16th April 1795. ho. 71.
but from the expression "bonafide cognizance of Collectors" 
it can be interpreted that they meant it to be. But at 
the same time, it is clear that the Directors wanted the 
regular Civil Judiciary to retain its control over the de­
cisions of the Collectors. This is apparent from the proposal 
that the Collector’s decisions were to be "subject to the re­
vision of the regular courts of justice by way^of appeal".
On 2nd October 1815 Lord Hastings, who had succeeded 
Lord Minto in August 1813, recorded a minute, in which he 
. stated, ".... an immediate relief to the Civil Courts may be 
affected by transferring to the Collectors, the cognizancecf 
all questions of rent Apparently because of Hastings’s
conviction and the Director's7 despatch there was a complete 
change in the attitude of the Bengal Government on the question 
of extending the judicial powers of the Collectors. In 1816 
the Governor-General-in-Council forwarded to the S.D.A. for 
their consideration and opinion a draft regulation for the re­
establishment of Hal Adalats. This draft had been prepared by
2
the Board of Revenue under instructions from the Government.
^Minute of Lord Eastings, 21st Sept. 1815. Printed in Papers 
relating to the Judl. System of Bengal Reg.(7l) 197.
2
Civ. Judl. Cons.jl4th June 1816. No. 2. 28-.
It proposed the re-establishment of the revenue courts under 
the Collectors, who were to have original, exclusive and final 
jurisdiction over all causes of rent, and their decision-was 
to be subject to an appeal only to the Board of Revenue.
The S.D.A. strongly opposed this proposal, basing its 
arguments on the reports received from several District Judges 
on the issue.^ The main points of the objectins stated by 
the S.D.A* were as follows:
i) Host Collectors were already fully occupied with revenue
affairs and would not be able to take the extra judicial 
2
load. Besides this^the jurisdiction of several Col­
lectors not being coincident with those of the District 
Civil Courts, inconveniences and complications might 
arise in some cases. For instance, in the Benares Divi­
sion, there were three District Courts, presided over by
^■Remarks of S.D.A. on the proposed re-establishment of Hal Adaluts. 
Printed in Papers relating to Judicial system of Bengal^ •Reg. (7l) 197.
2
The load of Summary suits could be quite heavy. For example^ the 
number of such suits instituted in some of the Districts of Lower 
Provinces between 1st July 1815 and 30th June 1816 were in Burd- 
wan alone (independently of Eooghly, Junglemahal and part of 
Beerbhoom, which were all under the Collectorship of Burdwan) - 
2655; Chittagong - 1606; Purnea - 1398; Murshidabad - 1155;
Tirhoot - 3272 and Tipperah - 963.
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the District Judges, in the Districts of Benares City, 
Mirzapur and Jaunpur, but there was only one Collector, 
stationed at Benares, for all the three Districts.
Hooghly, Junglemahal and Burdwan were likewise under 
the single Collectorship of Burdwan; while Beerbhoom 
was partly under the Collectorship of Burdwan and partly 
subject to the Collectorship of Murshidabad.
ii) Cases of rent were often intimately connected with 
questions of right and possession, which were to be 
determined by the Civil Courts. Hence in the event 
of exclusive jurisdictimover cases of rent being 
vested in the revenue authorities it would be difficult 
to define the suits thus excluded from the cognizance
of the Civil Courts so exactly as to prevent an occasional 
collision of authority and embarrassment.
iii) Incongruous and sometimes incompatible decisions could
be expected in the same cause of action, if cognizance
of all claims to a right of property or possession in
'i f
land were reserved for the Civil Courts, and^claims re­
lating to rent, which often involved disputed possession, 
on the adjustment of which depended the right of possession 
in many cases, were made exclusively cognizable by the 
Collectors.
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iv; The proposed delegation of exclusive jurisdiction to
the Collectors was directly against the principles de­
clared by Lord Cornwallis*
✓—\ I
But the S.D.A. did not oppose the revival of the Collector's1 
Courts altogether. They only suggested that if they were to be 
established, their decisions should be made appealable to the 
Civil Courts of the District Judges, instead of to the Board 
of Revenue. This, in fact, had also been the tenor of the sug­
gestion of the Directors.
The Hastings Government now performed a somersault by 
retracting completely its scheme for the extension of the judi­
cial powers of the Collectors. The justification'*- offered was
2
that the already improving state of arrears in the Civil Courts 
precluded the necessity of calling for any extra aid for the 
Civil Courts, by the reestablishment of Hal Adalqts, and by 
investing the Revenue officers with very extensive powers and 
jurisdiction over the administration of Civil Justice. On that 
ground, and also talcing into account the various objections raised 
by the S.D.A. against the revival of Hal Adalats in their old 
form, the Govemor-General-in-Council found it expedient to suspend
■^Judl. letter from Bengal, 4th July 181V ^ prs. 59 & 60. Vol. 6. 
S ’or details regarding reduction of arrears see Chapter III.
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the immediate adoption of any arrangement of that nature, even 
in the modified form that had been suggested by the S.D.A.^
The Governor-General-in-Council, however, fried to
2console themselves by recalling that without formally reviving 
The Mai Adalats or extending the authority of the Collectors 
over the Summary suits, considerable additional duties of a 
judicial nature had been confided to the Collectors and superior 
revenue authorities lately; for example, the power of revenue 
authorities regarding resumption of rent-free lands in the Ceded 
and Conquered Provinces, and in the Provinces of Bihar and 
Benares, as also the power of revenue authorities throughout 
the country of investigating and deciding upon cases relating 
to the infringement of excise laws.
The Constitutional position of Collectors regarding 
summary suits remained unchanged. In fact it deteriorated further 
when by Regulation XIX of 1817, the choice of referring to Col­
lectors summary suits relating to distraint of property for 
arrears of rent was restored to the District Judges. This dis­
cretion had been withdrawn earlier by Regulation V of 1812, which 
had made it imperative on the Judges to refer all those suits
^■Judl. letter, 4th July 1817, para 60, Vol. 6.
2
Xbid., para 61.
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to the Collectors for investigation and report. This was 
apparently done on account of the various inconveniences 
that had been felt by the Judges in referring all such suits 
to the Collectors.^
.Though the Hastings Government did not nominate it 
as a reason for not investing the Collectors with judicial 
powers 5the ability and experience of the Collectors to exer­
cise a power of judicial decision was, nevertheless, doubted 
by some. Commenting on the proposal of extending the power 
of Collectors to decide upon Summary suits, the Chieif Secretary, 
Dowdswell, observed;
”... The plan generally rests on a basis, which 
I apprehend, is quite unsound. It supposes that 
the Collectors will bestow a considerable share 
of their time and trouble to the discharge of a 
duty of a most irksome nature, which is in a 
great measure, foreign to the ordinary functions 
of their office .... It supposes likewise, the 
knowledge of the course of judicial proceedings, 
which few of the Collectors possess ...”2
In 1820, Stuart, a member of Hastings’s Council, who had 
previous^ served as a Judge of the S.D.A. for 6 years (1810-16), 
commenting on the Directors’ insistence upon extending the judi­
cial power of Collectors, remarked;
^See ante pp. 167-8 JThe S.D.A. also advanced the same justification 
later in 1824. Civ. Judl. Cons.^ 2nd July 1824^ No. 12. 4fol. -52*
2
Chief Secy.'s report, 17th Nov. 1814- Civ. Judl. Cons.j29tJi Nov.
1814j No. 27.
"The office of the Collector in'Lower Provinces, 
has come to be considered as one that requires 
less tal:ent and activity .... Hence the Government 
has been tempted to select the ablest of the Brit­
ish officers for the judicial branch in the Lower 
Provinces, and in consequence, the office of the 
Collector has been filled, generally speaking, with^ 
least capable and efficient of Civil servants "
That the Collectors office was bestowed on men of
inferior capability or integrity is also demonstrated by
the fact that Judges found guilty of corruption, neglect
or misconduct, and in consequence, considered unfit to hold
a judicial situation, were made Collectors, as a mark of
punishment.^
Though finally, after all the discussions, the power 
of Collectors regarding Summary suits remained unaltered (and 
the Judges were even freed from the Statutory obligation of 
referring all suits under Regulation V , of 1 8 1 2 to the Col­
lector's investigation), the Eastings administration became 
keen to se"^ e that the available assistance of the Collectors 
was utilised to the fullest practicable extent.
1
Kinute of Stuart, 21st Aug. 1820. Civ. Judl. Cons.^lst Sept, 
1820  ^Eos. 10-12.
o
'■ Thus f 3 ire Alexander ^eton in 1808, and J. V. Biscoe, in 1824, 
after having been found guil:ty of misconduct and negligence, 
and consequently having been considered unfit to hold their 
situations of Judge-Kagistrates, were appointed Collectors.
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During 1818, out of the 35,521 Summary suits for rent
disposed of by the Civil Courts, only 6,051 had been referred
to the Collectors, out of which their reports had been obtained
in respect of 4,377. In many Districts, not a single suit of
that nature hid been referred to the Collector's investigation,
while in some the numbers referred had been trifling.^ In
noticing these facts the Governor—General-in-Council directed
the S.D.A. to draw the attentionjof the District Judges to
the importance of their availing themselves of the aid of 
2
Collectors whenever the circumstances would permit of a more
3
speedy decision by the Collectors than by the Judge. In the 
following year, the Government, after analysing the Annual 
Report of S.D.A. for 1820, again felt dissatisfied with the 
number of such references made to the Collectors during the 
year (which was only 6,22 0 of which the .Collectors had re­
ported on 4,613), and remarked that: "The judicial officers,
in general, had not availed themselves of the assistance of re-
1 * ’
Annual Report of S.D.A. for 1818. The Dists. where no suits
had been referred to the. Collector's investigation T.ere Hooghly,
Beerbhoom, Backerganj, Chittagong, Dacca-Jelalpur, Sylhet,
Rungpur and B®har. In some.,very few suits were referred, e.g.
in Bhagalpur - 2; Dacca City - 1 4; Rajshahy - 27; Civ. Judl.
Cons.j 13th Aug. 1819, Nofc.\ 13-22.
2 #
Letter from Govt, to S.D.A.y13th Aug. 1819j Civ. Judl. Cons.?13th 
Aug. 1819j No. 34.
3
Govt, to 3.D.A.jl3th Aug* 1819j Civ. Judl. C o n s 1 3 t h  Aug. 1819  ^No.34*
venue authorities, in the decision of Summary suits to 
the extent to which it was desirable.11"^
Collectors who showed any slackness in reporting upon 
the suits referred to them were called upon by the Govern­
ment to explain the reasons for the delay in the submission of 
2
their reports. For example, in 1819, explanations were de­
manded from the Collectors of Jessore, Kidnapore, Twenty- 
four Parganas, Dinagepur and Murshidabad for the reasons 
for the delays which seemed to have occurred in the investi­
gation of the cases referred to them during the second half of 
1818. The replies received from the Collectors were considered 
to be satisfactory. Still, such a practice was definitely 
calculated to make the Collectors more alert towards this 
branch of their duty.
Under the vigilant attitude of the Government and under
the increasing pressure of business before the District Civil
■3
Courts froml820 onwards, there was an increase of the use of 
the agency of Collectors.
“^Govt. to S.D.A., 17th Dec. 1821, Civ. Judl. Cons., 17th Dec. 
1821, No. 30.
2
Letter from Govt, to Board of Revenue, 27th Aug. 1819, Civ. 
Judl. Cons., 3rd Sept. 1819, No. 2.
rz
Letter from Board of Revenue to Govt. (No date), Civ. Judl. 
Cons., 7th Dec. 1819, No. I.
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During 1822^ the Collectors investigated and reported
upon 6,946 such suits; this number increased to 7,406 
2
for 1823. The S.D.A. then had the satisfaction of reporting 
that the judicial authorities were "now generally availing them­
selves of the aid of Collectors in the disposal of Summary 
suits for rent.'1
Meanwhile, the movement for extention of the Collector’s 
judicial powers had again been gathering strength. The exi­
gencies of revenue administration in the unsettled districts 
of the Western Provinces forced the Goverment to invest the 
Collectors of those Districts with power to determine suits
arising from disputes relating to irrigation, boundaries, crops
4and other local rights connected with land. The powers vested
5
in the Collectors of the Western Provinces extended in 1825
to the Collectors of Khasmahal, Sunderbans and such other areas
as the hill lands of Bhagalpur and all other waste lands which
had not been specifically included within the limits of the 
estates permanently settled in the Lower Provinces. The judicial
1 Annual Report for 1822, Statement ’P f, Civ. Judl. Cons., 23rd Dec.
Nos. 10-25.
2
Annual Report for 1823, Statement fP f, Civ. Judl. Cons., 10th March 1825, 
Nos. 21-40.
3
Ibid. General remarks of tie S.D.A. on the report.
By Regulation YII of 1822.
By Regulation IX of 1825.
functinns of the revenue authorities were increased In a few 
more cases also in order to provide further relief to the 
Civil Courts. For example, Regulation II of 1822, which speci­
fied the conditions for the validity of sales for arrears of 
rent, and defined the nature of the title and interest conveyed 
to the person purchasing the estate, also vested the revenue 
officers with the powers to rectify any errors that might 
he committed in respect of the above, at the time of the sale.
Between 1815 and 1819 there had been a general reduction 
of arrears of pending causes. This naturally produced a feeing 
of optimism in the existing system which made Hastings1 s Govern­
ment more reluctant to make any basic changes in the same.
But after 1819» when the arrears started to mount again," the 
succeeding Governments of Adam and Amher&twere persuaded to 
give a trial to some of the reforms suggested by the Directors.
Thus a proposal from the S.D.A. ' was enacted into Regu-
1
'Though all the Judges were unanimous on the desirability of 
vesting the Collectors with the power of decision Harrington, 
the acting Chief Justice, wanted a simultaneous delegation of 
such powers to the deodar Ameens, because he thought that most 
Collectors^being already fully occupied, could not give ade­
quate time to the trial of Summary suits. But to Harrington1s 
proposal, Smith, the 2nd J.^offered many objections with which 
the rest of the J ’s agreed. The Govn.GenT*in-Council also doubted 
with Harrington whether the Collectors alone, being already bu 
could offer much aid in this direction, although they decided 
abide by the majority decision.
H*
 
to
lation XIV of 1824,^7 the Amherst Government, and vested 
in the Collectors generally "authority to hear, investigate 
and determine, subject to a regular suit in the Civil Court, 
all suits concerning demands of rent, arrears or exactions 
of rent, between landholders or farmers of land, and their 
under-tenants, or between any other persons concerned in the 
receipt or payment of land revenue."^- In the trial of those 
cases, the Collectors were given the same powers as were pre­
viously vested in the- Civil Courts, for causing the attendance
2
of parties and their witnesses.
The operation of this Regulation was bound to provide
more relief to the Judges, and at the same time, ensure a
quicker disposal of the Summary suits. This is borne out by
the increase in the number of disposals of such suits by the
3
Collectors, after its promulgation. By 1830, the Bengal 
Government had the satisfaction of noticing that the powers 
vested in the Collectors by the above Regulation generally
4
relieved the District Courts.
^"Preamble to Regulation XIV of 1824.
2/m ,
^Section 4,* l -w.'■ ■,
Disposal by the Collectors increased as follows: in 1824- 8,173
1825 - 9,279; 1826 - 13,166; 1827 - 10,860; 1828 - 11,349; 
1829 - 12,743* Data compiled from the Annual Reports of those 
years.
A
‘Judl. letter from Bengal^9th ITov. 1830, p.37* Vol. 14.
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But Regulation XIV had. not transferred the original 
jurisdiction; in respect of the Summary suits to the Col­
lectors. Those suits still had to he instituted before the 
Judge, who had the discretion of referjlLng all, any or none . 
of them to the Collector for his decision. The power of 
executing the Collector's orders or decrees was also reserved 
to the Judges. This was probably done to avdid a clash over 
jurisdiction between the Judge and the Collector. Also 
the administrative opinion in Bengal had not yet grown strong 
enough to make a complete break with Cornwallis's principles.
The delegation of the power of jud-icial decision to the Col­
lectors does represent a compromise o£ Cornwallis's philosophy.
But, at the same time, the retention of a complete control over 
the judicial functions of the revenue authorities in the hands 
of the Judges demonstrates that the Bengal Government was not 
yet prepared to break completely with Cornwallis's ideals #nd 
"the deadweight of administrative traditionalism it had come 
to represent".^
The inconvenience of the system adopted in 1824 came
under attack under the reforming tide of Bentinck's administration, 
»
r . Brie Stokes, The English Utilitarians &nA India, p.157.
Bayley, a member of Bentinck's Council, remarked:
"... there seems no good reason, specially since 
all suits of this description /Summary suits/ 
are, under the provisions of Regulation 14 of 
1824, referred to, and tried by, the Collectors, 
for requiring that they should be instituted 
before the Judge. They clog the files of the 
Courts and serve greatly to increase the miscel­
laneous business, while with the decision of them 
the Courts have nothing to do., .... The imposition 
of an unjust demand cn the one hand or the evasion 
of a just one on the other, being more easily de­
tected, at first sight, by the revenue authorities 
than by the judicial, ... such claims would be less 
frequently brought forward, if their entire juris­
diction should be transferred to the Collectors”.^
Aver since 1809, the S.D.A. had been consistently and
strongly favouring the extension of Collector's judicial powers
to decision over the Summary suits. In 1824, the S.D.A. won
its point when the Collectors were given the power to decide
upon the suits referred to them- by the Judges. But at the
same time the S.D.A. was keen to maintain a firm control over
the Collector's judicial activity in the hands of the regular
Civil judiciary. This attitude was amply demonstrated by their
vehement opposition to the proposal for the establishment of
the I-lal AdalOts in 1817. They thought that the powers which
had been granted to the Collectors in 1824 had catered to the
"^Minute of h. B. Bayley, &td. 5th Nov. 1829. Civ. Judl. Cons.^ 
12th Oct.1830^ ho. 69.
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practical necessity without sacrificing the sacred principles 
of separation of powers, and of the supremacy of judiciary, 
which they were zealous to preserve. Hence the majority of 
the Judges of the S.D.A. opposed Bayley's proposal of vesting 
the Collectors with original jurisdiction in cases of rent.
They saw in it an impious infringement of the structure and 
spirit of Cornwallisfs hallowed system, as well as a breach of 
the privilege of the regular judiciary.^
But Bentinck seemed to entertain no such sentiments and
2
he agreed fully with Bayley’s arguments.
Bayley’s plan was accordingly incorporated in Regulation 
VIII of 18315which authorised the Collectors to receive and de­
cide Summary cases for rent. Any party dissatisfied, with the 
Collector’s award had the option of instituting a regular Civil 
suit before the Judge, who was entitled to reverse or alter 
the Collector’s decision. The District Judges, at the same time, 
were forbidden to receive any claim for rent, unless it was 
preferred as a regular Civil suit. This removed the possibility 
of a clash of jurisdiction. The Collectors were also authorised 
to execute their own decrees.
Mi nute of Js of S.D.A. on Bayley’s proposal. Ross, the 5th J., 
criticised it as a "halfmeasure which ignored important questions 
of principle”. P.B.CbUs.18^ 2. ITo. 773 Appx. Ho. 2.
‘"Resolution of G.C.-in-C_j 12th Oct. 183 0^  Civ. Judl.Cons.y 
12th Oct. 183Cj Ho. 80.
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Transfer of Magistracy to the Collectors
It has been noticed in Chapter III that the trial of
regular Civil suits and appeals was not the only occupation
of the Judges of the Districts. They had many additional
duties to perform, of which the Magisterial functions were
the most arduous.^ It often required of them more time
than they could give to the Civil business.
As early as 18C1, Tufton, the Judge Magistrate of
2illah BChar, had advocated the appointment of a separate
Magistrate to that District so that he could devote his un-
2divided attention to Civil business. But the request was 
not sanctioned.
Under the Constitution of 1793 > tie functions of the Kg£t. 
were control and supervision of Police, apprehension and 
preventions of Crimes, punishment of petty offences, and 
commitment'of prisoners Charged with heinous offences to 
trial before the Court of Circuit. The list of offences 
triable and punishable by the I-lagts. was enlarged subse­
quently (by Regulations XII of 1818, I of 1822, and X of 
1824) so that by 1824 offences like house-breaking, burglary, 
affrays not attended with homicide or grievous hurt, escaping 
from prison, etc., had been transferred to the cognizance of 
the Magt. to ensure their quicker disposal. By Regulation 
XV of 1824 the power of Summary investigation and award, in 
cases of dispossession, was transferred to the Magt. By Re­
gulation XIV of 1816, he had been entrusted with the maintenance 
of order and discipline in the Jails.
2
The Judge suggested the above measure instead of the proposed 
transfer of portions of that Dist., to the adjoining Dists. of 
Ramgurh, Bhcagalpur, Shahabad and Patna, for reducing the press­
ure of business before the Dist. Court of Gaya. Tr ^
Tufton to Patna Provincial Court, 7th June 1801^ Civ. Judl. 
Cons, y 9 th Sept. 1801 ^ Nos. 3 & 4.
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In 1810 Ernst, the Judge of Circuit for Benares Division, 
remarked,
"... the Criminal business of our Courts claim
their /judge-MagistrateVy first care, and in most
Districts it has always been so heavy and so much
stress has been laid on the state of Police, that
the Magistrates have had but very little time to
spare for Civil Courts. The consequence has been
that these have been overloaded with business
that it has been found almost in vain to seek legal1 °
redress in matters of property....
In 1812, Sliakespear, the Judge Magistrate of Jessore,
while stressing the necessity of continuing the services of
an Assistant Judge there, had stated;
”1 have regularly reported my inability to sit 
more than ^wo days in’the week, sometimes only one, 
in the Dfcwani Ad5lQ.t. Heavy duties of the Criminal 
Court require the most unremitting attention”.?
In 1813, the same gentleman, as the Judge Magistrate of ITuddea,
had been devoting four of the six working days in the week to
3
Criminal duties. It may be recalled that by Regulation III 
of 1793 (s.5) the Judge s were required to sit at least three 
days in the week for the disposal of Civil business.
^Letter from Ernst to Govt.^dtd 12th May 1810, quoted in Judl. 
Despatch to Bengalj 28th Oct. 1814y Vol. 2, para 40,
2
Letter from Shakespear to S.D.A., 14th Jan. 1812^ Civ. Judl.
Cons 10th Feb. 1813j I'Tos. 15 c: 16.
3
Charge note of Her^ ejy Shakespear^ Civ. Judl. Cons.; 18th Sept. 1813j 
l'j o . 2.
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During the second half of 1814# Douglas, the Judge-*
Magistrate of Patna, had been so occupied with the irial of
petty Criminal suits that he could decide only one regular
1
and twenty-five Summary suits during those six months.
Likewise, in 1826, Vibrat, the Judge~I>lagistrate of Rajshahy,
was so engaged with his Magisterial duties that he could de-
2
cide only one Civil suit during the whole of that year.
The inexpediency of the union of Civil Judgeship and 
Magistracy was noticed in the 5th Report of the Select Com­
mittee in 1812, which commented; - "If as a Judge, he /Ehe 
Judge-Magistrate^exerts /himself7to reduce Civil business, 
the Magistrate's office is in the danger of falling into 
arrears, and if he employs himself sufficiently in the latter,
3
the file of the Civil business must swell."
The incompatibility of these two offices was acknow­
ledged by the Governor-General; Lord Hastings, in the following 
words,
"The business of Judge necessarily confines him 
to his court house. The duties of Magistrate can 
perhaps never be so properly executed as while 
he is engaged in a personal visit to every part 
of the District. Preservation of peace calls for 
all the active energy of youth.... A Judge should 
perhaps be abstracted from all private converse 
with the natives. A Magistrate must maintain a
"4le had disposed of 104 petty Criminal cases in the same period.
Civ. Judl. Cons.,29th Dec. 1814; Nos. 4-7. V.h
‘"Judl. Letter^ 9th Nov. 1830^ Vol. 14, p.34*
^5th Report of Select Committee of House of Commons. Pari. Dranch Colls., 
1812, Vol. 56, p.69.
192
most intimate communication with then
Justice should be blind, but Police requires the
eyes of Argus.
The first statutory/- provision for the separation of 
Magistracy from Judgeship was made by Regulation X\TI of 1810, 
which besides providing for the appointment of Assistant 
Magistrates enacted that the Superintendents of Police for 
the Lower and Western Provinces could be entrusted with 
the Magistracy of the Districts lying close to their head­
quarters. It was, however, not practicable to mahe any ez- 
tcnsive use of this provision. Only the Magistracy of the 
twenty-four Pargana^s was transferred to the charge of the
Superintendent of Police for the jJower provinces, and that
2
for a very short period.
The authorities, both in London and in Bengal, were 
agreed that the Magistracy should be transferred from the Judges, 
in the interest of an efficient administration of both Civil 
and Criminal justice. But, as to the node of transfer, there 
existed a difference of opinion between the two. There were 
two alternatives. Either separate officers were to be appointed
1
Minute of Lord Hastings, dtd, 21st Dept. 1815, para 9G.
Printed h Papers relating to the Judicial system of Bengal^
Zarj. 71 (197).
2
"The Magistracy was transferred bad: to the Judge of twenty- 
four Parganaj/.s on gist Dec. 1811. Judl. despatch, 28th Oct. 1814; 
Vol. 2, para. 172.
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tc held charge of the Magistracy, or else the Magistracy was 
to he transferred to the second officer of the District - 
the Collector.
In 1814, the Directors, keepingin line with their pro­
posal to the Madras Government of making a general union of 
Magistracies with, the Collectorships, desired the Bengal Ad­
ministration also to make a general transfer of Police and 
Magistracy to the Collectors.^ They made their dewire imperative 
on this point;- M... our orders are preemptory that the powers
of Magistrate shall hereafter be vested in the Collector, to-
2
gether with the superintendence of police."
But to such a proposal objections came from many sources 
in Bengal. The S.D.A., basing its views on the opinions ex­
pressed by the Provincial and District Judges on the issue, 
tendered the following objections:
i) The Collectors of the Ceded and Conquered Provinces 
(Western Province^), where the Permanent Settlement 
had not been extended, were fully occupied with their 
revenue and settlement duties. Hence they would be
^Judl. Despatch; 9th ITov. 1814; Vol. 5, paras. 165-168.
^Judl. Despatch. 10th April 1816. Vol. 4, pp. 37—38.
^Letter from S.D.A. to Govt., 9th March 1818, para 166. 
Papers on the Judl. system of Bengal; Keg.71 (197).
unable to share any new burden.
It was doubtful whether even any of the Collectors of 
the Lower Provinces could perform the whole of the 
additional duties that the Magistracy would impose, 
without neglecting their revenue functions.
Many Collectors were without any previous judicial 
experience. Hence they might not be competent to 
discharge the duties of Magistracy.
Under the established system the Judge-Magistrate 
combined in him a greater authority to obtain the 
cooperation of landholders, proprietors, and other 
inhabitants, in the administration of Police, than 
would be possessed by the Collectors, if vested with 
Magistracy.
If the Collectors were required to perform thewhole 
of the duties of Magistrate, they would seldom be 
able to leave their fixed stations, and thus one of 
the principal advantages of having a touring Magistrate 
would be lost.
If, to avoid these inconveniences, only Police was 
transferred to the Collectors, leaving the Judicial 
powers with the Judge, both the Collector and the 
Judge would be handicapped in the efficient discharge
195
of their respective functions, 
vii) There would he a risk of collision of authoritiesy
as in the event of the transfer the Collector^ would 
have to he subject to two distinct authorities, i.e. 
to the Judge of Circuit, in his Magisterial capacity, 
and to the Board of Revenue in his capacity of 
Collector of Revenue.
The S.D.A., therefore, recommended the appointment of 
separate Magistrates to those Districts where the Civil business 
before the Judge was very heavy.
Dowdswell, a member of the Supreme Council, made two 
new objections to the proposed measure. They were, first, that 
such union of Magistracy with Collectorship would be against 
the principles of Civil polity founded in 1793 by Cornwallis^and, 
secondly, that such union might be rendered a most intolerable 
instrument of oppression, as the Collectors, in their zeal to 
improve the revenue collection, on which their credit mostly 
depended, might utilise their Police powers for that end.'*'
Salmon, a member of the B0ard of Revenue, who contested 
the measure, stated:
^Minute of Dowdswell, dtd. 22nd Sept. 1819^ Civ. Judl. Cons.^
3th ITov. 1819j Ho. 15 ’A ’.
!,The division of judicial and revenue lines has 
deprived all Collectors of the opportunity of 
learning the duties of Magistrate, and there is 
no public office which requires experience and 
practice more .... If a Collector were to become 
a Magistrate, he would either turn out to be a 
good Police officer and a bad Collector; or a 
bad Police Officer and a good Collector; it is 
possible that he would continue to devote his 
attention to that branch which interests him more.
.... Very deep research or maturity of judgement 
are not essential qualities in a Magistrate but 
quickness of intelligence, activity of both mind 
and body ... are almost indispensable. The habits 
and routine of a Collector’s duties are not of such 
a nature.. .1,1
The Bengal Government had called for a report from the
Madras Presidency on the working of the new judicial system
which had been established there in 1816, in accordance with
2
the plan of the Directors. The report submitted by the Board
of Revenue of Madras in 1819 showed that on the whole the
combination of Magistracy with Collectorship had not been very 
3
useful. There was some difference of opinion among the Col­
lectors of that Presidency on the subject.^ For example, the
^Board of Revenue to Govt. dtd. 5th Ha3r 1818. Papers relating 
to the Judicial system of Bengal^ Reg. 71 ( 97).
2
Under the new plan the Magistracy was generally united with 
the Collectorship in all the Diets. of Madras Presidency.
3
The report has been recorded under Civ. Judl. Cone.^24th March 
1820. Mo. Oo, . , ■ >
A
‘In reply to the query circulated by the Madras Revenue Board. 
Unclosed in the B ard’s report above mentioned.
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Collectors of Hellore, Coimbatore and Bellary had found that
duties of Ilagictracs’ had not interfered with their revenue
duties; the Collectors of Halabar, Salem, Guntur and Gan jam
had stated no decided opinion while the Collectors of xla.j amundnry,
north g.rcot, Chingleput, Trichi, Hadurai, finnevelly, Tanjcre,
Hasulipatarn and Visagapatan stated that the discharge of tlieir
Ilagictcrial duties had materially interfered with their functions
in the revenue department. The Iladras Revenue Board gave its
o:..u opinion: "that the union of Magistrate' s office in the
several Districts had proved detrimental to- the interests of the
Revenue Department ...U and advised that there should be sopor-
’i
ate District Judge, I-Iagietrate and Collector in each District.
In considering the adoption of the Iladras pattern in 
Bengal, another factor to be reckoned uith was that the Ilagi- 
strates of Iladras had fever duties to perforn than their counter­
parts in Bengal. As shown in a report of the Sad/ir Adalat of 
I-Iadras of ISgC,^ the Iladras Magistrates or their assistants 
seldom interfered at all uith preliminary investigations in 
the cases which were not triable by them. In those cases the 
information was, for the most part, taken by Indian Heads of
■^Quoted in the letter of Judl. tecy. of Iladras to Bengal Govt.j 
dtd. 9th Feb. 1890, para 60  ^ Civ. Judl. Cons.^l^th June 1830 ? 
ITos. 7-10.
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Police, who either released the accused or committed hin
direct to the District and Sessions Judge. In point of fact,
the exercise of Magisterial functions in hadras was limited
to the trial of petty offences punishable without reference 
*
to the higher authorities. The Bengal Government rightly 
observed that the Magisterial powers of the Collectors in 
Iladras did not exceed the powers of the Assistants to the 
Magistrates under the Bengal Code.^ This fact alone, apart 
from the objections stated by the various authorities in Bengal 
(noticed earlier), was bound to introduce an element of hesi­
tation, or at least of a greater circumspection, on the part
of the Bengal Administration, in deciding to transfer the
2
Magistracy to the Collectors.
It was natural|~, therefore, for the Bengal Government 
to be inclined in favour of the employment of separate Magi­
strates, when necessary, instead of making a general transfer 
of Magistracy to the Collectors. But on account of the paucity 
of Civil servants, and on account of the insistence of the
\judl. letter from Bengal, 15th June 185--', para 8. Vol. 15.
2
The Madras Collectors had no Civil judicial functions in 1818 
(when the above report noticed on p. from that Presidency 
was submitted), while tlieir Bengal counterparts already had some. 
But this could not be made a ground for not transferring the 
extra load of Magistracy to the Bengal Collectors. In 1822, the 
Collectors of Madras were entrusted with, extensive Civil judicial
(cont.)
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Directors to implement their plan, the Bengal authorities 
at first resolved upon adopting a moderate course. This was 
to resort to both the alternatives simultaneously, via.: 
i) to transfer the Magistracy to the Collectors of those 
Districts uhere the revenue business was light and the in­
dividual holding charge of the office was considered competent; 
and 2) to employ separate Magistrates in the other heavy 
arrcarsDistricts, uhere the Collector may be fully occupied 
uitl: his oun revenue duties or may not have adequate judicial 
experience.
In 1823, Acting Governor-General John Adam created five 
separate Magistracies for the Districts of Ilooghly, Jessore, 
huddea, Purnea and Tirhoot, uhere the arrears before the Judges 
had been very heavy. On the question of transferring the 
Magistracy to the Collectors, the Governor-General made this 
policy statement:
(cont.) functions. By Hegn. V of that year (of the Madras 
Govt.) they uere authorised to take primary cognizance of 
all suits connected with rent. In fact the Civil judicial 
responsibilities then entrusted to the Collectors of Madras 
uere much more than what their colleagues in Bengal had until 1831.
1
Minute of; Govn. Gen..12th June 182h? Civ. Judl. Cons.3 12th June 
13233 Eos. 20-23.
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"...whether the general introduction of the 
system, even if it vere practicable would 
be desir^able, is a question which it is not 
necessary to discuss on the present occasion, 
but there is no sufficient reason why the 
experiment should not be tried in any parti­
cular District in which the Collector nay 
not only be well qualified for the tash but 
have sufficient leisure to execute it, without 
interfering with his duties ± l the revenue 
department, and where, at the same time, the 
business devolving upon the^Judge and Magistrate 
is particularly laborious."
The Collectors of Western Provinces^Benares and Bihar were 
very busy and so were the Collectors of most of the Districts 
of Bengal, nevertheless, after due consideration, the Col­
lectors of Rungpur, Ramgurh end Junglemahal were vested with
2the Magistracy of their respective Districts.
But these arrangements were, according to the Governor- 
General, intended to be of a temporary nature. It was stated 
that after the arrears had been reduced in the Districts con­
cerned, the Magistracy was to revert to the Judges there, and
the arrangements of separation of the two offices could be
3
employed in the other Districts with heavy arrears. Thus,
1
Minute of Govn. Gen.^12th June 132y^ Civ. Judl. Cons.^ 
12th June 18 2p^  ITos. 20-2p.
VbidL> ' ? *■ r*. h . n .  ;..d - u - . ; h  i - m .. y  ; y ' , m m -.
201
in 1326, the liapistracics were reunited with the Judge in Hooghly
and Runppur, on the ground that the purpose for which the
separation was implemented had been accomplished.^
In the two years following the separation in the several
Districts, the files of the Judges of most of then were greatly 
2
reduced. Thus, in Jessorewhore the number of pending suits 
before the Judge on the 1st Isarch 1824 (the date when the 
separation was actually affected) was 4 ,344^by October 1825, 
i.e. after eighteen months the arrears had fallen to 2,744,
«•
a reduction of 1,360. In ITuddea, between October 1825 (the 
date of .separation) and October 1325, the arrears on Judge ’ s 
file had been reduced by 1,773; and, in Rungpur, by 1,385 
in approximately the sane period. Only in the Districts of 
Junglenahal, Purnea^ said firhoot had there been a slight in­
crease in the arrears. But in Junglenahal the"'duties of Judge, 
I-Iagistrate and Collect u r li a d for unavoidable reasons devolved 
on the same person for many months during the period of reckon­
ing (1823-25). Likewise in Purnea^, where the separation had 
been affected from December 1823^ the functions of Judpe and
^Civ, Judl. Cons.^ 19th July 1826^ Ko. 13.
2
I-Iencrandum of Judicial Secy., dtd. 7th June 1826, in which a 
detailed statement of the increases and decreases in the file of 
the Judpes (who had been relieved of the Magistracy) in the two 
years following the separation is enclosed. Civ. Judl. Cons.;, 
12th June 1826/ Do. 7.
Magistrate had to be dischargedly the same person since 
November 1824, due to the non-availability of another officer.
Owing to the shortage of Civil servants it was often 
found necessary to make the Judge officiate as Collector, or 
for the Collector to officiate as Judge and Magistrate. 
Regulation IY of 1821 provided a legal basis for such arrange­
ments. No specific regulation was enacted providing forthe
transfer of Magistracy to the Collector but the Government
*
regarded Regulation IY of 1821 as the enactment covering
such transfers. In 1826 Magistracy was transfered to the
1 2 Collectors in Behar and Sylhet.
The policy enunciated by Adam on the issue of transfer
of Magistracy to the Collectors continued to be the policy of
the succeeding Government of Amherst, which remained averse to
a general transfer of Magistracy to the Collectors. In 1827
the Bengal Government emphatically objected to the proposal of
making a general transfer of Magistracy to the Collectors.
It stated: "... unless we could restore the ancient institutions
■^ Civ. Judl. Cons., 26th April 1826, No. 2, , ' > ^
Judl. Letter 30th Aug. 1827, pp. 381-2.
*
It authorised officers of revenue to be vested with the powers 
of a Magistrate.
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of village communities ana caul cl employ the heads of Villages, 
the farmers, the landholders, or their agents, as officers 
of Police, little mould "be gained and much mould be sacrificed 
by making Collectors, llagistrat.es generally. It went on to 
submit, for the approval of the Directors, a plan for having 
three separate European Covenanted Officers in each District, 
i.e. the Judge, the Collector and the Magistrate.
But with the commencement of Bentinch!s Governor-General- 
ship there mas a shift in the attitude of the Bengal Admini­
stration. A general transfer of magistracy to the Collectors 
came to be accepted in principle. A number of factors could 
berosponsible for this. In the first place, it would save 
money to have only two officers in the District instead of 
three (a Judge, a Collector end a Ilagistrate) . And economy
2
in the adminhtration was one of Bentinch’s primary concerns. 
Paucity of covenanted civil servants was another factor that 
discouraged the creation of new posts of District Ilagistrates.
The doctrinal support for the union of Hagistracy with Collector- 
shin came from the authoritarian paternalism of the Munro school.
^Judl. letter 22nd Feb. 1827j PP* 654-53.
2
Bentinch to hillian Astell, Chairman, Court of Directors, 
17th Oct. 1328^ Bentinch I73C.
Bentinch who had known Kunro from the days of his Governor­
ship of Madras wac influenced by his philosophy. As the 
best means of improving the efficiency of the administration, 
he recommended to the London authorities that they should 
"confirm end persevere in the system long since recommended 
by them to the Iladras Government, upon the authority of Sir 
Thomas I-Iunro, of uniting the appointments of Collectors and 
Ilagistrates, ... of making the Collector's great office con­
sisting of Deputy Collectors, Joint Ilagistrates, and Assist­
ants, subordinate to one head...
Union of Magistracy with Collectorship had also been 
strongly advocated by Holt I-Iackensie, in whose abilities and 
judgment Bentinch had considerable trust.^ Besides^Bentinch 
had an enthusiastic support for this reform from the Vice- 
President of the Supreme Council, C. T. Metcalfe. The latter 
had ruled in Delhi territory, exercising himself all the func­
tions of the Government, executive, fiscal and judicial. Prom 
that experience he" had become an ardent champion of Munro's 
paternalism. He even went to the extent of advocating that there
^Bentinch* s Minute, 10th IIov. 1831. Pari. Papers, 1832-32,
Vol. 9, p.749.
2
Mackenzie had been recommended to Bentinch by Malcolm, the 
Governor of Bombay, as the 'cleverest nan in Bengal'. Bentinch 
MSS., Mono.of Malcolm, 24th June 1828. Bentinch seems to have 
agreed, with the above opinion. lie described I Mackenzie as by 
far "the ablest of the Company's servants". Bentinch IISS. 
Bentinch to Melville, 16th Doc. 1828.
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should be only one officer in the District who should combine 
in himself the functions of Judge, Collector and Magistrate.^ 
Under these influences the Bengal Government resolved 
in 1831 to make a general transfer of Magistracy to the 
Collectors. The practical justification given by Bentinch 
uas:
"It become necessary to divest the Judges of 
their Magisterial powers, and there was no al­
ternative consistent with the dictates of fin­
ancial necessity than to transfer those powers 
to the Collectors.... I do not consider the 
latter measure to require any apology. On the 
contrary I hold it to bo admirably calculated 
to confer efficiency on the Police of the country
ii 2  • » « *—
Between 1826 and 1831 Magistracies had already been 
united with the Collectorships of Bliagalpur, Beerbhoom, haj- 
shahy, Purnea, Allahabad, Benares City, Tirhoot and Jessore.^ 
.1 single Judge was placed in the joint charge of the two 
Divisions of Bundelhhand (forth and South), but a separate 
Collector-IIagistrate was postedia each. ^
Hlinuto of Metcalfe, 11th April 1831; Pari. Branch Colls.; 1832; 
Uo. 77. Appx. IV. ITo. 6.
^Judl. letter, 13th Sept. 1831, para.17. Vol. 15.
^Judl. letter, 6th Sept. 1831; Vol. 15-
A
'Ibid.
Criminal justice to the District Judges. This.implied the 
transfer of Magistracy from the Judges to the Collectors 
in the Districts where the operation of this Regulation was 
to be extended in due course. Following the implementation 
of the above Regulation in the Districts of Agra, MervuCt, 
Koradabad, Saharanpur and the Central Division of Cuttack, 
Magistracy was united with the Collectorship in each of them 
on 17th June 1832.^
In 1314 the Directors had strongly recommended the 
union of Magistracy with Collectorship. But by 1832 there had 
been a complete transformation in their attitude. In their
despatch of 1832 they fully agreed with the objections stated
• ' ■  2 .......................
by the S.D.A.15 years earlier, and in accordance with the 
three officer plan submitted by the Amherst Government (in 
the Judicial letter of 30th August 1827) they instructed the 
Bentinck administration: "Me accordingly direct that in the
"^Civ. Judl. Cons.^23rd Feb. 18p2. Ho. 3.
‘Rjee ante pp. 193“94*
This followed from the juristic principle that the committing 
authority, i.e. the Magistrate^and the trying authority, i..e. 
the Sessions Judge, could not be the same individual.
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existing Zillahs, the ordinary European establishment consist
of a Judge, a Magistrate and a Collector, each having its
separate proper functions with separate Assistants.
This change in the Director^7policy was not abrupt.
To understand this it would be worthwhile examining the history
of policy-naliing at the London end over this issue.
The judicial despatches to Iladras and Bengal of 1814
which suggested the transfer of Magistracy to the Collectors,
and the grant of certain Civil judicial powers to them, marked
the culmination of a reaction against Cornwallis's system.
This had to a great extent been influenced by kunro. He
was a strong critic of the Permanent Settlement and the over-
*
concentration of power in tie hands of District Judges, which
had made the Collector s w e a.-. : and inefficient. Munro had cone
to London on leave in 1803 and lived there until 1814. His
ideas gained complete ascendancy at the Board through James
Cunning, who had become the Head of the Hevenue and Judicial
Departments in 1807» Buckinghamshire, who became President
of the Beard in 1812^and his friend and son-in-law^John
Sullivan, who was appointed one of the Assistant Commissioners 
2
of the Board.""
1 uv-
Judl. Despatch to Bengal, 4^* fob. 10p2^ Vol. 8 
0^. II. Phi Bps, East India Company, pp. 202-4.
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The Directors, too, were impressed with Ilunro1 s reasonings. 
In 1810 they positively forbade Linto to extend the Permanent 
Settlement to the Ceded and Conquered Provinces. One of the 
Directors, Davis, who had personally observed the worhing of 
Cornuallis1 s system in India, was very critical of " it . The 
alarming state of arrears before the Civil Courts and the de­
lays involved in the disposal of suits also convinced them of 
the necessity of reform in the Cornwallis system.
Thus, though hopelessly divided on other issues, in 1314
the Court and the Board found themselves in agreement over the
need for reform in the Madras and Bengal administrations, parti-
2
cularly the judicial side. The Directors, however, wished to 
call for reports from the Presidencies before suggesting re- 
fomsjbut the Board insisted on rushing them through without 
delay, commenting that in view of the information elicited by 
the 5th Report of the Select Comitte^d, they could not permit 
"without modification or improvement the continuance of a system 
which, however excellent in principle, has not onljr in practice 
proved inadequate to the beneficient purposes of its author, but
^Dissent of Davis, 9th Aug. 1817  ^ I.O.Appx. Court. I-Iinutesj Vol. p,
'C.II. Philips, op.cit., p.200.
has had the effect in some degree of increasing the evils
which it was intended to remove.
A special committee of the Directors drew up a draft in
1815 for the reorganisation of the judicial system in Madras.
The same plan was .suggested to the Bengal Government by the
Judicial Despatch of 9th Nov. 1814. The salient features of
the plan were the transfer of Magistracy to Collectors and
the creation of village Munsiffs and officially regulated
Panchayets. This was exactly what Munro had proposed in 1808
2
in a memoir written just after his return from Madras.
In I-ladras the plan advocated by the home government was
implemented immediately in 1816 under the personal supervision 
of T. Munro who was sent out to that Presidency in 1815 for 
the specific purpose of carrying out administrative reforms.
But the Bengal Government, who just before the arrival of 
the London despatch of 9th November 1814 had adopted a 
scheme of reforms to reduce arrears and ensure speedy 
decision of suits, were keen to observe the working of 
its own reforms first. They adopted a cautious and go-slow 
policy over the Directors1 instructions. They called for opinions 
from the judicial and revenue authorities in Bengal on the
*^ Board to Court, Bth Jan. 1814. . Letters from Board to
E.I. Company, Vol. 4, pp. 1234-66.
^Memoir on Judl. system by Munro, Edinburgh, 10th Sept. 1808. 
Melville Papers, National Library of Scotland, MS 12, ff. 187-9.
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practicability of their adoption. They also called for a 
report fron the I-Iadrac authorities on theworking of the 
system there. This has been noticed earlier.^
For several years the Directors seemed to adhere firmly
to the instructions conveyed in the despatch of 19th Iiovenber 
2
1814.' But after 1824 they started drifting away from the 
stand they had taken in 1814. By 1828, the Directors had 
already become lukewarm in their insistence upon the transfer 
of Magistracy to the Collectors. Thus, while in 1824 they 
had strongly disapproved of John Adam’s appointments of 
separate Magistrates, in 1828r they sanctioned such appointments 
whenever they were considered necessary. This was in response 
to the arguments advanced by the Amherst Government in 1827, 
against the union of Magistracies with Collectorships in general.
The factors influencing the change in the attitude of 
the Directors were, apparently, the practical difficulties in
Bee ante, p.1 96
^8ee ante, p .193 •
^Judl. despatch, 23rd July 1824, para 15. Vol. 6.
4Judl. despatch, 50th April 1828, para 19. Vol. n I .
the execution of their plan, which were expressed by the
authorities in Bengal from time to time, and also the
Madras Report"1' which showed that the system had not
been very successful there. But a change in the personnel
of the Direction was also responsible for the pull bach
towards Cornwallis’s ideals. The retirement of Samuel
Davis in 1818 had removed from the Court a very strong
2
anti-Cornwallis influence. The election of N. B. Edmon-
t Coior I" 3
ston^in 1820 and H. G. Tucker in 1826 to the Chairs, 
on the other hand, introduced a very strong pro-Cornwallis 
influence in the Direction. Both of them had served in 
Bengal during the time of Cornwallis and. both had shared 
his ideals.
The Board, on the other hand, remained rigid on the
proposals of 1814. For the sake of consistency they desired
to expunge anything from the Courfsdraft which involved
any deviation from the tenor of the instructions conveyed to
Bengal in 1814. In 1827, Tucker, along with another Director,
G. A. Robinson, strongly criticized this attitude of the Board.
Tucker said:
"The Board of Commissioners seem anxious to 
avoid inconsistency in the public correspondence;
Gee ante p.1 97.
2
^ee ante p.208.
^Dodwell A Miles, hist of Bengal Civil Servants.
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but if the authorities in this Country vere 
led to adopt vague and erroneous notions in 
1814 ... it is surely their duty to get, as 
soon as possible, into the right path....
The Directors had become opposed to any major deviation
from Cornwallis1 s principles. They found Bentinc!:Ts constituting
the Revenue Commissioners into Judges of Circuit, or Criminal
Judges, ee highly' objectionable in principle. In 1831 they
were only prevented by the Beard’s interference from sending
2a strong disapproval of this measure to Bengal. And, finally, 
in their despatch of 1832, mentioned above, they ordered the 
creation of separate Magistracies in each District, instead 
of joining^ttcmwith the Collectorships. The desiring of such 
a measure in the face of financial difficulties of Company's 
administration and of an acute shortage of European Civil Servants 
indicated that Ilunro's ideas had become a. spent force at the 
Directory's1 end while Cornwallis ’ s ideas still held firm ground.
But at the time when the Directors were changing their 
views the Munro doctrine was dominating the Bengal administration, 
through Bentinch and Metcalfe. It was natural that the Bengal 
Government so constituted should have shown reluctance to put
^Dissent of Tucker. Court Minutes, 14th Teh. 1827^ Vol. 134, pp. 623-29. 
""Court Minutes, 2nd Feb. 1331^ Vol. 138. (n.p.)
the clock bach by divesting the Collectors of their Magisterial 
powers. This would have destroyed his inage of the 11 benevolent 
autocrat", the Ma-Bap (father and mother) of the District, 
which the champions of Munro1s authoritarian paternalism wanted 
to keep. Throughout his Governor-Generalchip Bentinch remained 
opposed even to opening a discussion on the separation of Magi­
stracy from Collectorship. Me argued that the unification of the 
two offices had been effected after much deliberation, and a dis­
cussion for its revision could be opened with propriety only 
when it could be proved by positive evidence that the deterioration 
of Police could be attributed to the Magistracy being joined to 
the fiscal authority.
Auckland, who succeeded Bentinch in 1836, accepted the 
"three officer" scheme approved by the Directors. But due to 
the practical difficulty of providing enough covenanted Civil 
Servants to fill the posts of Magistrates^the separation of 
Magistracy from Collectorship was very gradual. Besides, this 
separation was confined to the Districts of Lower provinces only. 
Thus, by 1841, separate Magistrates oculd be provided for only
2
eleven out of the twenty-nine Districts of the Lower Provinces.
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The number increased to tuenty-four in 1850 and to twenty- 
five in 1856.^ Por various considerations Canning finally 
decided to reunite the I-Iayistracy with the Collectorships 
in all the Districts after 1859* But simultaneously separate 
Superintendents of police were appointed to every District. 
This made the burden of hayistracy liyhter. The Collector 
henceforth came to be designated as the District Ilayistratc-. 
and Collector, a position he has retained ever since.
Chapter V 
THE PROVINCIAL COURTS OF APPEAL
Origin
Before 1793f the only Courts of Appeal were the S.D.A. 
and S.N.A.jwhich functioned at Calcutta. In 1793 the 
judicial tribunals in the Districts were considerably in­
creased. ^ This in turn brought about the danger of a flood­
ing of the S.D.A. by the appeals from their decisions. The 
S.D.A. might not be equal to the business coming up from the 
District Courts. Hence in 1793 Cornwallis established a 
number of Provincial Courts to buffer the flow of appeals 
from the lower Courts in the Mofussil. Another idea behind 
the creation of Provincial Courts was to make the facilities 
of appeal more accessible to the people living in distant 
areas. The S.D.A. functioning at Calcutta was beyond the 
reach of many on account of distance, delay and expense.
In 1793f 4 Provincial Courts, called "Provincial Courts 
of Appeal and Circuit^ were established at Calcutta, Murshida- 
bad, Dacca and Patna. A fifth Court was constituted at Benares
^The number of District Courts was increased from 18 to 26 
in 1793* See Chap. Ill, p. 118.
in 1795. In 1805, the sixth and the last Court was created 
at Barailly to eater for the newly'acquired area known as 
the Ceded and Conquered Provinces.
Constitution
The number of Districts under the control of each Pro­
vincial Court varied. Murshidabad, Dacca and Benares Divisions 
each had 7 Districts under them. Calcutta and Barailly had 9 
each while Patna had only 6.
Under Regulation V (Section 2) of 1793, the Courts were 
to be constituted by 3 Judges. But this number was found in­
adequate. The Provincial Courts were also the Courts of Circuit 
or the primary Courts for Criminal trials. To discharge the
fPteiv
latter duty one of Judges, by rotation, had to be con­
stantly on ‘'Circuit’* at the District Headquarters for performing 
the *’Jail deliveries’*. These circuits had to be so arranged 
that there was one nJail delivery” in each District at least 
once every 6 months. Butthe number of criminal trials were 
often very large and their investigation took a very long time. 
Hence the Judge going out on the Circuit seldom managed to re­
turn to his Station before it was time for his successor to 
commence his allocated Circuit.^ In the Division of Dacca,
5th Report of Select Committee of House of Commons, Pari. 
Branch Colls.^ 1812. Vol. 56, pp. 67-69.
on account of the heavy accumulation of trials during 1800-2, 
all the circuits considerably exceeded the duration of 6 
months.'*' Disposal of prisoners held in custody awaiting 
trial being given top priority, it often became necessary 
for the next Judge to begin his Circuit on time, while the 
one performing before him was still away. This left only 
one Judge in the Court while at least two were required to 
sit on the Civil appeals. And in case of a difference of 
opinion the casting voice of a third Judge also became necessary.
To prevent the Courts1 business from being at a standstill
when two Judges happened to be away on Circuit, a Regulation was
passed in 1810, which allowed single Judges to sit upon the 
2
Civil appeals. But this did not go far enough as the Judges 
sitting alone were only authorised to confirm the decision of 
the lower Court. The opinion of at least two Judges was still 
required to reverse or alter a decision.
It was becoming obvious that the Courts could not, with 
only 3 Judges, cope with its Civil and Criminal duties. Already 
in 1802 when the arrears of Civil appeals before the Dacca Court
■*"5th Report of Select Committee of House of Commons, Pari. Branch 
Colls. 1812, Vol. 56, pp. 67-69.
2Regn. XIII of 1810.
had become very high (538), a fourth Judge was temporarily
provided for that Court.'*' But later a similar request from
the Patna Provincial Court, on identical grounds, was turned
2
down for financial reasons. It was not until 1814 that
the strength of the Provincial Courts was permanently raised
to 4 Judges each. This was done on a proposal from the
Chief Secretary, Dowdswell, which was incorporated into
3Regulation V of 1814.
The above arrangement was continued until 1829 except 
for the fact that from 1826 onward a fifth permanent Judge 
was provided for the Calcutta and the Benares Provincial 
Courts. This was done on account of the heavy accumulation 
of business before those Courts.^
In 1829, the Criminal duties of the Provincial Courts 
were transferred to the Commissioners of Revenue and Circuit. 
The Provincial Courts being relieved of a major part of their
^Civ. Judl. Cons.^22nd April* 1802, ITo. 3.
^Civ. Judl. Cons., 17th Dec.>1811j No. 3*
Proposal of Dowdswell summed up in EdmonstonV s (Member of 
Council) minute, 12th March 1814. Civ. Judl^ Cons.^l2th March, 
1814. No. 13.
^Judl. letter?30th Aug. 1827^ I.O.vo. 11, pp. 379-81.
business the number of their Judges was cut down. Thus 
only two Judges were left in the Dacca, Patna, Murshidabad 
and Barailly Courts, while Calcutta and Benares which so 
far had 5 Judges each were now left with 3 each.
Powers and Functions
In 1793 the Provincial Courts were constituted entirely 
as Courts of appellate jurisdiction. At first an appeal was 
allowed to these Courts from all decisions of District Judges 
and Registers. But such a wide scope of appeals having been 
found unmanageable, in 1795 appeals to the Provincial Courts 
were restricted to causes of more than Rs. 25/- in amount 
or value.^ The Decrees of District Judges were to be final 
on appeals from decisions of Registers and Munsiffs in cases 
of less than Rs. 25/-*
In 180 Q the District Registers were empowered to hear 
appeals from the decisions of Munsiffs^who tried causes of 
up to Rs. 50/-? A second appeal was allowed to the District 
Judge from the decision of the Register. As many of the
1By Regn. XXVI of 1795.
2 .1 bid . ,
See Chapter II, p. 58/**
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causes tried in the first instance by the Munsiffs were of 
more than Rs. 25/-, in accordance with Regulation XXXVI 
of 1795, still another appeal lay to the Provincial Court, 
this time from the decision of the District Judge on the 
Second Appeal, The normal practice being to allow two 
appeals at the most, the above Regulation had to be modi­
fied for the sake of preventing excessive litigation. By 
Regulation XLIX of 1803 the appellate authority of the Re­
gisters was withdrawn and appeals to the Provincial Courts 
were restricted to those cases only which were tried in the 
first instance by the District Judges, or to second appeals 
from the decisions originally passed by the Registers and 
Sadar Ameens. This rule was further modified by Regulation 
XXV of 1814^by which an appeal from the decision of the 
Registers in causes above Rs. 500/- lay straight to the Pro­
vincial Court instead of going through the District Judge.
The Provincial Courts were to continue admitting Special or 
Second Appeals from the decisions of Registers and Sadar 
Ameens. By Regulation XXIV of the same year these Courts 
were authorised to receive Summary Appeals from the orders 
and Decrees of District Courts in cases in which the latter 
might have refused to admit an original suit or appeal re­
gularly cognizable by them, or after having admitted it, dis-
missed the same, for default, without investigation into 
the merits of the case. In such cases, if the Provincial 
Court was convinced of the justness of the application by 
any party, it was to order the District Court concerned to 
receive the case and make a regular investigation.
The Provincial Courts were vested with original juris­
diction for the first time in 1808. By Regulation XIII of 
that year all suits of Rs. 5000/- or above were made triable; 
in the first instance by those Courts. So far all suits 
irrespective of the amount or value had been triable in the 
first instance by the District Judge. The following were 
the motives behind the enactment of this provision.^*
Inthe first place it was designed to relieve the District 
Judges of a portion of the Civil business to enable them to 
devote more time to their Magisterial duties. An all-round 
effort was being made at that time to improve the admini­
stration of Criminal justice and Police.
The second reason -was that this would reduce the expenses 
to the suitors .in cases of higher denomination by allowing them 
only one chance of appeal instead of two as before. As a
^Govt. to S.D.A.^2nd Dec. 1808^ Civ. Judl. Cons.?2nd Dec. 1808^ 
I'To. 9.
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corollary to this, the trial and final settlement of claims 
would be expedited. This argument was justified because the 
causes of higher denomination were mostly litigated to the 
end. This provision meant, in effect, that there was to be 
only one appeal in causes between Rs. 5,000/- and Rs. 50,000/-,
(if above Rs. 50,000/- a further appeal would lie to the Privy 
Council) while in causes of less than Rs. 5,000/- (i.e. of 
lesser consequence), two appeals were permitted. The apparent 
anomaly could be justified by pointing out that in cases of 
Rs. 5,000/- and above, the original decision was already passed 
by a superior tribunal which gave a reasonable guarantee 
of correctness. If, at all, there was an error, the single 
chance of its correction by the supreme tribunal (the S.D.A.) 
could be an adequate security for justice.
Thirdly, there being 5 Judges in the Provincial Courts, 
the investigation of important causes involving large amounts 
or value; would not be liable to interruption or delay, as they 
would be from the absence or indisposition of the District 
Judge, if the causes were tried in that tribunal.
The fourth argument offered was that in view of the general 
inclination to corruption of the Indian officers of the Courts, 
it was advisable to remove causes of importance away from 
their local influences or connections. If such cases were
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tried by the Provincial Court any pre-existing connections of 
the local Indian officers of the Zillah Court with the parties., 
could not have a chance of influencing the conduct of the trial. 
The last justification was that suits of material import­
ance would, under the new arrangement, be tried in the first 
instance by Judges of recognised superior ability and experience. 
In 1814, there was a strong move "to make all suits of more 
than Rs. 1,000/- triable, in the first instance, by the Provincial 
Courts. The idea was to provide relief to the District Judges 
as well as to obtain a greater uniformity of decisions in respect 
of causes of higher denomination by reducing the number of tri­
bunals dealing with them. It was only on consideration, of the 
inconveniences that many parties might have to suffer in repair­
ing to the Provincial Courts, as also on account of the prospect 
of these Courts being flooded with small causesjthat the idea 
was dropped. Causes between Rs. 1,000/- and Rs. 5,000/- were 
allowed to be instituted as before in the Zillah Courts but they 
were made removable to the Provincial Courts for trial in the
first instance at the discretion of the latter or on application 
1
of the parties.
^By Regulation XXV of 1814.
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Already the number of causes triable, in the first instance 
by the Courts was considerably increased by the enhanced valuation 
of landed estates. By Regulation I of 1814 (S.14) the value of 
rent-paying lands was increased from twice to thrice the amount 
of annual rent payable on the land. The value of rent-free lands 
was increased from twelve to eighteen times the expected annual 
produce.
In 1817 parties were given the option of instituting even 
suits between Rs. 5,000/- and 1C,OCX)/- in amount or value in the 
local District Judge’s Court.^ This was done apparently for the 
facility of the parties who found it difficult to repair to the 
Provincial Court for the settlement of their dispute. Practical 
convenience of suitors was allowed to take precedence over the 
theoretical justifications (stated in 1808) for making all suits 
of Rs. 5»0G0/- and above cognizable in the first instance by 
the Provincial Courts.
It has been said earlier that the Provincial Courts were 
only intended to be a sort of buffer between the District Courts 
and the S.D.A. They were hardly entrusted with any supervisory 
function over the District Judiciary beyond the power of hearing
By Kegn. XIX of 1817.
and deciding appeals coming up from the Zillah. and City Courts. 
However, in 1814 a portion of the '’Miscellaneous Business”* of 
the S.D.A. was transferred to them on the latter's recommendation. 
The purpose had been to relieve the S.D.A, of a portion of that 
branch of its duties. The Provincial Courts were given control 
over the appointment and removal of Indian Judges and the 
Pleaders in the District Courts;
Mode of Conducting Business
According to Regulation V of 17951 "the Provincial Courts 
were to hold sittings at least 3 days in the week or more often 
if necessary. In actual practice the Judges of these Courts 
found it necessary to sit on appeals 6 days in the week whenever 
they were at the station. By Regulation XLVII of 1795 at least 
two Judges were to hold a Court of Appeal and no Decrees of 
these Courts could be valid unless they had been passed by two 
Judges present in the Court. But later, on account of the ac­
cumulation of arrears of appeals, and on account of the vesting 
of original jurisdiction with these Courts in 1808, it became
■^ Civil Judl. ■ Cons.j 19th July 1814; Ho. 6.
^ ■
This was in respect of appointment and removal of 
Indian Judges.
tkeiV
necessary to increase the number of :j\ : sittings. Regulation 
XIII of 18103which was designed to prevent the business of 
the Court from coming to a standstill when two Judges were 
away on Circuit,^ was also intended to enable the Court to 
split into two Benches at the same time. But a Judge sitting 
alone could only confirm the decisions of the lower Court.
In case he disagreed with the verdict of the Court below and 
wanted to reverse or modify it, he had to wait until one or 
more of his colleagues could join him to hear the case. Re- 
gulatinn XIII of 1810 does not specifically state whether 
single Judges were permitted to sit on original causes in­
stituted before the Provincial Courts under Regulation XIII
2
of 1808. But this practice had already been adopted. The 
silence of the enactment on the point assumed its continuance. 
By Regulation I of 1807, single Judges had been authorised to 
execute Decrees of S.D.A. or those of their own Courts, to 
receive and admit petitinns for Regular Appeals, to summon
^See ante vp. 217*
2
Thus in 1809 the case of Pars an Lai vs Bai.jnath Sahu (which 
had been transferred to the Patna Provincial Court from the 
Shahabad Court because the value of the suit was more than 
Rs. 5,000/-) was decided by Judge Hawkins sitting alone.
See Chapter VI, pp. X$\ - 2-,
and examine witnesses under requisition from the combined Bench 
of the Court, to receive miscellaneous petitions, and to 
conduct correspondence with the S.D.A. or the lower Courts.
These functions of the single Judge were continued under 
Regulation XIII of 1810 as well.
But trial of appeals by single Judges was often found to 
be inconvenient. In case of disagreement with the verdict 
of the lower Court another Judge had to sit who found it nec­
essary to go through all the records again. This involved 
more time in the disposal of the case than if it had been 
brought at once before a joint sitting. Hence in 1819 Harrington, 
the Chief Justice of S.D.A., issued a Circular Order to the 
Provincial Courts instructing them to bring all the appeals 
at once before joint sittings.^ It was^however^suggested to 
the Courts that whenever th.6 accumulation of arrears made it 
advisable, the original suits should be brought before the 
Senior Judge sitting alone and the appeals were to go before 
the other two. If a fourth Judge was present (it may be 
recalled that in 1814 the strength of the Provincial Courts 
had been raised to 4 Judges), he might hold a second single
^Circular Order of S.D.A. to Provincial Courts, 14th Jan. 1819; 
para I. Civ. Judl Cons.;11th Jan. 1820; Ho. 8.
bench for the trial of original causes.
J. . . Stuart, Member of Supreme Council (and ex-Judge
2of S.D.A.), attacked the latter part of the above order.
Ee argued that 1he arrangement of allowing single Judges to 
sit over appeals and original causes had been adopted when 
there were only 3 Judges in those Courts and because the 
weight of the Criminal business rarely left two Judges at 
the Headquarters for any considerable length of time. But 
after 1814 there were 4 Judges In all the Courts. The weight 
of Criminal business had also been reduced because the Circuits 
now became more regular. Eence in the existing circumstances 
the presence of at least two Judges at the station all the 
time could be confidently expected. The frequent presence of 
3 Judges and occasionally even that of 4 could be hoped for. 
This not only rendered the arrangement of single Judges sit­
ting over original causes unnecessary but added powerfully 
to the objections against it, which, according to Stuart, were
 __ __Id be a great practical inconvenience to the
officers and Pleaders of the Court if they were split into
serious
"'"Circular Order of S.D.A. to Provincial Courts, 14th Jan. 1819^
para II. Civ. Judl Cons.^ 11th Jan. 1820^ , No. 8.
^Stuart' s Minute, 14th Dec. 1819. Civ. Judl. Cons.,, 11th Jan. 1820^
ITo. 9.
two or three benches. The most important objection was that 
all the separate benches would be disposing causes with 
great haste, and to a great extent without any coordination 
between them. It was quite likely that separate benches 
would decide on opposite views or principles, which would be 
fatal to uniformity and consistency of decisions.
Stuart's reasonings against making single Judges sit 
on original trials are not convincing. At the District 
level all suits were being tried by a single Judge, His 
decision could be rectified by a combined Bench of the Pro­
vincial Court. A similar scope for the correction of the 
decision of a single Judge of the Provincial Court, by a 
joint Bench , lay in the Regular Appeal allowed to the S.D.A. 
If single Judges of 45 Districts were trying and deciding 
original causes and appeals, why couldn't single Judges of 
the Provincial Courts who were supposed to be more experienced 
and mature do the same?
But Governor-General Hastings agreed with Stuart's opinion 
and ordered Hai0Lngton to modify his instructions to the Pro­
vincial Courts accordingly.^ Thus the Regulation permitting
^Minute of Hastings, 22nd Dec. 1819j Civ. Judl. Cons.^11th Jan. 
1820j Nos. 10 & 11.
single Judges to constitute benches. became inoperative 
in respect of the Provincial Courts.
One of thebasic principles of modern legal systems is 
that no person should be allowed to sit on an appeal from 
his own decision. Following this, an interesting situation 
developed in 1824, before the Patna Provincial Court.^ On 
two Special Appeals (Nos. 4245 and 4431) before the Court, 
the First and the Second Judges held different opinions.
In the normal course the cases would have been referred for 
the opinion of one of the remaining two Judges. But it so 
happened that Elliot and Flemming,the remaining third and 
fourth Judges respectively, had both been concerned with the 
earlier decisions on the cases. The original decisions in 
both had been passed by Flemming, as Register of Tirhoot^and 
both decisions had been reversed on First Appeal by Elliot, 
while he was the District Judge of Tirhoot. Hence both of 
them were now disqualified from giving their opinion on the 
case.
Finally^on S.D.A.*s recommendation, Tippet, the Judge 
of Patna City, was temporarily commissioned to act as a
^Letter from Patna Provincial Court to S.D.A., 1st April 1824* 
Civ. Judl. Cons.?6th Fay 1824? No. 2.
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Judge of Patna Provincial Court for the specific purpose
of disposing of those two appeals.^ ..The S.D.A* also informed
the Patna Court that the same course of commissioning an
acting Judge was to be followed in case all the 4 Judges of
the Court might disagree on a particular suit, as they
2
actually did on a Miscellaneous suit. Although Regulation
XXV of 1814 (S.9.) had given to the Senior Judge a casting
vote, in case of disagreement among the other 3 Judges over
any case, the S.D.A. held, nevertheless, that for passing a
valid decision the Senior Judge must concur with any one
of the other Judges. If he didn6t, an acting Judge was to
be commissioned^to obtain a fifth opinion which could be
reasonably expected to concur with one of the previous four.
In 1829 the number of Judges of Patna, Dacca, Murshida-
bad and Barailly Courts had been reduced to two and that
3of Calcutta and Benares Courts to 3- In the Courts left 
with two Judges only, the problem of a third opinion would
■^ Civ. Judl. Cons.^ 6th May 1824j No. 3« 
^Ibid., No. 4.
See ante p. ,219 •
arise in case of a disagreement between the two. It was
provided that in such cases the Government was to be in-
^  1formed, and^ would designate a third Judge to try the suit.
In 1830, 6 cases were reported from the Dacca Divisinn on
2
which the two existing Judges had differed in opinion.
The Government nominated Patton, a Judge of Murshidabad
3
Provincial Court, to dispose of those cases. In 1831 the
two Judges of Murshidabad Provincial Court (steer and Patton)
having differed over a case^the samewas referred to Cracoft,
4a Judge of the Dacca Provincial Court. But C-racof^s 
opinion differed from those of both the Judges of the Murshi­
dabad Court. A fourth opinion now being necessary, Smith,
5
a Judge of the Dacca Court^was deputed to decide the case.
Working of the Courts
Until 1815 the gap between the number of suits instituted 
in the Provincial Courtsand that disposed of was very wide.
1
Civ. Judl. Cons.^28th April 18295 Nos. 3 & 4-
2
Civ. Judl. Cons.j, 20th June 1830? No. 6.
3
Civ. Judl. Cons.520th June 1830 5 No. 8.
^Civ. Judl. Cons, .,7th June 1831^ Nos. 5 & 6.
5Ibia.
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For example, during the year 1805, 1,878 suits had been in­
stituted while the number decided wan only 757 or nearly 
two-thirds; during 1810, the number instituted was 1779 and 
the number decided was 804, i.e. less than half the number 
instituted; during 1815, the number instituted was 1608, the 
number decided 594 only - almost one-third.^  This naturally 
caused a mounting of arrears. On 1st January, 1805, when 
the Barailly Court had not yet begun functioning, the total
number of pending causes before the 5 existing Provincial
2
Courts was 1,107. On 1st January 1806, when the Barailly 
Court had been in operation for nearly 5 years, the arrears
3
had increased to 1,285. This figure climbed to 2,909 on
1st January 1811 and finally to 5,705 on 1st January 1816.^
Occupation of the Judges with the duties of Circuit was
the general cause of the accumulation of arrears of Civil 
5
causes. At times, in some Courts, absence of a Judge on
^Parl. Branch Colls.?1852, Vol. 77, Appx. V, No.16.
2
Civ. Judl. Cons., 22nd Sept. 1805, No.7.
3
Pari. Branch Colls. ,1852, Vol. 77, Appx. V, No.16.
4
Ibid.
5
See ante pp. 216 — 17 .
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leave, or the deputation of another for conducting inquiries
we re added to it. For exanqple, not a single appeal could
be decided in the Patna Provincial Court during the first 6
months of 1809.^ The reasons were that the first Judge had
been away on Circuit and the third Judge during the same
period had been on deputation to Sarun to enquire into the charges
against the local District Judge?which occupied him for 9 
2
months. Two of the 3 Judges being away for those 6 months, 
not a single appeal could be taken up for trial because 
single Judges were not yet authorised to constitute a Court 
of Appeal.
In 1808, these Courts were given original jurisdiction
rz
over causes of Rs. 5»000/— and above. It is not indicated in 
the half-yearly reports of the S.D.A. how many original suits 
were instituted before the Courts in the post"1808 period.
But - it is hardly likely that any substantial extra load 
could be caused by them. In fact the aggregate of suits in­
stituted before these Courts seems to be declining after 1808. 
Thus 1^ 378 suits had been instituted before them during 1805;
^Judl. Despatch, 2nd June 1812^ para 7. Vol. I, pp.39p-66. 
^Ibid.
3
See ante p. 22 $ •
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during 1810 the number instituted was 1,779, and during 1815 ,
1,608.^ * Actually, no significant increase in the aggregate
of causes instituted before the Courts could be anticipated
from a mere transfer of more original suits to their cognizance.
The reason was that the increase of original suits was balanced
by a corresponding decrease of appeals, which the Provincial
Courts would receive if those causes had been originally tried
2
by the District Judges. Hence, even the provisions of 1814, 
which certainly brought many more original suits before the 
Provincial Courts, could have little effect on the total number 
of suits coming before them.
After the strength of the Courts was raised to 4 Judges 
in 1814, their disposal capacity was automatically improved.
As a result, between 1815 and 1819, disposals led over in-
3
stitutions by an annual average of nearly 225. To take parti­
cular examples, in the Calcutta Court, 906 suits were in­
stituted in the period of 5 years between 1815-19 while the
1Parl. Branch Colls. 1832, Vol. 77. Appx. V.
2
See ante p.223*
3
On 1st Jan. 1815, the arrears before all these Courts stood at 5,850;
on 1st Jan. 1819, the figure was reduced to 2,705. Minute of
Dowdswell (Member of Supreme Council), 22nd Sept, 1819. Civ. Judl. 
Cons., 5th Nov. 1819, No. 15 'A*.
*
Causes of higher denomination were mostly appealed at least once.
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total decided during the same period was 1,238.^ In the
Patna Court the total number instituted had been 1,027 and
2
that decided 1,262.
But this phase was short lived. As with the Zillah and
'Z
City Courts, arrears before the Provincial Courts started 
increasing after 1820. The number of causes disposed of 
started lagging behind the number instituted !. The reason was 
that the disposals remaining almost constant, there was an 
increase in the number of suits coming before the Courts.
Between 1815 and 1819, 5,499 suits had been instituted and 
6,626 causes had been disposed of.^ This had given a total lead 
of 1,127 over institutions during that period. Between 1819 
and 1824 6,573 were decided (a little less than in the preceding 
period), but the number instituted had increased to 7,518.“* As
a result the arrears of pending causes before the Courts rose
£
from 2,449 at the end of 1819 to 3,394 at the end of 1824. The same
^Parl. Branch Colls.11832, Vol. 77, Appx. V.
2Ibid.
3
See Chapter III, pp. 137-8 .
4Figures compiled from the 8 Half-yearly Reports of 1815, 1816,
1817 & 1818, and the 2 Annual Reports of 1818 and 1819.
5
Figures calculated from Annual Reports of those years.
6
Annual Report for 1824, Civ. Judl. Cons., 19th Jan. 1826, No.6.
trend continued after 1824 with the result that by the end 
of 1829 the arrears before these Courts increased further 
to 3,603.1
»
The factors that could have contributed most to the 
increase of business before the Courts after 1819 were Special 
App eals and Separation of Magistracy from the District Judges.
The provision of admission of Second of Special appeals 
by the Provincial Courts was made by Regulation XIX of 1803.
The Courts were authorised by that Regulation to admit a 
Special Appeal, if from the perusal of the Decree and papers 
of the lower Court, the Judges considered a further investigation 
desirable. Under the discretion allowed by the Regulation the 
number of Special Appeals admitted must have been considerable.
It has not been possible to ascertain from the Half-yearly 
Reports the proportion of Special Appeals admitted because the 
figures for Special Appeals, Regular Appeals and original 
suits admitted are all combined under the heading of 
"Suits Instituted". Nevertheless some individual instances 
are found which support the above presumption. Por example,
■^ Annual Report for 1829, Civ. Judl. Cons., 31st May 1831, No.7.
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in 1814, the Judges of Patna and Murshidabad Provincial Courts
wrote to the Government that admission of "Second Appeals"
in petty cases retarded the decision of causes of greater
value or importance.*^ * It was stated by the Murshidabad
Court that of 100 appeals filed during the first 6 months
of 1814, 36 or more than one-third had been ’’Special Appeals"
2
for petty amounts.
By allowing a second chance for the correction of a 
decision by a higher tribunal, it was expected to eliminate, to 
a greater degree, the errors or injustices committed by two 
successive tribunals. The system of Special Appeals was created 
on this liberal principle.
But a wide application of this principle having con­
tribute"^ to the accumulation of arrears the admission of Second 
Appeals was considerably restricted in 1814. By Regulation XXVI of 
1814 (which became operative from 1st Feb. 1815) the Provincial Courts 
and the S.D.A. were allowed to admit such appeals only when the
^Hone Misc. Series, Vol. 775, ff. 4-5, paras. 5 & 8; f. 12, para 2. 
^Ibid., f.4.
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judgment of the last Court appeared, on its face, to be in­
consistent with any of the laws and Regulations in force, 
or with any established judicial precedent. This greatly nar­
rowed down the discretion of the Judges in admitting those 
appeals.
and 1819,
/ '
Between 1815--/; there had been an all-round reduction of 
arrears.^ A feeling of confidence in the ability of the ex­
isting judicial machinery to cope with available business was 
growing as a result. This led to the liberalisation of the 
admission of Special Appeals^ which had always been accepted 
as a desirable system. By Regulation XIX of 1819,-“ the Pro­
vincial Courts and the S.D.A. were allowed a general discretion 
of admitting a Special Appeal / whenever on a perusal of a 
Decree of the lower Court there might appear a 1* strong or 
probable11 ground for presuming a failure of justice. The Judges 
were thus given a very wide discretion.
Under the latitude allowed by the above Regulation the 
Special Appeals before the Provincial Courts must have increased. 
Between 1821 and 1825 the proportion cf Special Appeals in re­
lation to the total number of causes admitted in all the Courts
■^ Arrears in the Provincial Courts as well as the S.D.A. had been 
considerably reduced in that period because more cases were being 
disposed of than were instituted. See ante pp.255-6. and Chapter 
VI. pp.505-4 .
1
oer cent n e r -e e n t .
annually fluctuated between 23 /- and 30' / On this
account and in view of the fact that the arrears before 
the Provincial Courts and the S.D.A. had started accumulating 
again after 1319, it was once again sought to limit the ad­
mission of Special Appeals. By Regulation II of 1825, the 
enactment of 1819.' which had liberalised the admission of 
such appeals^ was rescinded., and the rules (restricting 
the admission of Special Appeals to cases accompanied with 
certain specific circumstances) prescribed by Regulation XXVI 
of 1814, were reimposed. But the Judges of the superior 
Court, who had become used to exercising a very wide discretion 
in the admission of those appeals after 1819, did not apparently 
pay much attention to the latest enactment. During 1825, 298
Special Appeals were admitted in tie Provincial Courts;
2
during 1826- 283; and during 1827 - 289* Their proportion 
to the total number of causes admitted remained nearly the same* 
as that of theppre-1325 period above noticed. This drew a 
comment from the Government that the Judges had not been pay­
ing heed to the provisions of Regulation II of 1825 which was
3designed to restrict the admission of such appeals. They also
table of Special Appeals admitted between 1821 and 1826 is 
enclosed in the Annual Report for 1826 (recorded in Civ. Judl. 
Cons.28th Peb. 1828. No, 8. Vol. 39)* The percentage has 
been calculated from the same.
2
Letter from G.G.-in-C. to S.D.A., 28th Peb. 1828y Civ. Judl. Cons. 
28th Peb. 1828; No. 9.
^Ibid. ^Between 25°/o and 28°/o.
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strongly suggested the abolition of the' system of Special
Appeals altogether as they were sceptical about its utility.'*’
They justified their opinion by a statement marked *11111 submitted
with the Annual Report for 1826, which showed that, out of
188 Special Appeals decided by the Provincial Courts during
1826, not a single decision appealed from had been reversed.
The S.D.A., however, emphatically opposed the Government’s
2
suggestion about the abolition of the system. They informed 
the Governor General-in-Council that the Statement ,TR" on 
which the latter had based their opinion, had subsequently been 
discovered to be erroneous. A corrected statement was now 
submitted which showed that; 'during 1825 . out of 250 decisions 
on Special Appeals,- the verdict of the lower Court had been 
reversed or altered in 60, and during 1826 out of 188 decisions; 
the Decrees of the District Court had been changed in 49.
The Government were finally convinced of the arguments of the 
S.D.A., and Special Appeals continued to form a sizeable portion 
of the business tefore the superior Courts .
From 1825 onwards a policy of gradually separating the 
Magistracy from the District Judges was pursued. Those Judges
^Letter frO:m G.G.-in-C. to S.D.A., 28th Feb. 1828, Civ. Judl.
Cons.y28th Feb. 1828, No. 9!.
2
Xetter from S.D.A. to Govt.,15th Aug. 1828, Civ. Judl Cons., 2nd Oct.
1828, No. 4 B.
3
See Chapter IV^ pp. 1 9 9 _202 .
who were relieved of the charge of Magistracy became free 
to devote their entire attention to the disposal of Civil 
causes. The increased disposal of Civil cases by that 
officer occasioned, in turn, a greater influx of appeals 
before the Provincial Courts. This tendency was most notice­
able in the case of the Calcutta Provincial Court. In most 
of the Districts under the Calcutta Division, the Magistracy 
had been separated from tie Judgeship. In 1823 the separation 
was carried out in 8 Districts.^ Five of them, Eooghly, 
Jessore, I'Tuddea.^  Rungpur and JunglemOlial, were under the 
Calcutta Provincial Court. This must have been the factor
2causing the increase of business before that Court after 1823. 
During 1823, 217 causes had been admitted before that Court.
In the following 3 years the number of suits instituted in- 
creased as follows:
During 1824 - 261 
" 1825 - 317
"  1826 -  361
The arrears of pending causes at the beginning of 1823 had been
■^ See Chapter IV pp. 199*200.
^Parl. Branch Colls ,jL832^  Vol. 77? Appx. V. 
^Ibid.
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725. At the end of 182(ytheyhad risen to 1,165, which forced
the appointment of a fifth Judge to that Court. ^ A similar
result could be anticipated from the separation subsequently 
2made in &©se Districts under the other Provincial Courts.
Abolition of Provincial Courts
In 1829 the size and functions of the Provincial Courts
3
had been curtailed. In 1851 Bentinch decided to abolish 
them altogether. An immediate abolition would, however, have 
been impracticable as a problem of disposing of the causes 
already on their file would arise. Hence it was decided to 
retain the Courts until the pending suits were cleared and the 
alternative arrangements (to be described later) were imple­
mented in all the Districts. Henceforth, the Courts were not 
to receive any fresh appeals and the vacancies (of Judges) 
occurring in the Courts by removal or retirement were not to be 
filled.
■^ See ante p. 218.
^See Chapter IV^  pp. 200-1 .
3
See ante p.218 .
4
Letter from Secy to Govr. Gen. to Vice-President-in-Council, 
51st Hay 18513 Civ. Judl. Cons.^ 19th July 1851^ I?o. 17.
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The abolition had originally been advocated by W. B.
Bayley in 1829.^ But his proposal had been shelved for
the time, on account of the opposition of the majority of
'Judges of S.D.A., who apprehended an overflooding of
appeals in the Sadar Court if the Provincial Courts were
2
to be abolished. But the proposal was revived by the
* 3
Civil Finance Committee in 1830. They advocated that the 
Provincial Courts would be rendered unnecessary, if the scheme 
of enhancing the original jurisdiction of Indian Judges and 
of relieving the Judges of the charge of Magistracy in all 
the Districts was adopted. Mackenzie, the Chairman of the 
Committee, considered the Provincial Courts useless in any 
case. He observed: 111 consider them /provincial Courts7, to
be bad Courts at present in general filled by men in no re­
spect superior to the District Judges over whom they are 
placed, and their decisions are of no value as guides to the
4
District Judges..."
"^ Minute of ¥. B. Bayley, 5th Nov. 1828. Civ. Judl. Cons.,12th Oct.
1830, No. 69.
2
Minutes of Js. of S.D.A, on Bayley's proposal. Pari. Branch Colls.. 
1832, Vol. 77, Appx. V. No. 2.
3
Letter from Finance Committee, 12th July 1830, Civ. Judl. Cons., 12th 
Oct. 1830, No. 1.
^Evidence of Mackenzie before Select Committee of House of Lords, 16th 
March 1832, Pari. Branch Colls.,1832, Vol. 77.
-ft
The Civil Finance Committee had been constituted in 1829 by Bentinck
(cont.)
One might agree with the latter part of the above state- 
*
ment, but it would be hard to accept the remark about the 
non-superiority of the qualifications of the Judges of the 
Provincial Courts. From the earliest days the Government had 
endeavoured to fill these Courts with men of ability or ex­
perience in the judicial line. In 1794, Governor-General 
Shore, considering the qualification of the members of those 
Courts to be of vital importance, had resolved that in future, 
no person was to be appointed a Judge of that Court unless 
he had served for a sufficient number of years as a District 
Judge and Magistrate.^ It was laid down by Regulation XXV 
of 1814 that no person could be made a Judge of the Provincial 
Court unless he had previously worked as a District Judge 
for at least 3 years or in any other situation in the Judicial 
Department for at least 6 years. In actual practice, however, 
an officer normally had to serve at least 6 years as District 
Judge,, befre being promoted to the Provincial Court. In a 
service cadre qualification is measured by experience. I-Ience 
it is absurd to say that the Judges of the Provincial Court
*^ Civ. & Criminal Judl. Cons., 24th June 1794, Ho. 6.
*/ \(cont.j for recommending administrative reforms for economising 
the expenditures in all the Presidencies.
m; were ,Tin no respect superior to the District JudgesT/.
The most valid reason behind the abolition of those Courts 
was that under the reformed structure of Civil Judiciary 
adopted in 1831: their existence as a buffer of appeals be­
tween the District Courts and the S.D.A. became superfluous.
Under the new scheme, primarily based upon economy, the Indian 
Judges were vested with almost the entire original jurisdiction.^*
| The District Judges by becoming a Court of Appeal from all
i the decisions of the Indian Judges, and a Court of original
[f
! jurisdiction for causes of Rs. 5,000/- and above, took over
the entire role of the Provincial. Courts. Hence the Provincial 
Courts could now be conveniently dispensed with. Their abolition 
was also to effect a good saving in the cost of judicial ad- 
mini st rat inn.
Position of Provincial Courts in Company's Judiciary
There is a good deal of truth in Mackenzie’s remark about
the inutility of the Provincial Courts in furnishing a guidance
2
to the lower Courts. These Courts could, of course, reverse 
or alter the decisions of the District Courts. But that was
^See Chapter II?pp. 65-66#
2
See ante p. 2 4 4 .
about all. They had no authority to control or guide those 
Courts. On all doubtful questions concerning the laws or 
regulations,and on all administrative matters, the District 
Judges were instructed directly by the S.D.A. The Judges 
of the Provincial Courts were authorised to issue orders or 
processes to the District Courts in connection with the 
cases before them. But if the District Judges neglected 
or disobeyed the precept, the Provincial Court could not 
punish the defaulters themselves. They were to report the 
matter to the S.D.A.) who alone were entitlted to take any 
action against the officer concerned.^
Cornwallis's intention had teen to create a very strong in-
2
stitution of District Judge^ which might have been incompatible 
with his subordination to any other authority except the 
highest - the S.D.A. This is indicated by his remarks on the 
provisions made in 1793 for enquiry into Hie charges against 
District Judges. According to the rules enacted then, if a 
charge against any District Judge was preferred before any 
Provincial Court, the latter was not to proceed on it sup- no to 
but had to pass the complaint on to the S.D.A. It was to make
1By Regn. V. of 1793. S.15. 
hee Chapter III, /p. 120.
only such investigations into the charges which the S.D.A. 
might subsequently commission them to do. Cornwallis thought 
that if the Provincial Courts were authorised to proceed with 
the investigation cf the charges on their own ”... they 
might from prejudice, misrepresentation or other motives, 
be induced to give a ready ear to them...’*^
He observed further, that:
"To delegate to the Provincial Courts -. ... such 
power would, in fact, be making the Judges of 
the Zillah and City Courts personally subject 
to their authority. This would soon deprive 
the Zillah and City Judges of all weight and 
consequence in the eyes of the people and lessen 
that respect which is necessary .... the Judges 
of Provincial Courts of Appeal should possess no 
authority over the Zillah and City Judges personally.
Their control over them should be only that of a 
superior Court empowered to revise their decrees 
when regularly brought before them."^
Constituted upon the above principles the Provincial Courts 
did not naturally have much consequence. The chief reason was 
a lack of adequate authority over the judicial administration 
in the Districts. The Courts were, as stated earlier, merely 
to be a buffer between the District Courts and the S.D.A.
^Minute of Cornwallis, 8th Peb. 1793 ? paras 65 & 66. Bengal 
Revenue Cons.;11th Peb. 1793; Ho.l.
2
Cornwallis’s Minute, 8th Peb. 1793; para 66. Bengal Revenue Cons. 
11th Peb. 1793. No. 1.
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Their prestige was reduced further when their function of 
Criminal Justice ms withdrawn in 1829•
It was not without valid grounds that Galloway, a con­
temporary observer, complained in the 1830s:
"At present the Provincial Courts are held in very 
little esteem, either by the Natives or by the 
Judicial branch of the service generally. The 
reason seems plain: they are vested with very 
little power ....; quod these, therefore, the 
Courts of appeal are little better than offices 
for the transmission cf causes to higher authorities...”
V Galloway: Observations on Law & Constitution etc.?
1832, p.368.
Chapter VI
m s  SADiR D t m n  apaiAt
Origin and Constitutional Development
As the Company took over the direct administration 
of the Provinces in 1772 a Dfcwani (Civil) and a Faujdairi 
(Criminal) Court were established in each District. Two 
corresponding superior Courts of appeal were created in 
Calcutta at the same time. They were known as the Sad£r 
Dbwani Adalut and the Sad£r Nizamat Adalat. The District 
Criminal Courts as well as the S.N.A. were left in the hands 
of the Nawab and his officers. This arrangement for Criminal 
justice continued until 1790 when the administration of 
Criminal justice was also taken over by the Company. The 
S.D.A. was to be constituted by the President and two other 
members of the Supreme Council at Pt. William. In the ab­
sence of the President, a third member was to sit in the 
Court so that not less than three members were to decide 
upon appeals.
1
The Court started functioning in March 1773* But it 
was abolished soon after in November 1775 by the Goyemor-
*4tevn. letter from Bengal, 25th March 1775j Vol. 2, p.2.
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General-in-Council for fear of a clash of jurisdiction with 
the Supreme Court. It was revived in 1760 after the cul­
mination of the historic controversy between the Supreme Court 
and the Company.
In 1781 Eastings offered the post of Chief Justice of 
S.D.A. to Sir Elijah Impey who was to hold it in addition 
to his assignment in the Supreme Court. Impey produced 
a plan for judicial reform which was adopted by the Govemor- 
General-in-Council in 1781. According to it certain changes 
were made in the S.D.A.
The Court, though remaining primarily a Court of Appeal, 
was given a discretion to try any particular cause in the 
first instance if the Judges considered it to be of special 
importance. The Judges or Superintendents of the eighteen District 
Adalats (created in accordance with Impey*s scheme) were put 
under the control of the S.D.A. Henceforth the Judges of 
the subordinate Courts were to be required to take an oath 
of loyalty and uprightness before the S.D.A. The S.D.A. were
| also authorised to frame rules of practice, and issue standing orders
for administration of justice for their own conduct, as well
iI
| as that of the Mofussil Courts. Thus the S.D.A. was given a
new and very significant role -that of the coordinator of the
i
judicial system, ;.'ith the expansion of the judicial administration
this function of 1he Court became increasingly vital and ex­
tensive.
Impey also proposed some changes in the constitution of 
the Court. He wanted the Court to be constituted by the 
Governor- General-in-Council and the Chief Justice and the 
four Puisne Judges cf the Supreme Court. But this proposal 
met with a stiff opposition from the members of Hasting^ s 
Council, probably because of the latter1s general dislike for 
Hastings and his association.- with Impey. Hence it could not 
be implemented. Impey himself was condemned tn the Parliament 
for Us acceptance of an office under the Company* s Government. 
He was removed both from the S.D.A* and from the Supreme 
Court in 1782. After Impey*s recall the S.D.A. reverted to 
its original constitution (i.e. by the Governor-General and 
his Council).
In 1790, after Cornwallis decided to take over the direct
tke
management ofACriminal judiciary}r ; \ 1 , the S.N.A. (which
*\had so far functioned at Hurshidabad under the Nazim ) was 
transferred to Calcutta and joined with the S.D.A.
The arrangements of 1795 did not modify"the constitution 
of the Court. As before it was to be formed by the Governor-
Reza Khan
General and members of the Supreme Council. Although Corn­
wallis and his admirers claimed that the system established 
in 1793 was based upon the principle of separation of powers, 
the retention of the supreme judicial office in the hands of 
the supreme executive was an obvious contradiction. The 
"Glorious Revolution" had completely freed the English judi­
ciary from the executive’s domination, by the beginning of 
the 18th century. Hence this arrangement was not the trans­
mission of a British idea but the continuation of despotic 
tradition inherited from the Moghul rule.
A  combination of the supreme judiciary with the executive 
was assailable in theory and inconvenient in practice. Itwas 
left to the succeeding Govemors-General, Shore, Wellesley, 
Barlow and Minto, to work towards the separation of the Court 
from the Governor-General and his Council.
Cornwallis's successor, Shore, first pointed out the 
risk of the abuse by the Govemor-General-in-Council, of the 
uncontrolled exercise of ultimate judicial authority.^"
In 1781, when the S.D.A- had been reconstituted, the 
number of judicial tribunals it was called upon to superintend,
Minute of Sir John Shore, 29th May 1795, Civ. Judl. Cons., 29th 
May 1795, Mo.10.
was only eighteen. In 1790, the S.IT.A. was also joined to 
it. In 1793t four provincial Courts of Appeal and Circuit 
had bean established. Another was added in 1795. The number 
of District Courts had been increased from eighteen to twenty- 
six in 1793. The management and superintendence of all these 
inferior Courts was S.D.A.Ts job. Sitting as the Nizamat AdalClt 
it had to hear appeals direct, in all serious crimes, from 
the decisions of the Judges of Circuit (who administered 
Criminal justice in the Mofussil). Besides, it had to super­
vise the management of Police. In Civil cases the Court found 
great relief from the Province Courts which buffered the 
appeals from the District Courts. Still, the number offirst 
and second or Special Appeals filtering through the Provincial 
Courts to the S.D.A. was found to be considerable. In spite of 
the limitations put on the appeals to the S.D.A. by Regulations 
XII of 1797 and V of.1798, one hundred and twenty four Criminal 
and forty Civil trials were received by the Courts during 1800.
At the end of 1801 one hundred and ten Civil and one hundred
2
and twenty-two Criminal trials were pending before them.
^Appx. to Minute of Stuart, 15th Nov. 1815. Papers on the 
Judl. System of Bengal, 1.0. Reg. (71) 197.
^Civ. Judl. Cons., 19th July 1814, No.6.
The volume of forthcoming business required the attention 
of full-time Judges. The Court's functions could not be per­
formed efficiently by the iuling authority who were distracted 
by so many other problems. This reasoning was particularly 
valid in the case of Wellesley, who was so occupied with poli­
tical and military affairs. It is no wonder that the first 
initiative for the separation of the Court from the Council 
came from him. Wellesley made out a very strong case for 
divesting the Governor-General-in-Council of their judicial 
functions in the S.D.A. He pointed out the theoretical ob­
jections first.
Justice in an open Court has been recognised as one of 
the basic guarantees of its proper dispensation. Following 
this principle the S.D.A. (like the other tribunals) was re­
quired to be an open Court.^ But on account of the Govemor- 
General-in-Council constituting the Court, this provision
could not be adhered to. The Court's sittings had so far been
2held in the Council Chamber. Neither the parties nor their 
Pleaders used to be present Afc any of the trials. The proceedings
^By Regulation VI of 1793. S.6.
2
General Despatch from Bengal, 9th July 1800. Vol. 40.
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(i.e. the plaint, the answer, the pleadings, the evidences 
and the judgments of the lower Courts) were all translated 
into English and then read to the Members present, who 
then passed the decision. The reasons given for the Governor- 
General-in-Council not sitting in an open Court were,first, 
that it would be incompatible with[dignity of the ruling 
authority to do so.^ Secondly, their presence in the open 
Court would prevent the pleading of the causes with due 
freedom. wNo Native Pleader would venture to contest his 
Governor-General's/ opinions, and the will of the Governor- 
General and not the law would be considered /joy the Pleaders 
Mid the Suitors^ as the rule for decision."2 The Governor- 
General's ignorance of the local languages also made it im­
practicable for him to preside at the trials in an open Court,
unless it was decided to conduct the proceedings in English
3
and by English Pleaders.
^General Despatch from Bengal, 9th July 1800. Yol. 40. 
2Ibld.
3Ibid.
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Talking about the dangers of the abuse of judicial power
in the hands of the supreme legislative and executive authority,
Wellesley stated:
"The honour and interests of the British nation and 
the sacred moral obligations which it has contracted 
by extending its dominions over the numerous in­
habitants, ... demand that every practicable pre­
caution should be adopted to preclude the ruinous 
consequences of the abuse of power....”!
According to him the ideal state of affairs would be when
”... the Governor-General-in-Council would be 
divested of the power of interfering in the im­
mediate administration of the laws, and when his 
own acts in his executive capacity together with 
those of the officers of the Government in all 
questions relating to private rights of property, 
will be subjected to the cognizance of Courts 
of judicature. "-2
Wellesley wrote to Dundas that a few things were still 
lacking to secure the noble objects contemplated by Cornwallis. 
The firsiJpnd the most important of them was the institution of 
a Court of S.D.A. and S.N.A. distinct from the Council.
^Proceedings of G.G.-in-Council, 12th March 1801, Civ. Judl. Cons*
14th March 1801, Wo.2.
2Ibid.
■^WeHesley to Dundas, 5th March 1800.Wellesley Papers«Vol.II.
p.251
Oxt the practical difficulties in the existing system ■
Wellesley observed:
"The extent and importance of the causes to be 
determined in these Courts furnished sufficient
occupation to require from the Governor-General
and Members of the Council the entire sacrifice 
of every other duty, and the Governor-General 
and the Members, therefore, had to keep content 
irith either an incomplete and tardy administration 
of the highest judicial function, or the neglect 
of 1he arduous charge of the executive and legis­
lative Government of this extensive Empire."*
But instead of making any abrupt change, Wellesley pro­
ceeded step by step* In 1801, the constitution <f the Court 
was modified to the extent that it was to be constituted by
only one Member of the Council, not being the Governor-General
CiviL p
or the Commander-in-Chief, and two covenantedAservants*
The Council Member was naturally (on account of his superior 
status) to be the Chief Justice* G* E. Barlow, Member of 
Wellesley's Council who presided over the Board of Revenue, 
was nominated to act as the Chief Justice* H* T. Colebrooke 
and J. H. Harrington, both covenanted servants, were appointed 
as Puisne Judges* All these persons had borne a principal share 
in the framing of the system adopted by Cornwallis in 1793*
^Proceedings of G.G.-in-Council, 12th March 18013 , Civ. Judl. 
Cons*, 14th March 1801, Ho* 2*
^Tbid.
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This was advanced as the reason for their selection.1
In 1805 Wellesley took the final step by providing that 
the Chief Justice too, like the other two members of the Court, 
was to be selected from amongst the covenanted servants of 
the Company.^ Colebrookeji^ as now appointed Chief Judge and 
Harrington and Fombelle as Puisne Judges. The Chief Judge was 
to receive a salary of Rs. 60,000/- per annum. The two Pftisne 
Judges were to get Rs. 55,000/- each.
But the Directors disapproved the complete separation 
of the Court from the Council. In 1807 they directed the 
Bengal Government to revert to the arrangement of 1801 by
which a member of the Council was to be the Chief Justice of
3
the Court . They rejected the plea of principles and ideology.
"We refuse to accept that the endeavour to secure the blessings 
of just law duly administered shall in any way be affected by
A
the vesting of the supreme judicial power in the executive.”
^Wellesley acknowledged their contribution in his letter to Dundas. 
dtd 5th March 1800. Papers of Wellesley, Monfc Martin. Vol. II, p.231* 
Earlier he had referred to Harrington (while he was acting as 
Register of the Court) as the "ablest officer in the Court of S.D.A. 
... a person who possesses just pretensjcns to an eminent situation
in the judicial dept....” Wellesley to Lord Clive, 29th July 1798*
Ibid. Vol. I. £.32.7
^Minute of G.G.-in-C, 25th July 1805> Civ. Judl. Cons^ 25th July 1805* 
Ho.14.
3Judl. Despatch;7th Jan 1807, 1.0. Vol. I.
4Xbid.
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Earlier they had criticised the Bengal Government £or having
made such an important change without consulting them;
"...nor can we approve of the manner in which you have taken
S m c M e v  & 4q-\u .!'
S-. D-. A-» • • • We
expect that no changes of importance shall actually be made
till our opinion shall have been taken.
One of the considerations which impelled the Directors
was economic. Wellesley’s wars had been very expensive. The
surplus revenues from the newly acquired territories was not
equal to the large loans contracted in India. During 1806-7
the deficit; of the three Presidencies was more than £3 million 
2
sterling. Hence the Directors had a natural reluctance to
sanction any judicial reform involving increased expenditure.
This economic consideration was common in their extreme re-
3luctance to sanction the appointment of Assistant Judges, and 
in their opposition to the establishment of the College at 
Ft. William for training the officers of the Company. Besides, 
Wellesley’s pursuance of an independent policy, in which he had 
Dund&s on his side, had been consistently irritating the Directors.4
^Judl* Despatch 17th Dec. 1806, para 39. 1.0. Vol. I.
2 ■ - ■.jjnd Report of Select Committee of House of CommonsPari. Papers,
1810. Vol. 5.
3
See Chapter III, jp. 141 •
4
Wellesley’s policy over the issues of private trade and the estab­
lishment of the Collggec at Ft. William had annoyed the Directors most.
upon yourself to alter the constitution (fthe/
A general apathy towards his reforms could he naturally 
expected from the Direction.
Barlow, who succeeded Wellesley in August 1805» com-
latter 1s
pletely agreed with W'.f..:. . * ;> views. Though he carried out
the instruction of the Directors by enacting Regulation XV
of 1807, which provided for a Council Member to be the Chief
Justice, he strongly championed separation. He justified
the preceding Government’s action, without prior sanction
of Directors, on the ground of the urgency of preventing
an accumulation of arrears.^ The number of Provincial and
District Courts had risen from thirty-four in 1801 to fifty-
one in 1807. Adverting to that and to the consequent increase
in the number of Civil and Criminal appeals to the Court, Barlow
asserted the necessity of maintaining at least three full-time 
2
Judges. He therefore resolved to employ three Judges from 
the covenanted servants of the Company besides the Chief Justice,
3
who was to be a member of the Council. At the same time he
a
urged the Directors to reconsider their instruction on the issue.
“^Barlow’s Minute, 23rd July 1807, paras 1 and 6> Civ. Judl. Cons. 
23rd July 1807. Ro.l.
2Ibids. para 7.
3Ibid.
^Judl. letter, 31et July 1807, paras 29-43. 1.0. Vol. I.
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In the meantime Minto took over the Governor-Generalship from 
Barlow on 31st July 1807. He carried out the resolution of 
his predecessor. Barlow,who, after Minto’s arrival, had reverted 
to his place in the Council as the President of the Board of 
Revenue, was appointed the Chief Justice. Colebrooke, Harrington 
and Fombelle were to continue as Puisne Judges of the Court'
In fact, the idea of having three Puisne Judges instead of two 
was a convenient arrangement in another respect too. The 
Government would otherwise have been faced with the immediate 
problem of finding an alternative employment for one of the 
three covenanted servants who had been sitting in the Court since 
1805.
Shortly afterwards Barlow was appointed Governor of Madras.
Colebrooke, was then allowed to succeed him bothih the Council
2fcnd in the Court. Burnish Crisp was appointed the new fourth 
Judge. He was succeeded by James Stuart in 1810.
Meanwhile the pressure of business before the Courts con­
tinued to rise. The number of Criminal trials pending before 
the Nizamut Adalot increased from 170 at the end of 1809 to 234
^Minute of G.G. 14th Aug. 1807j Civ. Judl. Cons.>34th Aug. 1807* 
No.l.
2Civ. Judl. Cons, 27th Aug. 1811. No.l.
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by the close of 1810.^ Civil trials before S.D.A. swelled
2
from 104 on 1st January 1809 to 224 on 1st January 1810.
The anti-ifcacoity campaign launched in 1808 meant a new load
for the S.N.A. By Section 2 of Regulation VIII of 1808 all
cases of the crime of Jobbery with violence were required
to be brought before the S.N.A. for confirmation of sentences
of the Circuit Judges. The number of such references alone
was 346 in 1809* In 1810 it increased to 492 and during the
first six months of 1811 a still larger proportion of 303
3references had already been received. The attention of the 
Court had been further occupied in the last few years with 
inquiries into the charges preferred against certain public
4
officers. On account of above factors and on the ground of 
his being unable to devote adequate attention to the Court (due 
to his responsibilities in the Board of Revenue) Colebrooke
5
made a plea for an increase in the number of Judges of the Court.
^Civ. Judl. Cons.j 27th Aug. 1811^ Bo.l.
2Ibid.
^TbiA.
4
The most tedious and prolonged inquiries over those years had 
been in the cases of C. Boddam, Judge-Magt. of Sarun, and that 
of W. Broddie, ex-Collector of Purneai;.
c
Minute of Colebrooke (n.d.). Civ. Judl.Cons.y27th Aug. 1811^ No.l.
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The Hinto Government responded by passing a Regulation which 
provided that henceforth the Court was to consist of "a 
Chief Judge and of as many Puisne Judges as the Governor - 
General-in-Council may from time to time deem necessary for 
the despatch of the business of those Courts."^ The idea was 
to make the strength of the Court elastic. Under the above 
provision J. H. Rees, a Judge of the Calcutta Court of Appeal, 
was appointed officiating additional Judge of the S.D.A. This 
arrangement was stipulated to be temporary. It was to be dis­
continued after the arrears had been reduced. Still the Hinto 
Government informed the authorities in London that it was very
doubtful that the existing number of permanent Judges could
2
ever be equal to the business before the Courts.
It was Colebrooke, once again, who initiated the final
5separation of the Court from the Government. He argued ihat 
being a member of the Government (eueh-ao ho) was incompatible 
with being the Chief Justice of the C o u r t T h e  former occupation 
hardly allowed any leisure which could be employed in the Court ■.
^S.2 of Regulation XII of 1811.
^Judl. letter, 29th Oct. 1811, paras 17-19. 1.0. Vol. Ill, pp. 11-16.
Hinute of Colebrooke, 7th Dec. 1811, Civ. Judl. Cons.> l7th Dec.
1811^ Nos. 1 & 2.
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He informed the Governor-General-in-Council that his pre­
decessor, Sir G. H. Barlow, had never been able to attend 
either of the Courts while ostensibly Chief Justice of them*
And whatever time he himself had been able to devote to the 
Adalats had been at the cost of neglect of his duties in the 
Government.^
In 1810 Charles Reed, a European settler of Pumea, had
made some libellous remarks against Colebrooke and other Judges 
2
of the Court. Those remarks had been made in a complaint to 
the Governor-General-in-Council. The conduct of the Judges 
in the investigation of charges against Broddie, the er- 
Collector of Purnea, had been the main issue of the complaint. 
Although the imputations of dishonesty and collusion made by 
Reed again st|the Judges were found to be baseless and Reed was 
subsequently found guilty of libel by the Supreme Court, the 
fact of Colebrooke being a member cf the Supreme Council caused 
considerable embarrassment to the Government. Colebrooke made 
this another justification for the separation of the Court from
3
the Government. He stated that £ a Member of the Council was
^Minute of Colebrooke, 7th Dec. 1811, Civ. Judl. Cons17th Dec.
1811. Nos. 1 & 2.
S?he case has been referred to in Cdebrooke's Minute of 7th Dec.
1811, Civ. Judl. Cons., 17th Dec. 1811. No. 1.
5Ibid.
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not nominally the Chief Justice of the Court there would be
no excuse for mixing up the Government with the proceedings
or decisions of the Court. Nor would there be any opening
for venting libels against a member of the Government, under
the cover of complaints to a competent authority, and with
consequent impunity. If the Judges of the S.D.A. were answer^
able to the Supreme Court, as they would all be if no Hember
*
of the Council was ..nominally its head, there would be no 
scope of preferring such charges before the Government and 
thereby creating an awkward situation for them.**'
The other reason advanced by Colebrooke for the separation
2was the theoretical one that had earlier been stated by Wellesley.
On the above grounds Colebrooke proposed that he should
be allowed td quit his situation in the Court and the senior
sitting Puisne Judge be allowed to succeed to it. Colebrooke
was an influential Hember of the Council. The Governor-General,
Lord Minto, was an ardent believer in the ideal of separation of 
3
powers. The proposal, therefore, easily got through the Supreme
^Colebrookefs Minute, 7th Dec. 1811, Civ. Judl. Cons., 17th Dec.
1811. No.l.
2Ibid.
3
See Chapter III, pp. 1 29-30.
*3y St21^ Geo. III. 0.70, the G.G. and Members of the Council had been 
made immune from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for acts 
done in official capacity.
Council.*
^  2 
J. H. Hari'ington was appointed the new Chief Justice.
He was the second person to hold this situation without having 
a seat in the Council (the first had been Colebrooke, between 
1805 and 1807). His salary was fixed at Rs. 60,000/- per 
annum, the same that had been allowed to Colebrooke in 1805.
Until 1812 the Directors remained ‘unconvinced of the 
need for having an independent Chief Justice. Replying to 
the Judicial letter of 31st July 1807, they said: "Your state­
ments of the expediency of completely separating the judicial 
power from executive are no doubt theoretically just, though 
hardily practicable ever ..... We see no inconvenience in placing 
one of the members of the Council at the head <f the department 
^CourtsJ. •
But in 1814, they sanctioned the separation made by the 
Minto Government, "... in view of the difficulties in the con­
tinuation of the earlier system of the Chief Justice being a
5
member of the Council...#"
*Letter from Secy, to Govt, to S.D.A., 17th Dec. 1811, Civ. 
Judl. Cons., 17th Dec. 1811. No. 2.
2Civ. Judl. Cons., 17th Dec. 1811. No. 2.
^See ante, p. 259-
^Judl Despatch,14th Feb. 1812j para 33* 1.0. Vol. 2.
v
^Judl Despatch^28th Oct. 18l£, 1.0. Vol. 2.
Like Wellesley, Minto had made this change without waiting 
for the approval of the Directors. But while Wellesley had been 
snubbed for having carried out such an * important change1’ without 
having obtained sanction from London, Minto*s identical action 
got through without exciting any comment of that nature. Ob­
viously the personal relations of Wellesley with the Directors 
was also responsible for the disapproval of his reforms.
It was enacted by Regulation XXV of 1814 that from 1st 
February 1815 onwards no person could be considered qualified 
to be appointed as a Judge of S.D.A. and S.N.A., unless he should 
have previously officiated as a Judge of a Provincial Court for 
at least three years, or have been employed in any other judi­
cial capacity for at least nine years. By implication this 
further insured the separation of the Courts* personnel from 
the executive or revenue branches of service.
Except for a short break during 1813-14 > while he was 
away on leave, Haa0Lngton remained Chief Justice of the Courts 
until 1820. After him, William Leycester was appointed to that 
situation in 1821. Leycester remained Chief Justice until 1829$ 
when the distinction between the Senior and Junior or Puisne 
Judges of the Court was abolished.*
*By Regulation III of 1829
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Although the permanent sanctioned strength of the Court 
in 1811 was only three, the services of an additional acting 
Judge were constantly retained* In 1816 the number of perman­
ent Judges was increased to four* An acting fifth Judge was 
added besides* In 18235 two of the Judges were required to 
act part-time (two days in the week) on the StLd©3r Special 
Commission.^ In view of that the permanent establishment of 
the Court was increased to five Judges. In 1828 the Court
requested the Government to increase the permanent strength
2
of the Court to six Judges. But the Bentinck administration- 
bent upon economy-was reluctant tojmake new appointments. Instead 
the services of two part time Judges was made available to the 
Court. They were C. R. Barwell and IT. J. Halhead, who held 
the offices of Special Commissioners for Calcutta and Murshidabad, 
constituted under Regulation III of 1828. They had their office 
at the Presidency. The work of their commissions did not engage 
the whole of their time. Hence Bentinck resolved to make use of 
their spare time to provide assistance to the Courts by appointing
3
them acting Judges.
The StLdx&r Special Commission had been established by Regulation
I of 1821, to settle disputes arising out of settlements in the 
Western Provinces.
2
Letter from S.D.A- to Govt. 5th Aug. 1828. Civ. Judl. Cons.?
2nd October 1828. Ho. 4A.
Judl. letter, 9th Sept. 1833, 1.0. Vol. 1 6 , pp. 436-38.
In 1814 the Directors suggested the separation of
ihe S.D.A. from the S.R.A.'1’ They thought that the S.D.A. and
the S.R.A. with two Judges, a Register and an Assistant each,
would ensure a more convenient despatch of business by the
Courts than under the existing set up. Substantial objections
2were raised against this proposal by the S.D.A. In the first 
place, a superior Court of appeal could not be constituted by 
only two Judges without giving a casting voice to a third in
the erent of a difference of opinion. Thus if the Courts were
they
separated would at least require three Judges each, i.e. a 
total of six instead of five existing. This, coupled with the 
necessity of maintaining two separate establishments with a 
Register and an Assistant for each, would entail a considerable 
financial burden. Secondly, so long as offices of District 
Judges and Magistrates weremited and the Judges of Circuit 
were also the Judges of the Provincial Courts of Appeal, a 
convenience of reference from, and a facility of control over, 
the subordinate judicial officers was insured by the union of 
Civil and Criminal Courts at the top. This advantage was to be
^Judl. despatch, 9th Rov. 1814, para 66. 1.0. Vol. II.
2
Letter from S.D.A. to Govt, (n.d.) para 5Sj Papers on the 
Judl. system of Bengal, Reg. (7l) 197, p.56.
lost if the Courts were to he separated. Besides, the S.D.A. 
found the proposed separation entirely unnecessary. Under 
the existing arrangement for distribution of business among 
the five Judges the Courts had been functioning very success­
fully. The arrears of Criminal business had been wiped out 
and that of Civil cases had been much reduced.
The proposal was thereflre shelved 3at least for the time
being. By 1826 the arrears of Civil causes before the Court
had accumulated to 425, in spite of all efforts to keep them
down. The Amherst Government, finding the situation hopeless,
sought the sanction of Directors either for establishing a
separate Court in the Western Provinces, or else for separating
the S.D.A. from the S.R.A.^ The Directors reserved their opinion
on the question of establishment of another Court in the Western
Provinces, but permitted the Bengal Government to separate the
2
Courts if they expected that to be beneficial.
The proposal for establishing a separate Court in the 
Western Provinces was, however, getting more popular in the 
meantime. Hence the idea of bifurcation was not considered any 
more.
■^Judl. letter, 30th April paras 8-15. 1.0. Vol. II.
2
Judl. Despatch^30th April 1828, paras 13-16. 1.0. Vol. VII.
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The establishment of the Courts at Calcutta meant great 
inconvenience to the suitors of the outlying Districts of 
the Benares and Barailly Divisions. Some of the Districts of 
Western Provinces, like Saharanpur and Merrut, were 900 miles 
away from Calcutta. The hardship that this distance implied 
to the suitors and the witnesses in those days of primitive 
transport can well be imagined. The Bengal Government rightly 
remarked that in the absence of a separate Court in the Western 
Provinces, justice was being virtually denied to the inhabitants 
of that territory.*
In 1820 the Chief Justice, Ha^ington, had proposed the 
transfer of the seat of the Court to a more central place, so as to
2
make it more accessible to the inhabitants of the distant regions.
He accordingly suggested the transfer of its seat either to Patna,
Bhagalpur or Monghyre. The latter two cities he preferred to
Patna. The other Judges of the Court, however, objected to the
3removal of the Court from Calcutta. The Court, if established 
at Patna, Monghyre or Bhagalpur, would certainly have been more 
accessible to the suitors of Western Provinces. But at the same 
time its removal from Calcutta might have obstructed the super­
visory role of the Court over the judicial administration. On
*Judl. letter, 15th September 1831, para 15. 1.0. Vol. 15.
^Minute of Harrington (n.d.) para 22. Civ. Judl. Cons.j11th Jan. 1820^ 
tfo.8.
^Minute of 3rd and 4th Js. (Rees & Goad) qn Hay/ington*s proposal.
Civ. Judl. Consv  11th Jan. 1820? Ho. 8. , r.o.
all matters of importance the Court had to be in constant 
communication with the Government. Hence its transfer from 
Calcutta would have seriously delayed its functions and de­
cisions concerning administrative matters. The Government 
however seems to have ignored the proposal completely as no 
mention is made of it in the subsequent proceedings.
In 1829 W. B. Bayley, then a Mamber of Council, advocated 
the creation of a separate Court in the Western Provinces.*
The Judges of the Court, particularly Ross, strongly 
objected to the suggestion on the ground that the etistence
2
of two supreme Courts would destroy the consistency of decisions.
But both Bentinck and Metcalfe favoured the proposal. They were
convinced that a single Court was absolutely inadequate to dispose
3
of the business arising out of the two provinces. The establish­
ment of a second Court in the Western Provinces was considered 
necessary for "affording efficient protection to those living
in the distant provinces", as well as for maintaining "an
4adequate control over the inferior tribunals". But considerations
*Minute of W. B. Bayley, 5th Nov. 18295 Civ. Judl. Cons.5 12th Oct. 
1830; No. 69v O.
^Minutes of Js. of S.D.A. on Bayley1 s proposals. Pari. Branch Colls 
1832. Vo. 77. No. 2.
3Judl. letter, 6th Sept. 1831, para,- 20. 1.0. Vol. 15, f.f.128-30.
4Ibid., para 18.
of economy made the Government hesitant. The Finance Committee
advised against the creation of another Court.*
In the meantime, however, the sanction of the Directors
for the creation of another Court for Western Provinces was 
2
received. The Bengal Government made the necessary arrangements 
at once.^ The Sad^r Dewani and Nizamat AdalaJt for Western
Provinces began functioning at Allahabad in 1833* At first it
4
started with only two Judges, Turnbull and Colvin. By 1835,
however, the number of Judges of the Allahabad Court was raised
5to six.
The S.D.A.s functioned until 1861. On account of the in­
convenience.( of maintaining two different systems of Courts, 
the S.D.A.s and Hie Supreme Courts were abolished and their 
jurisdictions were merged into the High Courts, established
g
under the Indian High Courts Act of 1861.
^Letter from Civil Finance Committee to Govt, 12th July 1830, 
Civ. Judl. Cons., 12th Oct. 1830. No.l.
2
Judl. despatch, 26th Jan. 1831, para 10. 1.0. Vol. 8.
^Judl. letter, 15th Sept. 1831, para 15. 1.0. Vol. 15*
4India Register.
5tbid.
g
For full discussion see Chapter VII, pp.380-1 .
Powers and Functions
The S.D.A. had been instituted as a Court of Appeal.
Under Regulation VI of 1793 it was authorised to receive 
appeals from the decisions of Provincial Courts in cases 
in which the amount or value exceeded Rs. 1,000/-. Due to 
a heavy influx of appeals this limit had to be raised from 
Rs. 1,000/- to Rs. 5»000/-.
2
The jurisdiction of the Court was redefined in 1814.
The Court was authorised to receive an appeal from all
judgments passed by the Provincial Courts on cases tried
and determined by them in the first instance. A Second or
Special Appeal also lay to the Court, in certain circumstances,
from the decisions of the Provincial Courts over regular or
4
first appeals from the District Courts.
The system of Special Appeals had been originally in­
stituted by RegulationsXIX of 1803 and.VIII of 1805* By these 
the Provincial Courts and the S.D.A. were allowed to admit a
1By Regulations XXI of 1797 and 7 of 1798.
2
By Section 5 of Regulation XXV of 1814.
5Ibid. Cl. 2.
4Ibid. Cl. 3.
Special Appeal in all cases not open to a Regular Appeal if 
thejoriginal decision appeared, on the face of it, to be un­
just or erroneous or if from any other cause a further in­
vestigation seemed desirable. The discretion allowed on 
admission of Special Appeals was restricted by Regulation XXVI 
of 1814. Under it no Special Appeal could be admitted by 
any Court unless the previous judgment appeared to be in­
consistent with some established precedent or with some law, 
regulation or usages, or unless the case involved some point 
of general interest not previously decided by a superior Court. 
To discourage litigants from seeking a second appeal it was 
further provided that petitions for Special Appeals were to 
be presented on Stamp Paper. But the restrictions on the ad-
r
mission of Special Appeals were considerably relaxed by Regu­
lation XIX of 1819.^ By it the S.D.A. and the Provincial 
Courts were given a general discretion to admit such an appeal 
whenever, on a perusal of the Decreejof the lower Court, there 
might appear strong and probable ground for presuming a failure 
of justice. Besides, the District Courts were authorised to 
certify to the Provincial Courts,and the latter to the S.D.A.,
^Tor reasons see Chap. V, p. 239-
that a particular case in which no regular appeal lay to the
higher Court involved some point of general importance hitherto
unsettled. If a Provincial Court rejected a petition so
certified by the District Court their order was not to be
final. The party seeking a Second f^ ppeal was at liberty to
file a petition before the S.D.A. for admission. The S.D.A.,
il7
if after the perusal of the application^thought it proper, was 
to direct the Provincial Court to admit the Special Appeal in 
question. Petitions of Special Appeals were, however, to be 
considered by at least two Judges. This was intended to intro­
duce a greater circumspection in the admission of those appeals.
But the above relaxation having caused considerable 
increase in the influx of such appeals, particularly in the 
Provincial Courts, Regulation XIX of 1819 was rescinded, and the 
limitations provided under Regulation XXYI of 1814 were brought 
back into force.
In addition to the Regular and Special Appeals, the S.D.A. 
was made competent to receive Summary Appeals from the orders 
and decrees of the Provincial Courts Min all cases in which 
the latter may have refused to admit a regular suit or appeal 
regularly cognizable by them, or having admitted such suit or 
appeal, may have dismissed it on the ground of delay, informality 
or other default, without investigation into the merits of the
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case”.^* These appeals were, however,not to be tried by the 
S.D.A. itself. The Court, after a perusal of the application, 
was either to reject it or order the lower Court refusing or 
rejecting the original suit or appeal, to admit the same and 
make a regular investigation. This process was also commonly 
termed Review1.
The Court was also authorised to exercise original juris­
diction. It was empowered to remove causes above the amount 
or value of £5 >000 from the Provincial Courts and try those it­
self in the first instance. The justification offered was,
"... we conceive that substantial advantage would 
arise from the trial, in the first instance, by the SudJev T)€-u>clyu 
fttloiuJr S»P-. A ■ > of some of those causes of primary magni­
tude and importance in which not only the interests 
of the individual but those of the Government may be 
involved, and which may in their operation, possibly 
affect the general . • . interests of the c o u n t r y . ”^
It was, however, not intended to burden the already overworked
S.D.A. by making an extensive operation of this provision.
The idea only was that should the Court find enough leisure
3
in future the rule might be extensively employed. The Court, 
however, never found enough respite from the appeals and other
■^Regulation XXVI of 1814> Section 3, Cl. 2.
2Judl. letter 29th Nov. 1814. 1.0. Vol. 4, ff. 16-17.
3
Chief Secretary Dowdswell's report on judicial reforms, 17th 
Oct. 1814 j Civ. Judl. Cons.^29th Nov. 1814> No, 27.
business to be able to devote any time to trial of original
causes.
As Nizamut Adalut the Court had to deal with all matters
relating to administration of Criminal justice^ and management
of Police and Jails.
It has been noticed earlier that the Court had been
established in the role of the controller and coordinator
of the entire machinery of judicial administration. Its function
in that capacity came to be classified under the head of "Miscel-
laneous and English” business. These functions of the Court
were summarised by Stuart in the following words:
"... to watch over the whole vast organisation by 
which laws are dispensed . • . , to see th&t the 
Courts and judicial officers are in constant motion; 
that as far as may be practicable, justice is not 
denied or improperly delayed, . . .  to attend to 
the state of Jails, the health, treatment and dis­
posal of prisoners:and convicts; to issue instructions 
to the Courts and officers below, in various cases 
requiring reference to the Court, or in which those 
officersT)wd£dL advice, and finally to check all ir­
regularities, abuses and misconduct. In the same 
Miscellaneous Department the Court conduct their 
correspondence with the Government^in which they 
have to report on numerous matters of difficulty, 
frequently to discuss plans for the improvement of  ^
the systems, and to frame regulations accordingly...."
All sentences of transportation for life,or^death, passed by the 
Js. of Circuit, and all convictions in cases of Robbery with 
violence by the Circuit Js.^were required to be referred to the 
S.N.A. for confirmation. Besides, all those cases in which the 
Futwa (opinion) of the Mufti (Law Officer) differed from the 
ophion of the Circuit J. were to be sent to the S.N.A. for final 
decision.
^Minute of J.; Stuart, 3rd J. of S.D.A., 15th Nov. 1815, paras 
6-8. Papers relating to judicial system of Bengal^ I.0.Reg.(71)
This branch further involved all questions (excepting the trial: 
of cases) relating to S.D.A.'s own proceedings or those of the 
subordinate Courts, over fifty in number. A portion of the 
above business, like correspondence with Government or with the 
subordinate Courts concerning administrative matters^was carried 
out in English. This was often more specifically termed as Eng­
lish business as distinguished from the Miscellaneous, which 
was generally conducted in Persian.
To aid them in their supervisory functions, the S.D.A. wgire 
given authority to suspend any Judge or officer of a Provincial 
or District Court, for disobedience or neglect of any process, 
rule or order issued by the Court, or for making a false return 
to it.^ * The S.D.A. could also suspend any District Judge for 
a neglect or disobedience of any order of a Provincial Court.
According to Statute 21^ Geo. Ill, Cap. 70 (Section 21) of 
1781, the jurisdiction of the Company1s highest tribunal was to 
be final and conclusive in all cases (under its cognizance) 
up to the amount or value of £5,000 or Sicca Rupees 50,000/-.
In cases of above that amount or value an appeal was to lie 
from the S.D.A.fs decision to the King-in-Council. In the 
case of Parsan Lai vs. Bai.jnath Sahu, however, the Court thought
^By Regulations II of 1801^and VIII of 1805
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that their jurisdiction had heen threatened by the Supreme 
Couitand hence they made a loud protest to the Govemor-General- 
in-Council.^
The case, in brief, was as follows; -« In 1806, one Parsan 
Lai . filed a suit against Baijnath Sahu for the recovery of 
certain property and sums of money. The case was originally 
instituted in the Shahabad Zillah Court where the pleadings 
were completed. The value of the claimed property and money 
exceeded Rs, 5>000/-. Hence, after the passing of Regulation 
XIII of 1808 which made all such cases triable in the first in­
stance by the Provincial Courts, it was transferred to the Patna 
Provincial Court. Hawkins, the second Judge of the latter Court, 
sat singly on its trial. He decreed the case in favour of the 
Defendant Baijnath Sahu in 1812, both on the merits of the case 
as well as on the ground of the Plaintiff’s suit being time-barred. 
Prom the Patna Court’s decision Parsan Lal:. appealed as Pauper 
to the S.D.A. in 1814- The S.D.A. thereupon affirmed the decree 
of the Provincial Court on 23rd August 1816. Subsequently the 
Plaintiff ; filed a petition for review before the S.D.A. This 
again was rejected on the 14th May 1819.
^S.D.A.’s report on the case of Parsan Lai vs. B. Sahu has been re­
corded under Civ. Judl. Cons.^30th Oct. 1822^ No. 5.
After this, in December 1819, Parsan Lai filed a Bill 
of Complaint before the Equity jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court. In that he set forth the -whole matter of his suit and 
charged that the Defendant had heretofore obtained the decision 
in his favour, in the Company's Courts, lay fraud and collusion. 
He particularly alleged that the Patna Court's decree in favour 
of Baijnath Sahu had been obtained by corrupt bribes of money 
given to Hawkins, the second Judge, and to the officers of his 
Court. In May 1820 the Defendant filed his answer before the 
Supreme Court^denying those allegations.
The Supreme Court at first issued a commission to the Judge 
and Register of Shahabad Court to investigate and report on 
the allegations of Jbribe against Hawkins. But this order was 
subsequently countermanded and another issued. As \&r the last 
order, the Bill of Complaint of Parsan Lai was to be retained 
in Equity till the following October to allow him (Parsan Lai ) 
to prosecute Hawkins for bribery before the next session of 
Oyer and Terminer (the Criminal bench of the Supreme Court).
The S.D.A. regarded the Supreme Court's admissinn of a Bill 
pertaining to a matter already decided by them, as a direct 
infringement upon their jurisdiction.^ They asserted that
"^ Letter from S.D.A. to Govt.*27th Aug. 1823. Civ. Judl. Cons.j 
30th Oct. 1822y No. 6. '
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according to the sense of the existing Parliamentary enactments, 
any interference, direct or indirect, by the Supreme Court, to 
alter, modify, rescind or in any way discredit or invalidate 
any decisioijof that Court was illegal.^ Such a pretension of 
the Supreme Court, as in Parsan Lai’s case, they claimed, "must 
render the decisions of the Court ^S.D.A^uncertain and incon­
clusive, though the Parliament has declared it to be final and
conclusive against every jurisdiction except that of His Majesty- 
2
in-Council."
The Court also criticised the Supreme Court’s nomination 
of the Judge and Register of the Shahabad Zillah Court, on a 
commission to examine the witnesses in respect of the charge 
of bribery against Hawkins* They considered the investigation 
into charges against a superior officer,by persons directly 
subordinate to him (such as the Judge and Register of Shahabad 
had been to Hawkins), as an extremely objectionable procedure.
Though the above objectionable course had been happily 
abandoned, yet the resolution of the Supreme Court to allow the 
suit of Parsan Lai to be retained in Equity to give him an 
opportunity of proceeding against Hawkins in the Sessions, had,
"^ Letter from S.D.A. to Govt.y 27th Aug.1822^ Civ. Judl. Cons.*30th
Oct. 1822j No. 6 .
2Ibid.
according to S.D.A., some serious implications.'*’ If Parsan Lal*s 
complaint was found valid by the Sessions and Hawkins was accord­
ingly convicted by the Jury, the Supreme Court would continue 
the suit in Equity. They would regard the decree of the Patna 
Court and that of the S.D.A. confirming it, as nullities.
The Supreme Court would then enter into the merits of the case 
and, if their view of the evidence were otherwise, they would 
award to Parsan Lai the estate which the S.D.A. had determined 
t> be the rightful property of Baijnath Sahu.
The S.D.A. did not deny that Hawkins or any other judicial 
officer was amenable to the Supreme Court. But they asserted 
that if such corruption were proved^it should rest solely with 
the S.D.A. to make that a ground for a fresh trial or not. It
2
would in no case have given that discretion to the Supreme Court.
The Advocate General, Fergussop,considered that so far the
3
Supreme Court had not invaded the jurisdiction of the S.D.A.
It would do so only if,after the trial of the original equity
suit still pending, the Supreme Court gave a judgment which
4
in any way affected the decision of the S.D.A.
"^Letter from S.D.A. to Govt.?27th Aug. 1822^ Civ. Judl. Cons.?
30th Aug. 1822j No. 6.
2Ibid.
3
Letter from R.C.Fergusson to Govt.?7th Oct. 1822; Civ. Judl. Cons. 
30th Oct. 1822.
4
The indictment against Hawkins failed before the Sessions. Conse­
quently the Equity suit was also dismissed on 5th Nov. 1823.
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The Advocate General!s opinion premised only the actual 
outcome of the Supreme Court*s action and not its possible 
implications. It completely ignored the constitutional con­
tention that the very fact of the Supreme Court having admitted 
a Civil action in Equity against a decision of Company*s high­
est tribunal, threatened latter*s privilege. The S.D.A. was 
right to raise this important question of principle. But the 
Government seemed to be in no mood to pick a quarrel with the 
Supreme Court.'*' They kept silent, presumably in view of Fer- 
gusson*s opinion.
By St.53* Geo. III. Cap. 155, Cl. 113 of 1813, the S.D.A. 
was empowered to issue processes against individuals or property 
in Calcutta. The provision was intended to give the Company 
Courts a means of completing their investigation in cases when 
a person becoming subject to their jurisdiction resided in
the S.D.A. could issue such a process only in cases actually
Courts. For the fulfilment of the intention of the above Act 
it was only logical that the latter course &ould be adopted.
Before the enactment of this provision the Courts of the 
Company found themselves absolutely crippled,,, once a person 
subject to their jurisdiction entered the limits of Calcutta 
or held or transferred his property there.
Calcutta The question arose whether
> 1;,:Nr \
before it or also' Jfa *aid of the jurisdiction of the subordinate
1,This point has been elaborated in Chapter VII, pp. 342-6
*
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But the4Clause did not clearly state that. The matter was
thus left to legal interpretation.
In 1815 Advocate General Strettel held that if an inhabitant
of Calcutta who sued in one of the Zillah or Provincial Courts
was cast with costs, the S.D.A. could not issue a process
against him in Calcutta in aid of the lower Court.^
He gave a similar opinion later in the case of Dr. Smet vs 
2Native Resident. Prom the last opinion it could be deduced 
that if lA* sued fBf in the Provincial Court of Barailly and a 
decree was passed in A's favour, B not having sufficient property 
at Barailly to satisfy the decree but having some goods at Cal­
cutta, the S.D.A. could not issue a process for the seizure of 
those goods.
In 1817, in a Criminal case against certain residents of 
Calcutta who were accused of being "accessoiy before fact" to a 
serious assult committed within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate 
of twenty-four Parganajts, Advocate General Fergusson gave a
3
different opinion. He viewed that the Court could in its Crim­
inal jurisdiction issue a process of arrest against a resident 
of Calcutta, for a Criminal offence committed beyond the limits 
of Calcutta and consequently cognizable by the local Magistrate.
^Letter from Strettel to S.D.A.?19th July 1815; Civ. Judl. Cons.; 
12th March 1819. No. 8. Encl. 'A*.
2Strettel to S.D.A.?13th Nov. 1815; Civ. Judl. Cons.;12th March 
1819; No. 8. Encl. *B*.
^Fergusson to S.D.A.^26th Feb. 1819; para 9* Ibid.
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But in 1819 Advocate General Spankie leaned Back on
Strettel*s opinion. When, in a case (Bheemkhan vs Bhuwan
abide
Mohan Gosain), an inhabitant of Calcutta refused to/c - 
by the orders of the Provincial Court for payment of certain 
fees to Pleaders, Spankie held that the S.D.A. had no authority 
to issue a process within Calcutta except upon persons directly 
subject to their jurisdiction. In other words the S.D.A. 
could issue a process against a resident of Calcutta only 
in connection with .matters before it and not injthe aid of 
the jurisdiction of another Court where the case may be pending.
Referring to the opinion earlier given by Fergusson in 
1817, the S.D.A. pointed out that unless a distinction was to 
be drawn between Civil and Criminal processes, Fergusson*s
2opinion was at variance with those of Strettel1 and Spankie.
The Court decided to request the Government to approach
the Directors for obtaining a clearer declaration by the Parlia-
*
ment of the powers intended to be given by the Act. They rightly
"^Letter from S.D.A. to Govt..6th March 1819* Civ. Judl. Cons, y 
12th March 1819  ^No. 7.
2Ibid.
The entire problem of obtaining Parliamentary enactments for legal 
reform in India was resolved in 1833 by St. 3 & 4* Will. IV. Cap, 85. 
which transferred full legislative authority to the G.G.-in-C., See 
Chap. Vll, pp. 378-9 .
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held that the powers as they now stood and had been inteiv 
preted, had to a great extent been defeated.^
The existence of the S.D.A. in Calcutta where the Supreme 
Court functioned affected its authority in soine more ways.
The Judges of the Companies' Courts were authorised, by 
the Regulations^ force, to prosecute and punish any witness 
for the Crime of perjury. But while the Judges of the Provincial 
and District Courts could exercise this power without any hindrance, 
the highest tribunal, the S.D.A., was unable to exercise this 
authority. In 1807, Smith, the Advocate General, ruled in the 
case of Mayaflam, who was alleged to have impersonated another
person and given false evidence before the S.D.A., that the
Court could not take cognizance of his crime. As the crime had
been committed within the limits of Calcutta it could only be
2tried by the Supreme Court.
The Court also found itself impotent to punish Europeans 
for contempt. Parties often employed the English Attorneys of the 
Supreme Court for pleading their cases before the S.D.A. which 
functioned at the same plac§. These Attorneys who had a pro­
fessional background and legal training naturally felt little
"^Letter from S.D.A. to Govt.. 6th March 1819% Civ. Judl. Cons.j
12th March 1819,. Mo. 7.
2
Opinion of Advocate General Smith on Maya Ramfs case , vide 
letter to Govt.^  dtd. 16bh March 1807 j Civ. Judl. Cons. 7 
19th March 1807^ Mo.5-
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regard for the Judges of the S.D.A,, who, in spite of their
judicial experience, could boast of neither. In 1828 one of
the Attorneys, Allan Cameroon, grossly misbehaved before the
Court and libelled the Judges in a case in which he had been
employed by his client Fateh ^ ab khan.^ The Judges naturally
wanted to punish Cameroon for contempt. But the Advocate
General held the view that the S.D.A. possessed no power to
2
punish a British European subject for contempt. He stated 
that the only punishment that the S.D.A. couldinflict on
t
Cameroon was to forbid him from appearing before the Court 
in future. The Court considered such a punishment to be totally 
inadequate. They therefore urged upon the Governor-General- 
in-Council to take steps to secure an enactment by which the 
Court could be empowered to punish a British European subject
3
for contempt. Such a power, they said, was essential for
4
maintaining the dignity of the Court.
^Letter from S.D.A. to Govt..30th Dec. 1828* Civ. Judl. Cons.. 
17th Feb. 1829; No. 15.
2
Letter from S.D.A. to Govt.,5th June 1829, Civ. Judl. Cons.; 
14th July 1829; No. 3.
Ibid.
I^bid.
Mode of Conducting Business
As described earlier the duties of the Court were divided 
into three branches - Civil, Criminal and Miscellaneous.
Under the arrangements of 1793» the members of the Council 
used to sit three days in the S.D.A. The number of sittings 
of the Nizamut Adalut was not fixed. It varied from one day 
to three days in the week, according to the pending business. 
The Courts normally devoted one day in the week to the disposal 
of English and Miscellaneous business.
After 1801, when the Court was partially separated from the 
Govemor-General-in-Council, the following routine of business 
was being followed:^ *
Court Number of
Day Sitting as Business transacted Js sitting
Monday S.D.A. Trial of Appeals 2
Tuesday S.N.A.. Criminal trials 2
Wednesday S.D.Al Hearing petitions and
deciding on motions 2
etc.
Thursday S.N.A. Criminal trials 2
Friday S.D.A. Trial of Appeals 2
Saturday Joint Sitting Miscellaneous and
English Proceedings 3
J^udLl. letter;30th Jan. 1808, para 31. 1.0. Vol. II.
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As would be apparent from above there were three sittings
of S.D.A. and two for the S.N.A. One day in the week was
devoted to Miscellaneous business. On most days only two Judges
sat in the Court. The third by rotation had to keep busy with
preparation of decrees and other routine administrative matters.
After 1807 the assistance of four Judges was sought to be
made available to the Courts. But so long as the Chief Justice
continued to be a member of the Council his assistance to the
1
Court was not very effective. The actual working strength 
of the Court virtually remained at three Judges. In 1811 the 
Chief Justice also became a full-time member of the Court and 
the actual working strength was raised to four whole-time Judges. 
Even then the same weekly routine of business seems to have 
been continued. The extra assistance of a fourth Judge was 
utilised for the creation of an additional Criminal bench of 
one Judge.^
In 1816 five Judges were provided - four permanent and
one acting. Simultaneously, a new arrangement for the distribution
3
of business was adopted for the Courts. Under it the day to day
^See ante pp. 264-5 •
*TJnder Regulation XIII of 1810.
3
The arrangement had been suggested by the G.C.-in-C, Vide Minute 
of G.G.-in-Cj 19th June 1816, Civ. Judl. Cons.,26th Jan.'1816, No.4. 
the S.D.A. resolved to adopt it from 18th March 1816. Vide 
Civ. Judl. Cons.,13th April 1816, Nos. 3 & 4.
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I routine English correspondence and Miscellaneous business was
to be conducted by the Chief Justice, Ha30Lngton, and in his 
absence, by the second Judge. The Chief Justice, -when not 
occupied in the English Department, was to assist the other
i
!
Judges in the disposal of Civil and Criminal cases. He was 
also to sit on trial of cases over which two Judges had 
differed in opinion.
The ordinary sittings of the S.N.A.^and the other Criminal 
business not pertaining to the Miscellaneous department were 
to be held by the second Judge and the officiating third Judge. 
Both were to sit singly, except on cases which, according to 
the Regulations, required the decision of more than one Judge.
They were also given the discretion to sit together on any
other case which they considered important enough. This arrange-
two
ment was, however, not to jjpre^ clude the / . : Judges above
mentinned (the second and the third) or either of them from 
sitting in the Civil Court, whenever they might not be engaged 
with the Criminal benches.
The ordinary sittingsof the S.D.A. were likewise to be held 
by the two remaining Puisne Judges, the fourth and the additional 
fifth Judge. They too were to sit singly but had the discretion 
of sitting together on all important causes. When not occupied 
with Civil causes they were to sit on Criminal trials.
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As mentioned earlier the Chief Justice was to conduct 
the day to day English correspondence and Miscellaneous 
business. But for dealing with matters of importance in 
that department^the Court was tohold one sitting every week.
At least two Judges were to hold the Miscellaneous bench with 
the occasional assistance of a third. The Chief Justice, 
being primarily concerned with this duty, was naturally to 
be one of them.
The above distribution had been primarily devised to 
expand the disposal capacity of the Courts. This had been 
found necessary on account of the increasing pressure of 
business, particularly Criminal, after 1810.
According to this arrangement, there could now be a 
simultaneous sitting of the Civil and Criminal benches. Follow­
ing its adoption, the S.D.A. began sitting all six days in the 
week. The S.N.A. sat on five, while two Judges used to constitute 
a Miscellaneous bench on one day.^ If single Judges were to 
sit all along over Civil and Criminal trials, it could be possible 
in theory to have 6 x 2 = 12 sittings per week of S.D.A. and 
5 x 2 = 10 of the Criminal benches.
minute, 5th Feb. 1827 ? Civ. Judl. Cons.;, 15th Feb
1827} Ho. 13
The arrangement was also designed to make individual 
Judges particularly versed, in the Civil or the Criminal side.
At the same time the scheme was based upon mobility. The 
services of all the Judges could be canalised to either depart­
ment according to need.
This system was carried on through the rest of the period 
under consideration. The increase in the number of -the- Judges 
after 1823 further facilitated its working. After a sixth acting 
Judge was added to the Court in 1826, the Courts could split 
themselves into three, four or even five benches at a time.
But the system of 1816 was altered in one respect after 1820.
That was in the mode of conducting English and Miscellaneous 
business by the Court.
Under Leycester*s Chief Justiceship the Court reverted to 
the old system of conducting Miscellaneous business which ensured 
the participation of all the Judges in the perusal of that part 
of the Court*s duty. After 1820, all the Judges of the Court 
started sitting together on Fridays for the disposal of Miscellan­
eous and English business. This was probably done in deference to 
the sentiments of the Judges who used to be left out of it. The 
business in this department often concerned matters of delicacy 
and importance. It involved control over the Provincial and 
District Courts, drafting of Regulations and other measures of
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general importance, like deciding doubtful questions arising 
out of the Regulations. On such issues the Judges often held 
different opinions. Hence naturally they all liked to be con­
sulted.
This, however, cut down the sittings of the Civil Court 
by one day because of all the Judges being required to assemble 
for Miscellaneous business on Friday. The existing arrears 
of business did not recommend this. Besides promptness and 
despatch could not be expected when five persons sat to take 
decisions on urgent administrative matters.
In 1826 the Governor-General-in-Council pointed out the
1
impropriety of this measure. They suggested that only three 
Judges should conduct the Miscellaneous business on Friday so 
that the remaining two could constitute a Civil bench on that
p
day. But all the Judges except the fifth, Ahmuty opposed
the proposal of the Government. On that account the matter had to be
dropped.
"^Letter from‘Govt, to S.D.A..14th Sept. 1826. Civ. Judl. Cons. •> 
14th Sept. 1826. No.l.
2
Civ. Judl., Cons., 14th Sept. 1826, Nos. 2 & 3.
Ibid.
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By Regulations XIII of 1810 and XXV of 1814 single Judges 
of Provincial Courts and S.D.A. and S.N.A. were authorised to 
hold sittings whenever considered necessary by them. According 
to the above Regulations the Judge sitting alone on appeals 
was empowered to confirm the judgment of the lower Court, whose 
judgment had been appealed agairrfc.His judgment confirming the 
decree of the Court below was to have the same effect as the 
one passed by the joint benches. But single Judges were not 
empowered to reverse or alter the judgment of the lower Courts, 
In such cases the opinion of a second Judge was also to be 
taken before a judgment could be passed. A single Judge could, 
however, determine the admission or rejection of regular 
appeals and his decision in that respect was to be final.
It has been noticed that under the arrangement for dis­
tribution of business adopted by the Courts in 1816, four of 
the Judges were authorised to constitute single benches,^ *
But the provisinn of single Judges sitting over Civil Appeals 
was not much utilised because it was found to be inconvenient.
The S'.D.A. reported to the Government in 1817 that:
SuxlAev DeiOani Mo-tui- 
"... in the trial of appeals the^&.D.A. have found 
it preferable to bring the case at once before a 
sitting of two Judges if practicable. By doing so 
not only ihe matter in appeal must necessarily be
^See ante, ;tp.2 9 3 *
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examined and determined by at least two Judges 
but if there appears to be reason for altering 
the original judgement, a final decision to that 
effect can be immediately passed,instead of^waiting 
for the investigation of another Judge ...”
Harrington, who was the Chief Justice during those years,
remained a consistent advocate of the system of two Judges
sitting on appeals. In 1820 he stated that HIt appears to
me essential that the sitting upon appeals should be held
p
before two Judges.” In 1826, as Member of the Council, he 
proposed an enactment for modifying the existing rules re-
3
garding trial of appeals by single Judges. It provided 
that at least two Judges were to sit on appeals. Harrington
4
gave the following reasons in justification of his proposal.
The sitting of two Judges on the trial of appeals saved the 
necessity of the papers being read a second time by another 
Judge, whenever it might appear necessary to reverse or alter 
the original judgment. It had also beaifound, by experience, 
to be more conducive to the speedy determination of appeals.
He thought that two Judges sitting together and discussing 
the evidence and the merits of the case, were better qualified 
to pass an accurate and just decision than one sitting alone.
1
Half yearly Report of S.D.A.; Civ. Judl, Cons., 4th July 1817;, No.20.
Minute of Harfington, 4th Jan. 1820. Civ. Judl. Cons.? 11th Jan. 
1820, No. 8.
3
Minute o f J u d l .  Cons.y21st Dec
1826? No.lx. y
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Besides it gave better satisfaction to the parties and their 
Vakeels when two Judges sat on the trial instead of one. The
1
last argument was more forcefully presented by the Government.
They stated that in cases of disagreement between two Judges 
sitting singly, over a decision on appeal, the verdict of a 
third prevailed if it concurred with the opinion of either of 
the two Judges before. But the opinion of the Judge left in 
minority still remained on record. This furnished the parties 
with materials for speculation as to what might have been 
the opinion of the fourth or the fifth Judge, had the case 
been forwarded to them too. The Vice-President-in-Council referred 
to actual instances when an appeal had been heard by three 
Judges sitting singly in rotation without any two concurring 
in opinion^ “plough in such cases a fourth Judge, concurring 
with the opinion of either of the three Judges before, might be 
able to decide the case, "there still remained on record, no 
less than two opinions in opposition to the judgement /ultimately/ 
passed."^
The Government therefore felt strongly inclined to enact 
the draft proposed by Harrington.5 But the majority .
Judl. letter.30th Aug. 1827, paras. 190-95. 1.0. Vol. 11, ff. 400-5.
2Ibid.
Ibid.? para 195.
of the Judges of the Court (Smith, Sealey and Ross) opposed 
this proposal on the ground that it would greatly reduce 
the disposal of appeals by the Court. The idea lad, therefore, 
to be abandoned. All the same the Vice-President-in-Council 
directed the Court that the practice of two Judges sitting 
together on appeals was to be pursued as far as feasible.^ " 
Ross was the strongest advocate of the system of single 
benches because that would insure a greater disposal of suits. 
Later, he even went to the extent of suggesting that the de­
cisions of single Judges, . when reversing or modifying
2the judgment of the Court below, should be made final. The
Directors seemed to favour this idea. They had perhaps also
been influenced by James Hill who had suggested that all the
Judges of the S.D.A. should sit separately, each deciding as
4
many appeals as possible. Apparently on account of these 
influences the powers of single Judges of S.D.A. were 
enhanced, though not to the extent advocated by Ross and Mill.
^Judl. letter^ 30th Aug. 1827^ para 195. 1.0. vol. 11, ~ T,
2
Judl. despatch 11th Jan. 1832. para 4. 1.0. vol. 8,
Ibid.
4Evidence of James Mill before Select Committee of House of Lords, 
29th June 1832^ Pari. Branch Colls.; 1832. Vol. 77.pp . 11 9-28.
300
By Regulation IX of 1831, a Judge sitting alone on an appeal 
was authorised to refer the same back for retrial to the 
Court whose decision was appealed against, if there was an 
apparent fault in the latter's judgment. Single Judges were 
also authorised to admit Special Appeals.
Working of the Court
It has been attempted to make an appreciation of the working 
of the S.D.A. by analysing the data from four selected periods 
of seven years each. The periods considered are
1) 1801-7;
2) 1808-14;
................ 3) 1815-21; ..............................
and 4) 1822-28.
The above division has been deemed convenient because it 
enables the influences of policies and other factors on the 
working of the Court to be traced best.
The following table shows the working of the S.D.A. 
over those four periods:'*'
This table has been compiled on the basis of data collected from 
the ^aif-yearly and Annual Ilkports of S.D.A., Judicial despatches 
and some Parliamentary Papers. Those data have been condensed 
by arithmetical calculation to arrive at the figures presented 
in the table. Therefore it is not possible to quote individual 
references.
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Period Total 
number 
of suits 
Instituted
Total
number
decided
Average
number
Instituted
annually
Average
number
decided
annually
Lead of
average
annual
disposal
over
Institution
1801-7 367 373 52.4 53.2 + .8
1808-14 589 328 84 47 -37.-7
1815-21 844 953 120.6 156.1 +15-5
1822-28 937 762 134 109 -25.'
It is clear from the aboye figuresthat in the first period 
disposals managed to keep just abreast of institutions. Very 
few appeals were received in this period from the newly acquired 
territories of the Western Provinces. The Provincial Court of
Barailly had started functioning only from 1804* Appeals from
Court the
the decision of that/only started coming from/end.of 1805 or
the beginning of 1806. Besides, Wellesley1s reforms in the
Constitution of the Court^ must have contributed to its efficiency.
Both these factors combined to keep the S.D.A. equal to the
incoming business. At the end of 1801, 110 appeals had been
pending before the Coutt. After seven years, at the end of 1807,
the number of pending appeals was reduced to 106.
^See ante pp. 258-60.
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Until 1807, the Court had only three Judges. The second 
period (1808-14) saw further reforms in the constitution of 
tie Court. ^ This certainly did improve the capacity of the 
Court. Still we notice thatjfche aggregate disposal of appeals 
over this period lagged behind the institutions. The plausible 
explanation is that the additional efficiency of the Court 
was more than absorbed by the heavy influx of Criminal references. 
This had been caused by Regulation VIII of B08 which made all 
convictions for Robbery with violence referable to the S.N.A. 
for confirmation of sentence. In the seven years preceding 
1808 the total number of Criminal trials received by the Court 
had been 1,225 of which the Court decided 1,178. In the seven 
years following 1808,. both the number of institutions as well 
as decisions almost trebled. Thus during 1808-14, the Court re­
ceived 3,356 Criminal trials and decided 3,307. Besides, during 
this period, a good deal of the time of the Judges had been 
occupied by the inquiries into the charges against M o  public 
officers, Boddam and Broddie. Hence the diminished disposal 
of Civil appeals in spite of the increase of the Court's . c a l n a i ’i t y  j 
is not surprising.
^See ante^pp.264-67•
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In the next period we notice that the number of appeals
instituted greatly increased over the figure of the preceding
period. But the number of decisions increased in a still
greater proportion.
The factors influencing increased institution must have
been, first, the extended capacity of the Provincial Courts.
Prom 1815 the strength of all the Provincial Courts had been
raised to four Judges. More causes were now disposed of by
those Courts which in turn meant a greater number of appeals
to the S.D.A. In the second place, due to the enhancement of
the value of landed property in 1814, the number of causes
triable by the Provincial Courts, in the first instance, and
conversely those directly appealable to the S.D.A.? increased.^ "
Ha30ington rightly anticipated an increase in the business before
the S.D.A. on account of the above two factors affecting the
2
Provincial Courts.
The increased disposal by the Court was achieved by the
efforts of the Government to keep the services of a fifth Judge
available from 1816 onwards. But the element contributing most
to the Court's efficiency was the new arrangement for dis-
3
tribution of business adopted in 1816. The arrearsof pending 
^For details see Cftap. V, p. 224*
^Harrington's minute, 15th Oct. 1815. Civ. Judl. Cons. 24th Oct.
1815. No.18. 7 ‘ . •'5.
^See ante pp.291’-ST3 •
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suits
/before the S.D.A. on 1st January 1815 had been 415. By 1st 
January 1819 the figure had been brought down to 302.^
In the last period (1822-28) the lead of institutions over 
disposals was again established. There was an increase in the 
total number of causes instituted and an appreciable decline 
in the numbers decided.
The reason for reduced disposal was the occupation of two 
Judges of the Court with the Sadar Special Commission from 1821 
onwards. Between 1821-25> two Judges were sitting three days 
in the week on th6 Commission. This instantaneously affected 
the disposal of Civil causes. While 485 appeals had been decided 
by the Court in three years (1820-22) only 295 could be disposed 
of during the next three years (1823-25). In 1826, Colebrooke 
was appointed as the permanent President of the Sadar Commission. 
This freed one of the two Judges who reverted back to his full 
time duties in the Court. Colebrookewas also required to act
3
as a part time Judge of the S.D.A. This made the working strength
^Dowdswell*s (Member of Council) Minute, 22nd Sept. 1819j 
Civ. Judl. Cons.„5th Nov. 1819* No. 15A. V.’-.*f /
2
Harrington's minutq? 16th Ded. 1826, para 8. Civ. Judl. Cons..
21st Dec. 1826j No.11.
^Civ. Judl. Cons.^4th Jan. 1827 ? Nos. 27-28.
*
See ante, p. 269 •
of the Court te- four full-time Judges and two part-time. The 
capacity of the Court naturally improved. Still the Court was 
unequal to the heavy accumulation of arrears.
From the above review it is apparent that the capacity 
of the Court was only equal to the incoming business during 
the first and the third periods. The gap between institutions 
and disposals led to a gradual mounting of arrears. The total 
number of pending causes at the end of the periods and the ex­
pected delays in their clearance, calculated on the basis of
i
the average disposals of^preceding three years, is presented 
in the table below
At the end Number of pending Expected delays
of the year Civil Appeals in their clearance
1801 110 2 yrs lV^ months
1808 104 1 yr 2^ /2 months
1815 467
* 3 .
6 yrs 2/4 months
1822 320 1 yr 11^/4 months
1828 492 4 yrs 1V 2 months
1830 444 3 yrs
This table has also been computed from the same data from 
which the preceding table^on p.^OJhas been compiled.
#
This figure might not be realistic. After 1808 the Court's 
attention had been heavily occupied with Criminal causes. The 
disposal of Civil causes was naturally slowed down. The average 
annual decisions of Civil appeals of 1813,1814 &$15 amounted to
(cont.)
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The disposal of Civil appeals by the Court was seriously
handicapped by its occupation with the other duties - Criminal
and Miscellaneous.
Jame^ >- Stuart, who had been associated with the Courts
for nearly thirteen years as Register and Judge successively,
analysed this problem very lucidly.^- Between 1799 and 1803
inclusive, the total number of Criminal trials decided by the
Court was 627, an annual average of 125 over those five years.
After 1804, due to the improvements in Police, annexation of
new territory and the anti-Dacoity measures, there was a sharp
2
increase in the'number of Criminal trials.
Superintendence over Police also pressed heavily on the 
Court*s time. It was the arduous and delicate duty of the 
Court to guide and restrain the ardour of the Magistrates and 
Police officers. The duties of the Court in the Miscellaneous
3
and English Departments have been noticed earlier. Stuart esti­
mated that each of the above three branches engaged a third
4portion of the Court’s time. The complexity of Civil causes
"^ Minute of Stuart, 15th Nov. 1815, paras 17-19* Papers relating 
to the Judl. system of Bengal^ Reg. (7l) 197.
2
See ante pp.262-3*
3
See ante pp. 279-80.
^Stuart’s Minute, 15th Nov. 1815, para 17. Papers on the Judl.
system of Bengal^ Reg. (7l) 197.
*(cont.) 70 only. Hence the calculated delay for clearance of the 467 
causes :j pending at the end of 1815 became enormous. But in the light of 
the increased efficiency of the Court from 1816 onwards this figure 
(of 6 yrs 23/4 months) was unrealistic.
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also slowed down their disposal. They frequently comprehended
transactions of long standing, of numerous parties and of
complicated interests. Stuart talked about some more difficulties:
"They /the Civil Appeals/ are appeals upon written 
evidences of facts and the tediousness which attends 
such proceedings is well known. The Courts are, 
further, without any fixed system of Jurisprudence ^
to direct their investigation and govern their decision."
Second or Special Appeals formed another major part of the Court’s
duties. By 1815, three days in the month had to be devoted to
Special Appeals.^
Of the 368 causes pending before the S.D.A. on 31st July
3
1817, 87 or nearly one-fourth were Special Appeals. After 
the relaxation on the admission of such Appeals by Regulation IX 
of 1819 the influx of Second Appeals increased further. During 
the three years following the enactment (1820-22) the Court re­
ceived 622 applications for admission of appeals of that class 
- an annual average of 2Q7. Of these 205 had been admitted, 347
rejected and the remaining 121 were still pending perusal at 
4
the end of 1822. Regulation II of 1825 sought to restrict the
^Stuart's minute, 15th Nov. 1815, para 19. Papers on the Judl. 
system of Bengal^ Reg. (7l) 197.
2
Ibid., para 27
3
Half yearly Report of S.D.A.^Civ. Judl. Cons.;19th May 1818^ No. 9.
4
For a discussion of rules regarding Special Appeals^see ante, pp.2 7 5 -6 .
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admission of Special Appeals. But the object was hardly achieved.
Of 121 appeals admitted during 1826, forty-six had been special
and of an aggregate of ninety-eight-decided, forty-six or nearly
half had been of that kind."*" On 1st Jan. 1830 a total of 444
2
appeals were pending. Of these 146 were Second Appeals. It
was apparent that a major portion of the Court's time was being
engaged by Special Appeals.
This situation brought abaut a very strong suggestion from
the Government for the abolition of this class of appeals altogether.
In 1828, the Governor-General-in-Council expressed their doubts,
in this connection, whether "Much of the substance of justice
may not be sacrificed by the desire of affording to the people
a gradation of tribunals in which errors and misapprehensions
•5
of one Court may be corrected by another.'1^  The Govemor-General- 
in-Council thought that the Special Appeals could be prohibited 
altogether without any disadvantage and they desired the Court 
to give a serious consideration to that proposition. They viewed 
that the existing arrangements for Summary Appeals or Review, if
^Annual Report for 1826 ^ Civ. Judl. Cons.?28th Peb. 18285 No.8.
2
Annual Report for 1829^ Civ. Judl. Cons.^ 31st May 18315 Nos.7-11.
Letter from Govt, to S.D.A., 28th Feb. 1828? Civ. Judl. Cons.,,
28th Feb. 1828.
extended, could afford the same,, security for correction of
arrears which the system of Special Appeals provided.
In the S.D.A., on the other hand, there had always been
opinions in favour of the retention of the system of Special
Appeals. In 1815, Stuart, the third Judge of the Court, lamented
the restrictions on admission of appeals imposed by Regulation
XXVI of 1814 saying that "they Special fo?eals>7are founded
upon the indispensable necessity of giving to the higher Courts,
an opportunity of correcting deviations from law and principle,
apparent on the face of the decree of the lower Court".'*' In
1825, Smith,the second Judge, vehemently opposed the proposal
for rescinding Regulation IX of 1819 which had liberalised
2the admission of Special Appeals. He held that those appeals
were not admitted indiscriminately. Their admission was decided
upon only by two Judges and they were absolutely essential to
the ends of justice.
The Governments proposal of 1828, for abolition of Special
Appeals, was also unanimously opposed by the Judges of the
3
Court. On the view that an extended system of Summary Appeals
■^ Minute of Stuart, 15th Nov. 1815, para 27. Papers on the 
Judl. system of Bengal^ Reg. (7l) 197.
^Minute of C. Smith, 6th Dec. 1824^ Civ. Judl. Cons.?24th March
1825j No. 11.
3
Letter from S.D.A. to Govt. 15th Aug. 1828, enclosing minutes 
of Js. on Govt.'s proposal for abolition of Special Appeals.
Civ. Judl. Cons.?2nd Oct. 1828^ No. 4B.
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or Review would provide an adequate substitute^Ross commented 
that "there would be little likelihood of the latter ^ o w e ^
Court altering its judgement, on a 'Review1, which it had at 
last granted only in obedience to an order from a superior 
Court," and further that "a case involving an unsettled question 
of general importance, the revision of its /own/judgement by 
an inferior Court would not settle the question."^ The proposal 
was therefore dropped.
Status of S.D.A.
Under Cornwallis's scheme of establishing a rule of law, 
the Judicial authority was intended to function independently 
of the Executive. Although^like the Revenue Department,.Judiciary 
was to be one of the organs of administration, the degree of 
interference which the Government was to exercise in the function­
ing of the two differed. Theoretically, the control of the Government, 
or the Executive, over the judicial administration was to be restricted 
to the appointment^transfer and removal of its functionaries and to 
the framing of the laws in its legislative capacity. The Govern­
ment had nothing to do with the individual decisions of the Tudges 
given in discharge of their office.
"^Ross's Minute, 15th Aug. 1828. Civ. Judl. Cons..2nd Oct.
1828, No. 4B. *
The S.D.A. was the nucleus of the judicial system.
It would be interesting to analyse the degree of independence 
that this highest tribunal of justice enjoyed, or.* putting 
it conversely, the amount of interference and control that 
the Government exercised over the activities of this Court.
There was an apparent contradiction between Cornwallis!s 
philosophy of "Separation of Powers1 and the constitution of 
the S.D.A. as established in 1793* Until 1801 the Court 
was constituted by the Governor-General-in-Council, the same 
body which formed the executive authority. It was, however, 
stipulated that while performing the functions of the 
Court .the Governor-General-in-Council were to consider themselves 
dissociated from thenExecutive!/ Still the position was untenable. 
Hence it is only after 1801, when the Court became separated 
from the Council, that an analysis of its position and status, 
in relation to the ruling power, can be made with propriety.
Wellesley held very liberal sentiments about the Court.
He wanted to establish it on a very respectable footing. This 
is apparent from his intention to ask London for a Parliamentary 
enactment which might put-the Chief Justice of the S.D.A. and 
S.N.A. ”... as nearly as possible,on the same level with the 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court...”^
^Wellesley to Dundas, 5th March 1800. Wellesley Papers^
1 . ^ A, Vol. II, p.25ir
In 1851 Metcalfe, the Vice-President of Bentinck’s
Council, lamented the reform of 1801, by which the control
previously maintained by the Governor-General-in-Council over
the Court had been abandoned. He said:
’’The Natives of India are accustomed to look 
upon their rulers,, as the Supreme power to which 
they can appeal for justice, and our Government, 
in depriving itself of that character, committed,
I fear, a great error, calculated to lower it in 
the estimation of its subjects. The utter helpless­
ness of Government, which can not redress the 
grossest injury to individuals, if they have been 
judicially committed, seems to me, likely to excite 
any feeling,* but that of respect or attachment} 
while the State struggling in vain for justice 
before tribunals composed of its servants^who de­
cide according to their own whims and fancies, can 
only be an object of ridicule.”1
Metcalfe was in fact expressing his concurrence with the views
■ ■ 2 
of Mackenzie but in much stronger terms.
The contemptuous opinion expressed above, on the subject
of independence of the S.D.A., stands at the opposite extreme 
ta
.^ the ideals entertained by Wellesley.
In reality, however, the S.D.A. never acquired the status 
visualised by Wellesley. Nor did it become a mere branch of the
^"Metcalfe’s Minute, 11th April, 1831} Civ. Judl. Cons.?19th April 
1831} No. 20.
2
Holt Mackenzie (then Chairman Finance Committee), had expressed 
an identical opinion in, Letter from Civil Finance Committee to 
Govt.5 12th June 1830} Civ. Judl. Cons.; 12th Oct. 1830} No. 1.
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Executive as Mackenzie and Metcalfe desired it to be. There 
was nothing like the concept of an independent judiciary as 
the guardian of the constitution emerging. The Court all along 
functioned under the thumb of the Governor-General-in-Council. 
Stillywithin its own sphere it enjoyed a certain degree of non­
interference from the Executive.
This independence of S.D.A., as of the other Courts, was 
primarily in respect of freedom of judicial decisions according 
to the laws and regulations or in accordance with justice, 
equity and good conscience. As the coordinator of the judicial 
system, the Court was to regulate the conduct of the subordinate 
judicial officers and as the ultimate Court of Appeal it was to 
rectify the errors committed by them. All questions relating 
to the interpretation of the Regulations of Government, arising 
in course of trials, were to be referred by the subordinate 
Courts to the S.D.A. for clarification. The Court enjoyed autonomy 
in such matters.
Constitutionally, the Government was to exercise only a 
genersL control over the judiciary through the power of appointment 
and removal of its personnel and through the framing of the laws 
in its legislative capacity.
In actual practice, however, the interference of Executive 
extended much further. The Court had to submit to the Government
314
periodical reports containing a statement of the business 
transacted and pending in all the Courts and of the problems 
concerning the different aspects of judicial administration. 
It was the practice of the Supreme Council to issue such
necessary after a perusal of the periodical reports. These 
orders or remarks did not pertain to individual cases. They 
mostly related to the mode of disposal of judicial business.
The idea was to keep Government's supervision over the con­
duct and management of judicial business. But this, strictly 
speaking, was the exclusive province of the Court.
All cases of doubts regarding the meaning of the Regulations 
were to be referred to the S.D.A. for interpretation or explanation 
under Regulations X of 1796 and XXII of 1803- The Court, if 
itself in .doubt, was to refer the matter to the legislative 
authority - the Governor-General-in-Council. Otherwise the 
Court was to give the interpretation of the law as it under­
stood it and direct the Court seeking clarification accordingly.
It also adopted the practice of directing, on its own initiative, 
the construction to be put on specific Regulations. The 
Court's interpretation was issued for the guidance of the 
subordinate tribunals in the Circular orders that it sent.’ 
to the Provincial and District Courts from time to time.
orders, instructions or remarks to the Court
315
The Directors found this practice objectionable. In
1820 they directed the Bengal Government that henceforth all
such Circular orders were to be submitted for the approval
of the Government before they were issued.^- They thought
that the authority which enacted the Regulation in question
could alone be certain of the intentions In framing it. They
stated their conviction that ]
nA certain latitude of power to interpret must 
necessarily be conceded to every judicial tri­
bunal but a power to enact its own interpretations 
and to distribute such enactments under the name 
of Circular Orders, with authority equal to that of 
the original Regulation, without sanction or know­
ledge of the original legislative power, can not
be delegated to any subordinate authority.”2
Technically, the Directors were right. The function of inter-
to
pretation of the law in relation a specific case was of 
course within the competence of the Judges. By this activity 
judicial precedents and Judge-made laws were created. But 
making a general interpretation on its own initiative and then 
circulating it to all the Courts for observance was not merely 
establishing a judicial precedent. It was tantamount to ex­
planatory legislative enactment.
Whatever the justification, the authority enjoyed by 
the Court in this respect was m&de subject to the Government's
■^Judl. Despatch?26th April 1820, para 62. 1.0. Vol. 5.
2
Ibid.^ paras 60-61.
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approval, after 1821, in obedience to the instructions of 
the Directors. The Directors also advised the Bengal Govern­
ment that it would be better to repeal such Regulations as were 
of a doubtful meaning and promulgate new ones, rather than 
attempt to amend the existing ones by supplementary explana­
tions.
Although the mode of regulating its own proceedings as 
well as those of the lower Courts was, in theory, the sole 
concern of the S.D.A. there were occasional interferences 
from the Government in that direction too. For example, the 
system of distribution of business adopted by the Court in 
1816 had been suggested by the Government.^
It has been mentioned earlier that the Government had 
made a suggestion to the Court in 1826 for altering the system 
of conducting the Miscellaneous business by all five Judges.
In 1819, on the advice of Stuart, Hastings disapproved 
Harington's instruction to the Provincial Courts for con- 
ducting original trials in those Courts before single benches.
^Minute of Governor General-in-Council, 19th Jan. 1816, Civ. Judl. 
Cons., 26th Jan. 1816, Ho.4.
^See ante, p. 295 •
3
Minute of Gov. General, 22nd Dec. 1819, Civ. Judl. Cons., 11th
Jan. 1820, No.10.
In the month of July 1826 only three causes had been de­
cided by the S.D.A. After perusing the Court’s report for 
that month, the Governor General-in-Council issued an order 
to the Court directing them to attach an explanation with 
their monthly reports whenever they might decide less than 
ten causes in any particular month. ^ This order was indeed
humiliating for the highest tribunal of justice. All five
2
Judges of the Court protested unanimously against it. Smith, 
the second Judge, was most critical of the order. He said:
"Its only effect can be to raise an idea that in the Govern­
ment’s opinion the highest of their Courts of justice requires
watching and stimulating, because it has proved itself deficient
3
in diligence to energy." The Government, however, dismissed
the objections raised by the Judges and insisted on compliance 
4with the order. The Judges had no choice but to bear with it.
The above order indicates the paternal attitude which 
the Government held towards the S.D.A. and the Judiciary. This 
is bora out more clearly by another instance.
^Letter from Govt, to S.D.A., 14th Sept. 1826. Civ. Judl. Cons.. 
14th Sept. 1826} No.2. 7
2
Letter from S.D.A. to Govt..18th Nov. 1826, Civ. Judl. Cons.* 
21st Dec. 1826; No.10.
3
Ibid., para 6 of Smith's Minute.
A
Letter from V.P.-in-C. to S.D.A.^21st Dec.l826^s Ibid.,No*ll.
In 1826, the S.D.A. had rejected the appeal of Bibee 
Asmat against one Shah Kabiruddin, the "Sajjadah Nashin'f or the 
Successor Designate to the Dargah (Shrine) of Sasaki. The 
matter in issue had been whether certain grants of land for 
the Dargah of Sasaram was an 'endowment* within the meaning 
of the Mohamplan law and the Regulations in force. Bibee 
Asmat preferred an appeal against the S.D.A.'s decision to 
the King-in-Council. According to the current procedure the 
Respondent dn the case, Shah Kabiruddin, was required to tender 
before the S.D.A. his security for the performance of the 
decree of the King-in-Council, in case the same was passed 
against him. The Government offered ‘'security'* on behalf of the 
Respondent through its Remembrancer of Legal Affairs.^
On 13th Pe b. 1827, the usual motion for admission of 
the security was made before the Court. Smith, the second Judge, 
who sat alone to consider it, rejected the security offered by 
the Government. He took the plea that only a small period re­
mained before the expiration of the Company's Charter. It was 
not certain whether it was going to be renewed in 1832 and the 
Company's Government was to continue or not. The appeals to 
England took a very long time in disposal. Hence the security
The case has been recorded in detail, in the Proceedings of 
Vice President-in-Council, in the Territorial Department 
dtd. 22nd Feb. 1827. Also mentioned in Civ. Judl. Cons.*8th March 
1827j No.6.
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of the present Government under such circumstances could not 
be accepted.
Smith’s opinion on the inadmissibility of Government’s 
security was, however, immediately overruled by the concurrent 
opinion of two other Judges. On 15th February the security offered 
by the Government was finally accepted by the Court.
But the Government were extremely annoyed at Smith’s in­
solence in refusing to accept the credit of the Government to 
whom he owed his appointment. He was at once asked to explain 
his conduct in the following stringent note!-.*
’the only conclusion the Vice-President-in-Council 
can draw from such proceeding is that it evinces a 
perversity of judgement or disposition, such as, 
unless explained by Mr. Smith, proves him unfit to 
be employed by^the Government, in the high station 
he now fills.*
In reply Smith stated that he had not rejected the Govern­
ment’s security on any suspicion of ’’malajfid^ on the part of 
2the Government. "No fear suggested itself to my mind, of Govern­
ment being displeased at this, nor had it, could I, consistently 
with the oath of my office . . . have allowed such fear to deter
3
me from acting as I did.” He explained further,
”It is true also that it was an orderpassed against 
Government, in a Court in which the Government has 
appointed me to be a Judge ^ ut/such orders are of
^Proceedings of Vice President-in-Council in Territorial Dept.
22nd Feb. 1827. Civ. Judl. Cons.^8th March 1827 5 No.7.
^Letter from Smith to Govt.?5th March 1827^ Ibid. No.8.
■^ Ibid., para 5.
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frequent occurrence, and arise out of the Re­
gulations which have put the Government, in the 
Courts, upon the same footing with individuals, 
and out of the terms of the judicial oath which 
solemnly binds the Judges to discharge the functions 
of the office without favour or fear.
Smith reminded the Government of the independence of opinion
anong the Judges: "My opinion was overruled by two other Judges.
They were free to accept /the securi tjJ as I was to reject, nor
2
is it within my province to make any remark upon their judgement."
As is apparent from the above, Smith at first tried to 
justify his action. But in vim of the stern attitude of the 
Government he was persuaded to climb down most disgracefully 
and apologise for his action. He realised that his proceedings 
of 13th February were calculated to do mischief and he promised 
that he would refrain from acting similarly in the future. In 
view of the regret expressed by Smith the Government dropped
4
further proceedings against him.
It is true that Smith's decision of rejecting the security 
of the Government was absurd. Even if the Crown's Government came 
to be established after the expiration of the Company's Charter,
"^Letter from Smith to Govt.,5th March 1827, #ara 6, Civ. Judl.
Cons.,8th March 1827, No.7.
2Ibid.
^Civ. Judl. Cons., 19th April 1827, No.l
4
Ibid.
it could well be presumed that the succeeding Government would 
have honoured a pledge involving a purely pecuniary responsibility. 
Even so it was a judicial decision. The action of the Government 
in questioning its legitimacy and threatening the Judge with dis­
missal. strangled the concept of freedom of judiciary. It was 
against the ideal and oath-undertaking to act without favour or 
fear-on which the judicial offices were constituted in 1793*
It must have created the impression that the independence of 
judicial decision which the Judges of the Courts enjoyed was 
conditioned by the acquiescence and tolerance of the Government.
In 18319 Holt Mackenzie, an officer held in high esteem, 
complained of an absence of adequate control of the Executive
over the judicial organ,which, according to him, had resulted
1 2 in much evil. Metcalfe entirely agreed with this view. But
3
Bentinck disagreed with both. He thought that in the selection 
of proper persons to be the Judges of the Court,and in its power 
of removing them for sloth and misconduct, the Government pre­
served adequate security against any abuse of authority by the
1
Letter from Civil Finance Committee, 13th Dec. 1829,
Civ. Judl. Cons.,12th Oct. 1830, No.l.
2
See ante, p. 512.
3
Letter from Secy, to Govn. General to Territorial Dept.,
26th Jan. 1831, Pari. Papers 1831-32, Vol. 12, pp. 490-95*
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Court. In his opinion, the only interference the ruling power
■ C.ould exercise with propriety in the administration of justice
was in its legislative capacity. The power of general control
which the Government reserved to itself was, according to Ben-
tinck, enough. He deprecated meddling with individual cases
under any circumstances whatsoever.^ He also rejected a proposal
from Mackenzie that all Circular Orders of the S.D.A. to the
subordinate Courts should be sent to the Government before
transmission.^
Bentinck's attitude was that of a practical reformer.
He was no blind opponent of Cornwallis’s ideology like Metcalfe
or Mackenzie were; neither was he its blind follower. He
subscribed to the above view more on practical grounds. He
stated that he "was at a loss to understand what degree of inter^ -
ference /beyond that being already exercised/the Executive could
possibly exercise, consistently with a prompt and efficient award
3
of justice and without sacrifice of other important duties”.
^Letter from Secy, to Govn. General t) Territorial Dept.,
26th Jan. 1831, para 8. Pari. Papers 1851-32, Vol. 12, pp. 49(^ 95.
^Ibid., para 27.
3
Letter from Secy, to Govn. Gen. to Territorial Dept.913th Dec. 
1829, para 7. Civ. Judl. Cons.?12th Oct. 1830^ No.l.
Though Bentinck refused to put a curb on any of the
powers exercised by the S.D.A. he did not show much respect
for the Court’s opinion on matters of judicial reform. Hitherto
all important changes in the judicial system had been either on
the Court’s suggestion or with their concurrence. The Regulations
incorporating the reforms of 1814 had been framed under the
supervision of S.D.A. The Court’s objections, to a great extent,
1
prevented the reestablishment of the Mai Adalais in 1816.
In 1824 the Regulation empowering Collectors to decide Summary
2
suits had been enacted on the initiative of the Court. It was 
again on account of the Court’s opinion that the general transfer 
of Magistracy to the Collectors had been held up by the Bengal 
Government.^
But the S.D.A. was given no such voice in or initiative 
in the reforms of Bentinck era. In 1829^  Commissioners of Revenue 
were given jurisdiction over Criminal cases without consulting 
the S.D.A. at all. The general transfer of Magistracy to the 
Collectors was accepted in opposition to their views. Collectors
"^See Chapter IV, pp. 175-77 -
2
See Chapter IV, pp. 184-5* 
^See Chapter IV, pp. 194-5-
were given original jurisdiction over Summary suits in face 
of a strong opposition to that measure by the S.D.A.'*'
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that the 
status of the Court was not, in reality, founded on the basis 
of the Regulations. The extent of its independence depended 
on the discretion of the Executive.
^See Chapter IV, pp. 187-8.
Chapter VII
THE SJDPjEmj. COURT ^  AHB THE BENGAL ADMUTISTRATIOIT
The Supreme Court was established in Calcutta (under 
the provision of the Regulating Act of 1773) by a Charter 
of George III issued on 26th March 1774. It was to consist 
of a Chief Justice and three Puisne Judges, all of whom were 
to be appointed by the Crown. Sir Elijah Impey was nominated 
as its first Chief Justice.
This Court superseded the Mayor's Court, which had been 
functioning in Calcutta under the Royal Charter of 1753. It 
was thought that the Judges of the Mayor's Court, the Mayor 
and Aldermen<f the Calcutta Corporation, could not take an 
independent or impartial stand when the Company's interests 
were at stake. This was because they owed their appointment 
to the President-in-Council and could be dismissed at the latter' 
pleasure. lilliam Bolts, who had personally served as an 
Alderman of the Calcutta Mayor's Court, was very critical of 
the existing system of Justice in Calcutta. He wrote that 
j  fas everywhere defeated by the overriding power of
control, appointment and interference which the Governor-General 
held over the Courts in Calcutta.^ Besides, the Aldermen
Bolts; Considerations on India Affairs, etc. p.86.
of the Court used to be the junior servants of the Company.
They were without any professional knowledge of, or legal 
training in, the English law which they were obliged to 
administer.
The reports of the Company’s maladministration had 
led to the appointment of a Committee of the House of Com­
mons to investigate its affairs in Bengal. The reports of 
the Committee revealed that the Company's officers and agents 
had been practising great oppression over the local inhabitants 
in the Hofussil and that the existing judicial tribunals in 
the interior, under the control of the Nawab, were unavailing 
in offering any protection to the people.~
The main idea behind the establishment of the Supreme 
Court in Calcutta had been to purify the administration of 
justice (according to English law) in the British settlement 
of Calcutta by creating a Court which could function inde­
pendently of the influence of the Company'’s Executive. It 
was to be constituted by persons who had been professional 
lawyers for at least five years and the appointments and re­
movals were vested with the Crown. As such the Court was better
7th Report of the Committee of Secrecyy Pari, branch Colls.?\172.
lr 13, Ho. . pp. 324-6.
equipped to secure a fair and impartial administration of 
justice than its predecessor. Though the Suprei irt 
was primarily designed to administer justice, according to 
English law, to the British persons in Bengal, it was also 
intended to afford protection to the Indians against any 
oppression by the Company's servants.
,To achieve this object, the Court was given a wide 
jurisdiction in both Civil and Criminal matters. Certain 
specified categories of persons were made amenable to them.
They were all British subjects, persons employed by, or 
being directly or indirectly inihe service of the Company, 
or by any of His Majesty's subjects; and any Indian living 
outside Calcutta, if he submitted himself voluntarily to 
the jurisdiction of the Court, in a suit instituted against him 
by a British subject when the cause of action exceeded Rs. 500/- 
The Charter of 1774 defining the jurisdiction of the 
Court was, however, not clear on certain questions. In the 
first place, it was not stated whether the Company in its
It may be recalled that the territory forming the city of Cal­
cutta was regarded as British territory ever since the purchase 
by the Company of the villages of Kalikata, Sutanti and Govind- 
pur, from the IJawab, towards the end of the 17th century. The 
Indians living within the limits of the city of Calcutta were 
regarded as British subjects. They had therefore been amenable 
to the Mayor's Court and became automatically so to the Supreme 
C ourt.
L a i pacity was to be subject to the jurisdicti 
the Court. The Company’s Government asserted that the Court 
had no right to question an3^ of its activities and that its 
servants were immune from the jurisdiction of the Court 
for acts done in their official capacity . The Supreme Court 
refused to accept this claim and they were probably right 
in doing so. There were many provisions in t' : ;ulating
Act which indicated that it was intended to establish an 
impartial control over the vagaries and excesses of the ser­
vants of the Company. The Charter had expressly provided 
that the Court was authorised to take cognisance of all 
Civil and Criminal cases in which the servants of the Company 
were involved without drawing a distinction between acts 
done in their private or public capacity. The Court, on 
these grounds, proceeded to regard not only the Collectors 
of Revenue but all servants of the Company, whether British 
or Indian, as within their jurisdiction, for any acts, public 
or private. The Kazfefcs and Pandits, or the Indian Law Officer 
of the Company's Courts, were therefore considered by the Sup­
reme Court to be answerable to them for acts done in the dis­
charge of. their office. Thus in 1778, in the case of Nadra 
Begum (regarding partition of certain property at Patna), the 
L(f and Mufti of the Adaifltt (Court) of Patna Council were
Summoned by the Supreme Court to answer for the acts done 
in their official capacity and in obedience to the order 
of the Patna Council. The Company described the Court’s 
exercise of jurisdiction in the above case (popularly known 
as the Patna Case) as being completely illegal.
As stated earlier, the Court's jurisdiction also ex­
tended to those persons who were employed by the Company, 
or were in its service, either 0 directly or indirectly ”,
This was another vague provision which led to another clash 
between the Court and the Company. The Court interpreted 
the provision to mean that the Zamindars and Farmers of Revenue, 
who in a way collected revenue for the Company, fell into the 
category of persons being 'indirectly' in the service of the 
Company. Eence they, too, along with the Collectors, were 
subject to their jurisdiction. The Govemor-General-in-Council, 
on the other hand, claimed the absolute immunity of the Zamindar 
from the Court's jurisdiction. The dispute on this issue 
reached a bitter climax in the Kashijurah case in 1779. The 
Court issued a writ of Capias or arrest against the Zamindar 
of Kashijurah in connection with a case instituted against him 
in the Zupreme Court by another Zamindar. The Company’s Govern­
ment informed the Zamindar of Kashijurah that le was not,subject 
to the jurisdiction of that Court. They also issued a general
notification to all landholders informing them that they 
were not subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The Kashijurah Zamindar had concealed himself to avoid 
jst by the officers of the Court and hence the writ of Capias 
was returned unezecuted. After this the Court despatched the 
Sheriff with a small force to seize the Zamindar’s property 
in order to compel his appearance. The Government replied, by 
sending their own force to Kashijurah. It seized the Sheriff’s 
party and brought them to Calcutta. The Zamindar (Kashinath 
Babu), who had sued the Kashijurah Zamindar in the Supreme 
Court, then brought an action for trespass against the Governor- 
General, Hastings , and the Members of his Council, individually.
s and his Councillors t! entered their appearance” 
But when they realised that they were being sued, for acts done 
in their official capacity, they withdrew their appearance 
and refused to submit to any future processes of that Court.
The Supreme Court had failed.. It had been unpopular with 
the administration a well as with the Indian population. The 
Company’s servants detested it because it faced them with the 
prospect of being prosecuted for acts done in their public 
capacity. The Government hated it because it sought to restrict 
their freedom. Its interference in the revenue affairs threat­
ened the collection which was the Company’s chief concern. The
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Court was dreaded by most Indians. The examples of Bahadur
Beg and the Law Officers of the Patna AdalCUt who ere dragged
all the way to Calcutta (the old Maulvi having expired on
*
the way), and those of Raja Nandkumar , who was executed for 
an ordinary crime of forgery, and of the Zamindar of Kashijurah, 
who was humiliated by its processes, were enough to terrorise 
the Indians. It was more horrifying to them because the pro­
cedure, the law and the language used in the Court were com­
pletely foreign to them.
Matters having reached a crisis, Parliament was obliged 
to intervene, in 1780, by passing the Act of Settlement.'*' The 
preamble and the provisions of the Act show that in the preceding 
contest between the Court and the Company the Parliament had 
given its verdict in favour of the latter. The jurisdiction of 
the Court was curtailed so as to remove the areas of dispute.
In the first place, the Governor-General and his Council 
were guaranteed absolute immunity from the Court’s jurisdiction 
for acts done in their official capacity.
Except British subjects, all other persons were exempted 
from the jurisdiction of the Court, for acts done in pursuance 
of an order of the Governor-General-in-Council.
xAct 21, Geo. Ill* Cap. 63.
*
Raja Nandkumar had been sentenced to death in 1776 for the 
crime of forgery which was then a capital offence under 
English law.
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Section 8 of the Act provided that tie Court was not 
to have, or exercise, any jurisdiction in natters concerning 
revenue. They were also prohibited from interfering with any 
acts or orders of the Government. relating to the collection 
of revenue.
Section 9 of the Act declared that no person was to 
be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court on account of 
Is being a I r or Farmer. This directly reversed
the assumptions of the Supreme Court in the Kashijurah case.
It was specifically declared by Section 17 that the 
Court was to have full authority over British subjects and over 
all inhabitants of Calcutta whether British, European or Indian. 
This was no new provision. The town of Calcutta had already 
been regarded as British territory. All its inhabitants were 
therefore legally subjects of the Crown. The juristic ' ion 
of the rest of the territory administered by the Company was, 
however, different. Over these areas the Moghul Emperor was 
still considered to be the legal sovereign. The C t ny was
t —
The most significant part of the Act of Settlement was that, 
for the first time, it gave Parliamentary recognition to the judi­
32 7 .
cial system organized and maintained by the Company. By Section 
21 the Sadfcr Dfewani AdalCLt was recognised as the highest Court 
>f the Company, competent to hear and determine appeals and 
references from the Country Courts. Its judgment was to be 
final except on causes of Rs. 50,0CC/- and above, when a further 
appeal lay to the King-in-Council (commonly referred to as 
Privy Council).
It Section 24, Magistrates and Judicial Officers (both 
Indian and British) were made immune from any action in the 
Supreme Court for any act done in their official capacity.
The exemption also extended to persons acting under the orders 
of any such Judicial Officer. Apparently this provision was 
directly suggested by the Patna Cause. It was intended to 
make the local Judicial Officers and functionaries more secure 
in the exercise of their offices. All the same, the European 
officers were made liable to prosecution in the Supreme Court 
for any acts of corruption. Section 25 laid down the process 
by which an action could be instituted before the Court.
The jurisdiction of the Court thus curtailed and defined, 
it was expected to function smoothly along with the machinery 
of Company’s administration. At the same time it was anticipated 
that the Company’s administration in the Provinces would now 
function without any interference from the Court. But such
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hopes were not fulfilled. Although such scenes of open conflict
between the Government and the Court as those of the pre-1781
period did not recoup instances were not Inching in the post-
1781 period when the actions of the one irritated or inconvenienced
the functioning of the other. The Government protested that the 
/
Court had exceeded their jurisdiction; the Court complained 
that the Government had refused cooperation. A number of such 
instances are to be found in the period 1793-1800, and then in 
the period after 1828 when the powers of the Supreme Court were 
once^ain questioned by the Government.
The first incident occurred in 1 7 9 3 In that year a 
certain Mirza Mohammad, a resident of Dacca City, had filed 
a Civil suit for possession of certain property against one 
AghI Asee, an Armenian Christian resident of Dacca. The case 
was filed before Patterson, the Judge of Dacca City. Agha Asee 
refused to abide by the jurisdiction of the local Court, claim­
ing that being a foreigner he could only be subject to the 
Supreme Court. On a petition being presented by the Agha, to 
the Supreme Court, the latter issued a writ declaring that the 
petitioner, being an Armenian Christian, was subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. They further directed the
"'Case of Hirza Mohammad vs _„gha -.see recorded in Revenue A Judl.
•7 J
plaintiff, Mirza Mohammad, to cease all proceedings against 
the Agha, in the Dacca Court. The above order was served
5 : had earlier, on Agha's petition to him,
sided the' ' a ..see, not being a European British subject
or a French subject, could not be amenable to the jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court. Patterson sought instruction from the 
Government, fter consulting the Company's Attorney, Simon, 
on the case, . vernor-G eneral-in-Council directed Patter­
son to take no cognizance of the Supreme Court's order to the 
P aintiff and proceed with the case.
Under the terms of the Charter of 1774, the Supreme 
Court’s jurisdiction outside Calcutta extended only over Brit­
ish subjects, over persons in the service of the Company or 
of a servant of His Majesty, or over Indians voluntarily sub­
mitting to its jurisdiction in a case against a British subject. 
It is apparent that Agha Asee did not fit into either of the 
above classifications. The Government's defiance to the 
order of the Supreme Court was justified.
:. Judl. Cons.526th April 1793* ho, 43.
2
This jurisdiction was defined more restrictively by the Act 
of 1780 (to the extent that Zamindars were specifically 
declared exempt from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court).
Cn several occasions the Bengal Government was per­
suaded to resist the processes of attachment or sale issued 
by the Supreme Court against properties in the Kofussil.
Indians residing outside Calcutta could make them­
selves subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by 
election. Prom this permissive clause parties losing or 
expecting to lose an action in oneof the Company’s Courts 
found an easy way of defeating the execution of Decrees of 
the latter Courts* A Hefendant in the District AdSlftt, when 
anticipating & Decree against him, transferred the whole of 
his property to one of his friends or relatives residing in 
Calcutta. The transferee, at once, in collusion with the 
transferor, applied to the Supreme Court for an attachment of 
the said property on the basis of the Deed of transfer. The 
ost^ rr transferor then made himself amenable to the juris­
diction of the Supreme Court by executing a bond. On his admit­
ting the transfer, his collaborator, the fictitious Plaintiff, 
found no difficulty in procuring the attachment which was 
granted by the Supreme Court as a matter of course. When the 
real creditor obtained a Decree in his favour from the Kofussil
Letter from Thomps n, Burdvan J., 5th June 1794* Criminal & 
Judl. Cons., 13thJune 1794. " . •
Court he frund the whole property of the Defendant, from 
which the Decree could be satisfied, in the hands of the 
Sheriff. The Decree could not, therefore, be carried into 
effect.
This practice became prevalent in the Districts ad- 
joining Calcutta, like Burdwan, Hooghly, and the twenty-four
j  *t wa; mem easily accessible
their
, it difficult for them
to find a relative or connection in Calcutta to collaborate 
with them in the fraud.
. the case of Gaya Bain Bose vs. Ram joy Baral, in the 
Burdwan District Court, the Judge had attached the crops 
standing on the lands belonging to the Defendant and had the 
same sold under his orders.~ The Defendant had since proceeded 
to Calcutta and manipulated to procure from the Supreme Court 
an attachment ii favour of a local resident, for the whble 
land (including the standing crop already sold) in dispute.
An officer from the Supreme Court arrived at the spot and exe­
cuted the attachment. Thompson, the Judge of Burdwan referred 
the case to the Government for instructions.
1
~Cr
Civil
Judl. Cons., 1 yth June 1j94♦ 1 ■0 . 5.
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After consulting the advocate General, Burroughs,1 on
the case, the Governor-General-in-Council directed Thompson
to give notice to the Sheriff of the said property already
being subject to a suit in the Kofussil Court and require him
to vacate the attachment. In case the Sheriff did not comply
with his requisition, the Judge was to proceed with the trial
and execute his Decree without taking cognizance of the
2
Sheriff’s attachment.
The Governor-General-in-Council issued an identical
*
order in a similar case when certain property litigated in 
the District Court of Burdwan had been attached and sold by 
the Sheriff." The Judge was directed to inform the Sheriff 
that any application from the purchaser at the Sheriff's sale, 
for being put into the possession of the p r o p e r t y  purchased, 
could not be complied with, until the contested right (to the 
property) was finally determined by the Burdwan Court.
In the case of Banar^si Ghosh vs. Radha Lohan Ghosh the 
execution of a process of the Supreme Court was resisted again
Civil
Buirough's opinion has been recorded in Criminal A/Judl. Cons.?24th 
Oct. 1794, To. 1C. *
Civil
Criminal 7/Judl. Cons.^24th Get. 1794; No. 11.
Civ. Judl. Cons.?11th ITov. 1796^ No. 5.
#•
■Jaso of Gour Mohun u vs Earchandra Chaudl .
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by the Government•J‘ In the year 1793 the Judge of Zillah
Hooghly had attached certain lands in connection with the above
cause. The case had since been decreed in favour of the Plaintiff.
Subsequently, the Defendant, Radha Mohan, manipulated to secure
an attachment from the Supreme Court in favour of a party in
Calcutta of the disputed lands which had already been decreed
by the Hooghly Judge in Banarsi Ghosh's favour. The Sheriff
was then planning to put the lands on sale.
The Advocate General considered in the case that the
Sheriff's sale did not create a new title but merely conveyed
2
■ one to t purchaser. only the title,
which had been declared invalid by a competent Court (of the 
Company) could be conveyed at the Sheriff's sale. The title 
of Radha Mohan Ghosh to the lands nn question had been declared 
invalid by the Hooghly Judge. Hence there was no question of 
? _ sty being conveyed to any purchaser at the Sheriff's 
sale. The Governor General-in-Council accordingly decided to 
withhold the conveyance of the lands to any prospective liurc
3
at the Sheriff's sale.
^Civ. Judl. Cons.?18th ITov. 1796} No. 14.
“Ibid.
''Ibid.
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The Governments of Cornwallis and Shore thus denied 
the assertion of the Supreme Court in one case (that of Agha 
Asee) and resisted the execution of their processes in others 
when they tended to interfere with the Company's judicial and 
revenue administration.
But the Supreme Court had lost the earlier bite after 
their recent defeat of 1780 in their contest with the Govern­
ment. Hence, instead of raking up another quarrel they de­
cided to appeal to the Government for their cooperation in 
the functioning of the Court. Governor-General Wellesley (who 
assumed office on 18th May 1798) was very responsive to the 
new approach. On a request from the Supreme Co irt, Wellesley 
and his Council pledged to bind the Judicial Officers of the 
Company to assist in the execution of the processes of that Court.^ 
Wellesley did, in fact, inaugurate an era of amity and cooperation 
between the Government and the Court, which was to last through 
the subsequent Governor-^eneralships until the advent of Ben- 
tinck. Wellesley's attitude towards the Supreme Court must 
have been conditioned by his liberal approach towards the judi­
ciary in general, which is apparent from his views on the inde-
^Civ. Judl. Cons., 24th Aug. 1798, Nos. 1 & 2.
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pendence cf the S.D.A.1 Ke was very friendly with Anstruther,
2
the contemporary Chief Justice of the Court. He even tried
to revive, to an extent, the Hastings-Impey tradition of the
head of the Government seeking the personal advice of the head
3
of the Ling’s Court on judicial affairs."
The Government of Wellesley, and those following,lived 
up to the assurances given to the Court in 1798* The preceding 
Governments of Shore and Cornwallis had denied a jurisdiction 
claimed by the Court and had resisted their processes when 
found inconvenient to the administration. But from 1800 onward 
there was a striking change. Henceforth the Bengal Government 
held the line that the Supreme Court was the only competent 
body to decide whether a particular person was subject to their 
jurisdiction or not and that the local officers were not to 
interfere with the execution of its processes on any grounds 
whatsoever. The following instances demonstrate the seal of the 
Government to assist, and cooperate with, the Court.
'^3ee Chapter VI, p. 311.
This can be inferred from his private correspondence with An­
struther on all kinds of affairs including even political and
mil itary.
' ■ is supported by a letter from Anstjruther to Welles,le
27th March 1799. Wellesley Papers, ■ y • - . Vol. I,
p.508. ‘ s
In the year 1800 Osborne, a British resident of Calcutta,
obtained from the Supreme Court a Letter of Administration to the
Bstate of a certain w'erber, deceased. The latter1 s property
and effects had been in deposit with the City Court of Dacca.
"inee Verber had been a foreigner (not being a subject of the
Crown) residing ±i Dacca for some time past, the Dacca Court
asserted that he was subject to iAs jurisdiction and not to 
the.
t: at of/Tuprene Court. The assertion see is to be reasonable.
All the same the Government ordered the Dacca Court to honour 
the writ of the Supreme Court and deliver the property in
p
question to Osborne.
In 1802 the Governor~-General-in-*Council readily agreed 
with a suggestion of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
for stationing one of the Sheriff's officers at Benares. This 
was to facilitate the execution of the Court’s processes against
3
persons resident in that area. They also directed the Judge
and Magistrates and the fficer Commanding the Battalion at
Chunar to afford every protection and assistance to the officers 
4
of the Sheriff.'
'^Letter from Register, Dacca Court to Govt., 1st July 1800. 
Criminal Judl. Cons, y 20th Nov. 1800^ To. 4.
‘'Ibid. No. 5. (Resolution of G.G.-in-C., 20th Nov. 1800).
s.^ 26h Aug. 1802j No. 17#
^Ibid. No.20.
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In 1805 the Sheriff sent an officer with a writ to
Hurshidabad to seize a local resident, Srikanta by name.
Srikanta sought the Murshidabad Judge’s protection^stati l g ,
on oath, that he had never executed any bond, or made himself
amenable to the Supreme Court otherwise (i.e. by residence
in Calcutta). On the basis of the above statement the Judge,
Becher, deferred his permission to the Sheriff’s Office for
seizing the person of Srikanta, and wrote to the Government
for instruction.^ The Governor“General-in-Council remarked
that whenever any question arose regarding any person being
subject to the jurisdiction of the Court or not, the Judges
2
of Supreme Court alone were competent to decide the issue.
Becher was told that his resistance to the heriff’s writ was 
unjustified and he was bound to render every possible assist- 
ance to the Sheriff's officer.^
In the same year, Massie, the Judge of Nuddea, refused to 
assist the Sheriff’s officer in seizing an estate in satisfaction 
of a process of the Supreme Court issued in the case of iillia
1Letter from Becher to Govt.. 2nd Jan. 1805% Civ. Judl. Cons.^
10th Jan. 1805. No. 15.
2
etter from Secy, to Govt, to Murshidabad J., 10th Jan. 1805^
Civ. Judl. Cons10th Jan. 1805j No.17.
•'Ibid.
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a . The reason for the Judge’s
refusal was that the said estate (which had been assumed by the 
Supreme Court to be the property of the Raja) had been mortgaged 
to a third party who had already obtained its possession, under 
an order of the Nuddea Court. Massie referred the case to the 
Government.
After consulting Advocate General Smith on the case,
the Government reiterated their earlier stand. The Nuddea Judge
was informed that his resistance to the Supreme Court’s order
2
had been absolutely unjustified. ' A Circular Order was also 
issued to all the Judges and Magistrates in the Provinces for­
bidding them to resist the processes of Supreme Court on any 
plea whatsoever and requiring them to assist the officers of 
the Supreme Court in every possible way.J
The above decision of the Government stands in exact 
contrast to their attitude in the case of Banarsi Ghosh vs 
Radha Mohan Ghosh in 1796.^ This indicates that the Bengal
Civ* Judl. Cons.j!4th Nov. 1805; No. 3*
2
Civ. Judl. Cons.; 14th Nov. 1805; No* 5.
^Ibid. No. 6. (Circular:.' Order dtd. 7th Nov. 1805).
• See ante pp. ^  ^
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Government were now determined to extend their cooperation
for a smoother functinning of the Court.
In 1818 the Government of Bombay solicited instructions
from the Bengal Government in a case in which the Judge of
District Salsette (under the Bombay Presidency^ had protested
against the operation of a writ of the Supreme Court of Bombay
on property situated within his jurisdiction.^ Spankie, the
Advocate General of Bengal justified the action of the Bombay
Supreme Court saying that it was the constant practice of the
Supreme Court of Calcutta to issue writs against properties
situated in the mofussil if their owners happened to come
2
within the jurisdiction of the Court. MThe jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court,” he commented, " was confined only by the
description of persons, and I have never heard of resistance
or remonstrance against the legality of such writs by any
Judge and Magistrate /of Bengal/,or by any other person, for
■3
which, indeed, there could be no column or foundation.'
The Bombay administration was instructed accordingly by 
the Governor-General-in-Oouncil.^
1Civ. Judl. Cons., 16th Oct. 1818, No.20. 
2Ibld., Ho.22.
''ibid.
4Ibid.. Ho.23-
34G
In 1820 the Sheriff requested the assistance of the
u
(dstates) in the District of Midnapore to a particular person, 
in the execution of an order of the Supreme Court.^ The Govern­
ment responded enthusiastically. They drew the attention of
u
November 1805- and ordered: ,!You will of course give such
assistance as may be necessary to the Sheriff’s Officers ... 
in the legal executinn of the process... ”
In 1822 the Government kept silent over a very strong 
protest made by the S.D.A. against an alleged invasion of their 
jurisdiction by the Supreme Court.^
So far the Supreme Court had functioned smoothly. Their 
wits against the persons,' or properties of individuals (both 
British and Indian) had been running freely throughout Bengal 
without any hindrance. Whether an Indian or any other person
. Cons^L5th Get. 1820 5 ho. 17.
2
ee a. Lte, p. 5 4 4  •
'Civ. Judl. Cons.^LJth ct. 1820^ Jo. 20.
4In the case of Pars an Lai vs. Baijnath Sahu, see Chapter VI, p285.
living outside Calcutta was subject to its jurisdiction 
or not,ms left to the determination of the Judges themselves. 
And their decisions were never disputed or doubted.
But with the arrival of Bentinck in 1828, the earlier 
passiveness of the Bengal Government towards the Supreme Court 
vanished and an attitude of criticism and hostility towards 
the Court started developing. Several factors might have caused 
this change.
The Government of Bombay and the Supreme Court there had 
been locked in bitter dispute over the past few years.^ As 
a result, a general reaction against the King’s Courts may have 
been growing at the controlling Presidency.
With the appointment of Metcalfe as the Vice-Fresident 
of the Supreme Council, in 1828, a very strong authoritarian 
element was introduced in the Bengal administration. This was 
irreconcilable with any degree of passivity or acquiescence on 
the part of the ruling power, towards the exercise of any 
authority by the Court which had not been explicitly sanctioned 
by the Statijfes. Metcalfe's ideal was an all-pervading 
Executive. In the Districts he desired the Collectors to
^The origin of the Bomb&y dispute had been the Supreme Court's 
assertion of a right to issue writs of habeafls corpus for the 
release of Indians detained by the Government,and the Govern­
ment's firm denial of it.
be vested with the powers of Judgeship as well as Magistracy.
He lamented! the fact ' he Executive (Governor-General-
in-Council) had dissociated themselves from the functions of
2
the Company’s highest tribunal of justice - the 3,1).A. And
he wanted the Supreme Court to function in complete subordination
to the ruling power. He observed:
"To me, it seems quite clear that the supreme
power ought to rest with the Government, and 
that in any case in which the exercise of the 
powers of the Court might be deemed injurious 
to the safety or welfare of the State, the 
Government ought to possess authority to suspend 
the function of the Court, as regarding that parti­
cular case, and the Court be bound to acknowledge and 
abide by the restrictive powers of the Government 
pending a reference to a superior authority in 
England.
Metcalfe's influence was another factor shaping the attitude 
of the Administration towards the Court.
Lastly, the Governor-General, Benti , himself was 
not very happily disposed towards the Court. The conflict 
between the Judges of Madras Supreme Court and the Government 
during his administrationjpf that Presidency was most likely 
to have prejudiced his mind with a feeling of apprehension to-
ee Chapter IV, p. 205.
bee Chapter VI, p. 31 2.
Minute of Metcalfe (Vice-President-in-Council in Secret 
Dept., 15th April 1829^ Pari. Papers^ 1891, Vol. 6, Appx V. 
Encl. 8, pp. 1J-14.
wards the exercise of unauthorised powers by the Judges of 
the King’s Court. He actually apprehended great, injury to 
the Government and the people of Bengal, from the powers 
assumed by the Supreme Court,and he rejoiced at the assurances 
given by Ellenborough (president, Board of Control) to support 
the Government against the Court. He wrote: 11. .. I shall hail
as a great public benefit the communication of your determination 
to support the authority of the Government, and to protect the 
feelings and interests of the Natives against the ever-extending 
jurisdiction and the ruinous processes of the Supreme Court..."1
With this composition the Bengal Administration became 
determined to dispute some of the powers which the Court had 
assumed, not from any specific provision, but by an interpreta­
tion of the Statues. The Governor-General wrote to the Supreme 
Court:
"On several important points the jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court appears to be doubtful, 
productive of alarm to oir native subjects, of 
embarrassment to the local Governments and dis­
creditable to our country. In some instances 
it seems that those Courts have been compelled 
by a construction of law, contrary to the probable 
intention of the Legislature, to extend their
"Bentinck to Ellenborough, 6.th July 1829. Colchester Papers.
jurisdiction'in /sic/a degree inconsistent 
with the public convenience.... "-L
In 1829, the Vice-President-in-Council specifically
alleged that the Supreme Court had exceeded their jurisdiction
2
in four cases over the recent years. Those were: 
l) Case of Morton ve Hehdi All Khan;
Case between two British partnership firms of Calcutta;
3) Case of Khudabaksh and 'C* vs Government, and
4) Case of TTmesh Chandra Pal Chandhry and Rattan Chandra
Pal Chandhry vs Prem Chandra Pal Chandhry and others.
It may be worth narrating, briefly, the issues in each of the 
above cases, the allegations of the Government about the
Court having exceeded their jurisdiction, and the replies of
  3
the Supreme Court to such charges.'
In the first case the Plaintiff, Morton, was a British
«
resident of Calcutta. He had commenced an action in the 
Supreme Court against one Mehdi Ali Khan, for the recovery of 
certain debts. Though the Defendant, a resident of Oudh, had 
never lived in Calcutta he was carrying on some trade there,
'“Letter from Govn. Gen. to Supreme Court, 14th July 1829, para 4» 
Pari. Papers 183P; Vol. , Appx. V, p.2.
'Metcalfe’s Minute, 15th April 1829* Pari. Papers 1831^ Vol. 6,
Appx V, pp. 20-28.
The issues in three of the above cases (llos. 1, 2 & 4) and the 
Court’s answer to the allegation of the Govt, (vide Bentinck’s and
Metcalfe’s minutes 021 the preceding pages) have been stated in the
Letter from C.Grey, C.J. of Supreme Court to G.G.-in-C., 22nd Oct. 
1829, Pari.Papers 1831, Vol. 6, Appx V, Encl. 19*
through his servants. The debt was alleged to have been contracted 
by the servants on behalf of their master Hehdi Ali Khan, The 
Supreme Court considered the Defendant as amenable to their 
jurisdiction, took cognizance of the Plaint and had the goods 
and properties of Than seized.
The Government contended that Hehdi Ali Khan could not be 
subject to the jurisdiction of the King’s Court because he was 
not only an Indian living outside Calcutta, but he was not even 
a resident of any part of Company territory.^* And without his 
having voluntarily submitted to their jurisdiction, the Court’s 
assumption of jurisdiction over him was entirely illegal. Be­
sides , the Government anserted that the allegation cf the debt 
on which the action against Khan was based was false.
As to the ground of action being a fake, the Chief Justice 
stated that no Court could be so constituted as to be 11 exempt 
from the evil consequence s of perjury’*. But in fact there had 
been nothing to warrant the assertion of false testimony on the 
part of the Plaintiff. About the Government’s claim of Hehdi Ali 
Khan being without the jurisdiction of the Court, the Chief 
Justice gave the following reply.
X'udh was ITawab’s territory. It was directly administered by him.
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He accepted that no specific provision had been made 
the Statutes for the Supreme Court exercising jurisdiction
3 21% Geo. Cajv.'it, 8.28 (of 1780) 
had prohibited a British subject from living beyond the radius 
ten miles of Calcutta without obtaining a si X
from the Government. The Chief Justice asserted "with confi­
dence" that even the above provision did not intend to place those 
established at Calcutta without a legal remedy there, against 
an Indian trader or banker of Calcutta, who might choose to live 
away from that city. Besides, argued the Chief Justice, the 
meaning of the word "inhabitants" could not be confined to
include only residents. This had been established long before
*  ,
by Coke. St. 22% Hen. VIII. Cftap. 5, regarding repair of
^ridges had made the inhabitants of the Shire or Riding liable 
to contribute towards the repair and maintenance of the bridges 
in the locality. From this Coke had construed that although a 
man may be dwelling ii a foreign country, yet if he had lands 
or tenements in his possession or management in the country (England)
5
Sir Edward Coke was Attorney General of England at the beginning 
of the 17th century. He later became the Chief Justice of 
Common Pleas and Chief Justice of King’s Bench during the early 
Stuart rjeriod. He is famous for his Reports and Institutes’ 
which form an important contribution to the evolution of the 
English legal system.
he was an "inhabitant both where his person dwelleth and 
where he hath lands or tenements in possession..."“ Hence 
to regard Hehdi Ali Khan as being beyond the Court's juris­
diction, just on the ground of being a resident of Oudh, 
without considering the fact of his having trading establishments 
in Calcutta, would have been establishing a precedent contrary 
to the principle established by Coke. It would also, argued 
the Chief Justice, have been at variance with the principles 
of justice and against the ordinary course of Law of Merchants 
of most civilised nations of the world. He also emphasised 
the practical inconveniences to the settlers in C.alcutta if 
the word "inhabitants" was interpreted to include physical re­
sidents only. It was common for Indians to carry on extensive 
trade, dealings in money and securities, at Calcutta by means of 
servants, while they themselves resided at Murshidabad, Patna, 
Dacca, Benares or elsewhere. Besides, it would follow from 
the above construction that any Indian resident of Calcutta, 
having all his transactins and property in Calcutta, might cease 
to be an inhabitant of Calcutta the moment he chose to remove 
his physical presence from the city. There being no court at 
Calcutta which had any means of providing for the trial in the
ft. Jnst*f. , p.702. Quoted by Sir J. Frank , Judge of 
Supreme Court. Minute of J. Pr , 23rd Sept. 1829j Pari. Paper 
1831j Vol. 6, p.83.
provinces, the net result of the above construction would be 
that the liter cant ile id ar ties of Calcutta might have to ask for 
licences" to go to half the Zillah Courts of Bengal, if they 
had to sue those with whom they dealt only in the vicinity
v
of their own dwelling places.
The second case in which the Supreme Court was alleged 
to have exceeded its jurisdiction was one between two British 
partnership firms of Calcutta. One had made some advances of 
money to the other, who subsequently became insolvent. The 
Creditors obtained a Decree from the Supreme Court and the 
entire property of the insolvent Partnership, including some 
/ ' 1 trade, i o factories an 1 perties 1
Barailly, were seized by the Sheriff in satisfactimof the 
Decree.
The Government charged that the Court had no authority 
to seize the properties in Barailly, particularly when there 
were local Indian Creditors of the insolvent firm.
The Ohief Justice answered ihat, since no law of Bankruptcy 
or Insolvency had yet been introduced into India, each Creditor 
had to take care of himself. As for the Court's right to seize
property situated outside Calcutta, he stated that the same 
was absolutely necessary under particular circumstances, 
for the fulfilment of its task. The Court was empowered to 
decide suits. He enquired: "...what sort of determination
would it be if the Defendant, by removing himself and his 
goods and chattels, during the progress of the suit, beyond 
the limits of Calcutta, might make execution impossible and 
6 judgmoii o u a tor; ?"
The third was a Criminal case in which four Indian 
inhabitants of Calcutta were involved." They were Khudabaksh, 
iadatullah, Shallaroo and Asgar Khansama. The first three 
were charged with burglary committed just outside the limits 
of Calcutta, and the fourth with having been in possession 
of stolen goods. They were all tried by the Judge of Circuit 
of Calcutta Division. Khudabaksh, Sadatullah and Shallaroo 
were acquitted by the Company's Court because their guilt could 
not be proved. Asgar KhansamaJd was released because the Company's 
Court could not take cognizance of his case since he was found 
in possession of the stolen goods at Kalinga, which was within 
the defined limits of the city of Calcutta. The Magistrate of
"This case has been described in detail, and the allegations of 
the Government answered in Letter from Supreme Court to Board of 
Control (n.d.)* Pari. Papers 1831. Vol. 6, Appx V, Ends* 16-18
pp. 44-48.
the Suburbs of Calcutta, after releasing all the above prisoners 
from his custody (as per the above order) referred those persons 
tc the Calcutta Foliog' for investigation into their characters 
because they were inhabitants of Calcutta. The Calcutta Justice 
oil Peace (i.e. Magistrate) took them in his custody and committed 
them for trial before the Supreme Court. The latter took up their 
trial and convicted all four.
The Government charged the Supreme Court for not only 
having exceeded their jurisdiction by trying Indians for crimes 
committed outside Calcutta, but also of having violated the 
privilege of the Company’s judiciary by retrying three of the 
prisoners already tried and acquitted by the Calcutta Provincial 
Court.
As to the first part of the allegation, the Chief Justice 
Lmed that the Natives of Calcutta were to be consic 
British subjects, under the meaning of Act 13* Goo. III. C. 63,
S.14 (of 1773) and the Charter establishing the Supreme Court, 
and hence were amenable to that Court for all acts done within 
or without Calcutta, in the same manner as an Curopean born 
British S ject, ‘kief Justice’s reply to the second part
of the charge (i.e. about taking up the trial of a case already 
decided by Company’s Court) was that, in the first place, the 
Supreme Court had no judicial information about the parties
1 aving boon already tried and arraigned by the Company’s Court.
His impression had been that the Calcutta Provincial Court 
had merft$y disclaimed the cognisance of the case on the ground 
of the parties being residents of Calcutta. Ev $  the Supreme 
Court had the information,that, in the opinion of the Chief 
Justice, would not have formed any legal ground for the acquittal 
of the prisoners.
to last care (that of Umes. u. __
R _ _  .__________ ______ . . _____________ u  _______
both parties were residents of Calcutta. The case had been for
e in Nuddea District which had been
jointly owned by the Plaintiffs and the Defendants. In 1829 
the Supreme Court decreed the partition, adjudging to the Plaintiffs 
a certain fraction of the joint ©state. They also assigned the 
specific villages and lands constituting the Plaintiff’s share.
As the public assessment of revenue had so far been on the whole 
©state, the Court, after assigning the shares, also distributed 
the public assessment on each. And to compel the performance of 
the Decree, the rents and profits of the joint ©state were se­
questered and an officer of the Court was appointed as Receiver 
to collect the Revenue on the spot.
The last action drew the strongest objectinn from the Ad­
ministration. The Revenue Bard protested that great inconvenience
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was likely to be caused by the appointment of an European 
officer of the Court to collect the public revenue because 
that officer would not be amenable to the Mofussil Courts 
or liable to the penalties prescribed for the undue exaction 
of rent.'*'
Holt Mackenzie apprehended that tie appointment of
Receivers by the Supreme Court would prejudice the revenue 
2
collection. Metcalfe stated that such an action was cal-
3culated to set the Regulations of the Government at nought.^
The Government also contended that the Supreme Court
had no authority to partition or transfer property in the
Ilofussil. Though Advocate General Pearson admitted that such
a power had been exercised by the Court from the earliest
4
times, he doubted whether it had any legal basis at all.’
The Chief Justice’s reply to all this was that under 
the Charter constituting the Court, full and exclusive powers 
had been given to them to decide suits between inhabitants of
^Letter from Board of Revenue to Vice-President-in-Council,
6th March 1829, para 9; Pari. Papers. 1831^ Vol. 6, Appx V, Encl. 7.
2 /“Quoted in the Hete by Macnaghten (Register of S.D.A.) dtd.
9th April 1829^ Pari. Papers 1831, Vol. 6, Appx V, Encl. 11.
* 7
Minute of Metcalfe, 15th April 1829^ Pari. Papers 1831y Vol. ",
Appx V, pp. 20-28.
^This opinion was given by Pearson in the case of Hurruck Chandra Ghosh 
vs Bundichand Batta. Civ. -• .? ?4th July 1828. Nos. 1-5.
Calcutta* X • , &J). . 3*1 •
was given full authority to decide disputes concerning their 
succession and inheritance. There could be no other way of 
securing the adjudged shares in the Kofussil except by appoint­
ing a Receiver. He argued:
"It can not be seriously meant as a more easy 
proceeding that a suit should be instituted 
against an inhabitant of Calcutta in each Zillah
\JL
or even that this Co""' ut, after having declared 
the rights of the parties to a partition, should 
direct them to bring a second suit against the 
Defendant in any other Court /of the Company/ 
and take the chance of having the same thing de­
creed all over again..."
In 1831 the Bengal Government reported another series
of cases to London in which the Supreme Court had exceeded
their powers by exercising jurisdiction over succession to,
and transfer of, property in the Mofussil.^ On one of such
cases (hlstonand Biswas vs PrsV) Khrishna Biswas) Advocate
2
General Pearson repeated his earlier opinion that the Supreme 
Court had been exercising this power without the sanction of
3
the Legislature.' he admitted, at the same time, that this
1Judl. letter, 19th April 1831, Vol. 15*
3
Pearson to Govt., 3rd Feb. 1831. Printed in Circular Orders 
. . .*0 I* Jones 1855), pp. 360-61*
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authority had been exercised, by the Court from the earliest 
times, without being challenged. Cases in which this issue
jo had gone
appeal and the King-in-Council had decided them, without it 
having struck them that the Supreme Court had exceeded their 
jurisdiction.
But while the Governments of Pellesley, Barlow, Ilinto, 
Eastings and Amherst had acquiesced and assisted in the exer­
cise of such a jurisdiction by the Court, the administration 
of Bentinck and Metcalfe were bent upon challenging its pro­
priety. Metcalfe informed the Directors that: "In our address
to the Judges /of the Supreme Courtyas well as in our corres­
pondence with the Governor General, we have specially guarded 
against the drawing of any inference which might imply an 
acquiescence, on the part of the Government, in the jurisdiction 
exercised by the Supreme Court over Estates in the Kofussil...
He then urged the Directors to press the Frivy Council to give
a clarification or to obtain an explanatory enactment from the
2
Parliament itself.
L , vol.
7
2Ibid.
It may bo noticed from the preceding narrative that 
ail the disputes between the Court and the Government origin­
ated from the issue of the former1s processes against persons 
or properties in the Mofu-ssil. T-Ietcalfe alleged that the
Judges were always inclined to take advantage of the vagueness 
t
)f the Statuses and extend their jurisdiction beyond the actual
exJ
Court also had the strongest inducement to urge such extensions
as their income improved with the increase of business brought
1
before the Court.
The Judges of the Court, on the other hand, complained
of a lack of cooperation from the Government. They regretted
that instead of trying to bring about a synthesis between the
Company’s judiciary and the Supreme Court, the Government had
been inclined to erect their judicial structure separately axid
2
in a form of opposition to the King’s Court.
Both were extreme views. In fact the incidents of con­
flict between the Court and the Government, either during the 
pre-1800 period, or during the post-1828 period,, were neither
Minute of Met calf e-in-Council, .• .-cret Dept.? 15th April 1829 ^
Pari. Papers 18pl^ Vol. 6, Appx. V, Encl. 8.
2
Letter from Supreme Court to Boar itrol, Sept. 183C^
Pari. Papers 18plj Vol. 5, .1 . 26, Encl. 4.
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the outcome of a passion on ibe part of the Judges to enlarge 
their powers, nor the result of an attempt by the Government 
to obstruct the functioning of the Court. The occasions for 
friction arose out of the inadequacy of provisions with regard 
to the jurisdiction of the Court and the consequent uncertainty 
in the exercise of their powers. Neither St. ljS^ Geo. III. Cap. 
op (of 1'7 :'p), by which the Court had been created, nor St. 21- 
Geo. III. Cap. 70, by which its jurisdiction was redefined, 
specifically provided for the contingencies in which the Court 
ght have to issue processes againr $ roperties outside
Calcutta. As it came to be, persons or properties coming directly 
under the jurisdiction of the supreme Court often involved persons 
or properties lying in the Mofussil under the exclusive jurisdiction 
of -the Company’s administration. The Supreme Court, when called 
upon to decide such cases, were faced with the choice of either 
issuing their processes in the Mofussil or abandoning their 
legitimate jurisdiction over persons or properties within Cal­
cutta. The Government, on the other hand, found the sanctity of 
its own administration threatened, when the writs of the Supreme 
Court started running into the Districts. Very often eat at or. 
attached or sequestered by the Supreme Court were found subject 
to another litigation in the Company's Court, or even already 
adjudged to be a particular party by the latter.
Persons directly subject to the Court's jurisdiction 
often held lands which contributed their share of revenue to 
the administration. In the suits against them the Court fre­
quently found it necessary to seize, divide or sell such lands.
Yet by St. 23^ Geo. III. Cap. 70. S. 8, they were forbidden to 
exercise jurisdiction in any matter which concerned public 
revenue. This was another ambiguous proposition that the Court 
had to deal with.
Even the definition of persons who were to be subject
the
to th irtfs jurisdiction was left vague i;iAhtatuibs. Phis 
gave rise to many doubtful cases. Under the Charter of 1774 
the jurisdiction of the Court was prescribed over certain 
classes of persons. '-hem were all °British” subjects
and all inhabitants of Calcutta, whether Indians or Europeans.
lestion was - who were the British subjects? In St. 21^
Geo. Ill and other Acts, the term 0British subject!> is never 
used in a sense to include any category of Indians. But even 
in 1773, Calcutta was Crown territory and the Indians living 
there must have been regarded as subjects of the Crown. That 
is why they were made amenable to the ICing's Court. A distinction 
had therefore to be maintained between the c'British subjects” 
and the ^Subjects of the Crown”.^  distinction was never
Letter from Supreme Court to Board of Control, Sept. II .
Pari. Papers 1831 ^ Vol. 6, Appx V, No. 26, Encl. 4.
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specifically provided for by any of the enactments. It 
rested upon the inference drawn from the term ClBritish subjects’* 
in the several Statutes, particularly St, 21v Geo. Ill, Gap. 70.
It was generally agreed that the tern vBritisl s 1
included allfeersons born in Great Britain, or whose fathers 
or Paternal $rand Fathers were born there, so as to exclude 
the Hindu and Muslim inhabitants within or without the Presi­
dency towns.^
The liabilities of the 0 British Subject” were fully de­
fined by the Statutes. He was to be amenable to the Supreme
Court for any Criminal acts committed in any part of the Presi- 
2
dency. In Civil causes too he was liable to the same Court 
so long as he resided in Calcutta. But if he went out of Cal­
cutta as a private citizen, he was required to obtain a licence
3
from the Company1s Government.' If he wanted to live anywhere 
beyond a radius of ten miles from Calcutta, for personal reasons, 
he was required to execute a bond making himself amenable to 
the local Company’s Court in Civil actions against him.' By
1
Letter from Supreme Court to Board of Control, Sept. 1850.
Pari. Papers 1851/ Vol. 6, Appx V, Ho. 26, Encl. 4.
2
-in exception was made to this rule by St. 53, Geo. III. Cap. 155 passed 
in 1813. By Cl. 1C5 of the Act British subjects residing outside 
the Presidency towns were, for petty crimes, made amenable to punish­
ment by fine up to Rs. 500/- by the local Magistrate.
By Section 28 of St. 21, Geo. Ill, Cap. 70.
^By Regulation XXVIII of 1793*
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. " ^ Geo. Ill, Gap. 155, Of 1813* ' iectr residing
in the interior were generally made amenable to the local Courts
actions Lans. ho bond
was to be required now. but the British subject was allowed 
the choice of appealing from the local Court's decision to the 
Supreme Court, instead of to the S.D._i.
dor*
Was < p
5.0 left Calcutta. He was required neither to take a licence 
for going out of Calcutta into the Provinces, nor to execute 
a bond when he transferred his residence from Calcutta tc some 
place in the interior, /[hat would be his position if he de­
cided to go out of Calcutta or to live in the interior? To 
whom would he be amenable if he committed a crime outs: de Calcutta?
o
questions had to be supplied bp interpretation. Prom the practice 
followed by the Supreme Court it is apparent that they tended 
to place the Indians of Calcutta in the same position as the 
British subjects in respect of their liabilities to the Court.
Thus Indians living out of Calcutta were allowed to sue, or be 
sued by, the Indians of Calcutta.' This was obviously otne under 
the sanction of that clause f the Charter which permitted
1
e ante p. 32 7*
Indians not amenable to the Court to submit voluntarily
to their jurisdiction, in suits instituted against them by
British subjects.*1* Likewise the Supreme Court regarded the
a s
Indians of Calcutta ^Liable, in the same manner as the
British subjects, to them for crimes committed in any part
2
of the Presidency.'* The Court was willing tc go even a
step further. They claimed that the existing legal status
of even the Indians living out of Calcutta was the same as
that of the Calcutta Indians. They were now equally subjects
of the Crown and there was no constitutional justification
why oven they should not be liable to the Supreme Court for
3
crimes committed anywhere. Their reasoning was as follows: 
the Charter of 1774 the term uBritish subjectsM had been 
used generally to exclude the Indians living outside Calcutta 
who, though being governed by the Company, were still nominally 
regarded as the Subjects of the Moghul Emperor. But since 
then the situation had materially altered. Though it can not 
be precisely stated when the dominion cf the Hog] uJ. Emperor
Dee ante p. 32 7 *
2
Particular reference: case of IQiudabaksh and ' C’. See ante pp.
rz
Letter from Supreme Court to Board of Control (n.d.),
Pari. Papers 183*1, Vol. 6, Appx# V, Encl.s 16-18.
formally terminated and that of the Crown began over the 
whole of the Presidency, it was at least clear that the 
sovereignty of the British Crown over all the territorial 
acquisitions in India was indirectly asserted in 1813 by
Geo. Ill, Cap. 155. In that Statute the territories 
under Company’s administration lying outside the limits of 
the Presidency towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay are
it ar “British Territories”. And from 
this it followed that all those living there were King’s 
subjects.
The Judges even argued that so far the Supreme Court 
was the only tribunal in Bengal which was legally (under the 
Parliamentary Statutes) competent to try charges of crimes 
and misdemeanours., other than abuses in collection of revenue.” 
They claimed that the entire establishment of the Sadar Nizamut 
.dalut and the subordinate Courts of Criminal justice created 
and maintained by the Company had been made without any authority 
of the Crown or Parliament. St. 21- Geo. Ill, Cap. 70 had 
recognised the existence of the Courts maintained by the Company. 
But the only Courts maintained by the Company then were the S.D
■'"Letter from Supreme Court to Board of Control (n.d.),
Pari. Papers 1051, Vol. 6, 'ppx V, No. 26, Encl. 4, pp. 117-140.
and the subordinate Courts of Jivil judicature. The Sadar 
zamut Adalut and the entire machinery of Criminal judicial 
administration was then under the management of the Nawab.
The Company took over the Sadar Nizamut adalut and the ad­
ministration of Criminal justice from him in 1790. The arrange­
ment was incorporated in the Regulations passed by the Government 
in 1793. But in 1793, the Judges argued, no power had been 
created by the Crown or Parliament, under which, except for 
revenue offences, the Bengal Government could establish Courts 
of Criminal justice.
The legal analysis of the Judges might not have been 
wrong though it would have been impracticable and impossible 
to put that into practice. The Judges never did, in practice, 
regard the Indians living out of Calcutta as amenable to their 
Court for crimes committed by them. ITor did they ever challenge 
the existence of the S.IT.A. or the subordinate Criminal Courts. 
Their arguments were only meant to prove that the jurisdiction 
already being exercised by them was well within their permitted 
authority.
The stand taken by the Government boiled down to this. 
Indians were subject to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction only 
so long as they lived in Calcutta. Once they moved out of 
Calcutta they moved ait of the Court's jurisdiction, both in
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Civil and Criminal natters. After leaving Calcutta they could 
be liable to the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction only for crimes 
committed during their residence there, but for any crimes 
committed outside that city they were to be subject to ordinary 
jurisdiction of the local Company’s Court/'
So long as the Parliament did not declare its actual 
intention on the above issues both the Court and the Government 
could assert with equal justification that their own inter­
pretation was correct. Here lay the seed of contention. Metcalfe 
rightly observed that,after 1780,
"Cither from a better understanding of the in­
tentions of the legislature, or from a mutual 
moderation between the Government and the Judges, 
or from a submission of the Government to gradual 
or quiet encroachments /byihe Supreme Court/
... there has not been the same degree of mis­
understanding or dispute regarding the powers 
of the King’s Courts; but it is evident from 
what is now passing on at this Presidency and 
from what has happened before, both at Madras 
and Bombay,' that seeds of dissension still exist 
in the undefined condition of the jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Courts."2
Following the recent disputes several suggestions were 
made for working out an arrangement that would reduce the
'The views of the Government are deducible from Metcalfe’s Minute 
in Secret Dept., 15th April 1829; Pari. I .
Appx V, Encl. 8.
3 ) ,
Appdx V, Encl. 8.
chances of friction between the Court and the Government,
The Chief Justice, Sir Charles Grey, advocated the formation
of the territory within a certain radius of Calcutta> into
1
the Province of Calcutta, In this area, all the inhabitants, 
British or Indian, were to be subject to English law, which 
was to be administered by a chain <f Courts, with the Supreme 
Court at the top. The latter was to cease being a Court 
of original jurisdiction and become entirely a Court of Appeal 
from the decisions of the subordinate Courts in the Province 
of Calcutta, In the remaining territoxy under the Presidency, 
a different system of judiciary, applying Indian laws, was to 
function under the exclusive control of the Governor-General- 
in-Council. Persons, either British or Indian, residing in 
this area, were to be entirely subject to these Courts and 
the Indian laws and usages.
The above proposal was apparently intended to create 
two watertight compartments within which the two judiciaries 
could function separately without any encroachment upon 
other. But when the general administratioi^of the country was 
the same it would have been most impractical to bifurcate it
^Letter from Supreme Court to Board of Control, Sept. 1830
Pari. Papers,1831y Vol. 6, Appx V, No. 25, Encl. 4, pp. 117-40
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merely for the purpose of judicial administration* Bentinck
found the proposal objectionable on political and commercial
grounds as well.^
From the Government's side Metcalfe suggested a different
scheme for the reform of the Court's juilsdictinn. Some of
2its principal features were as follows:
I. Persons who have never resided in Calcutta ought not
to belLable to arrest or generally amenable to the 
Court's jurisdiction, on the plea of "their being 
inhabitants of Calcutta. on account of pecuniary 
transactions in the city. The property of such a
person, if situated within Calcutta, could be liable
to the Court in any case arising out of his business 
transactions within the City. But property beyond 
the limits of Calcutta ought never to be liable to 
the Supreme Court. It is apparent that this was 
directly intended to counter the Court's assertion 
in the case of Hehdi A1 dikhan. ^
^Letter from G.G.-in-C. to Supreme Court (n.d.), paras 9-17. 
Pari. Papers91831; Vol. 6, Appx V, No. 28.
^Metealfe's Minute, 15th April 1829. Pari Papers. 1851; Vol. 6, 
Appx V, Encl. 8.
3
See ante pp. 350-4*
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II Indian residents of Calcutta ought to be liable to
the Court for crimes committed within the limits of 
the city, but ought not to be so for acts committed 
within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Courts. 
Obviously, this qualification had been directed 
against the Court's assumption of jurisdiction in 
the case of Khudabaksh and others.^*
I H  The Court's processes against the properties of persons 
amenable to their jurisdiction ought not to be executed 
by their own officers but by the local Magistrates. 
Officers of the King's Courts were to be prohibited 
from proceeding beyond Calcutta. The local officers 
of the Government were to be the instruments for 
carrying out the orders of the Court concerning
persons’ property situated beyond Calcutta.
IV It ought to be the duty of local authorities to bring
to the notice of the Government any instances (occurring 
within their jurisdiction) of the Supreme Court ex­
ceeding their known and acknowledged powers. The 
Government, if it agreed with the local officer's 
report, was to have the power of calling the attention
1Ke
of the Court to^complaint. The Court ought to be
^See ante pp. 354-57*
be bound to listen to the reference from the Govern­
ment and to ezplain the grounds of their proceedings.
The Government, if not convinced by the eiplanation 
offered by the Court, was to have the power of appealing 
to the King-in-Council and, pending the result of the 
appeal, they were to have the authority to suspend 
the operation of Supreme Court's order in question. 
Metcalfe’s proposals offered the Court no friendly com­
promise. It called for a complete submission, by them, to the 
assertions made by the Bengal Government. The Judges, naturally, 
reacted strongly* against his suggestions. The last proposition 
was particularly obnoxious. The Chief Justice said: "Of this
I can never express an approbation until I am told by the sole 
competent authority /ihe Parliament/that the sovereignty of 
the King-ii-Parliament is only nominal in India. ..**^
Bentihck also carried on some discussions with the Court 
for exploring ways and means by which the Court and the Govern­
ment might arrive at a smoother working arrangement. But there
2could be no agreement between him and the Judges.
^Minute of Chief Justice Grey, 2nd Oct. 1829. Pari.Papers 1831, 
Vol. 6, Appx V, Encl.19*
Stentinck to Ellenborough, 23rd Feb. 1830. Colchester Papers.
The merger of the Supreme Court with the Company’s 
judicial system was th^answer to all the difficulties*
Several authorities, including Bentinck and Metcalfe, sub­
scribed to this idea.^
But the amalgamation of the Supreme Court with the 
Company’s judiciary would not hawe been practicable without 
the creation ofa common law giving authority for all persons 
and the formation of common codes applicable to Indians and 
Britons alike*
Meanwhile, the existing rivalry between the Government 
and the Supreme Court had been engaging the attention of 
the authorities in London. A strong opinion was building 
up at the Board for an intervention in favour of the Govern­
ment. Already in 1829 » EUlenborough, President of Board of 
Control, had privately communicated to Bentinck his determination 
to support the Government against the Court. His successor, 
Charles Grant, made a strong plea for putting the jurisdiction
*5
of the Supreme Courts under the control of Indian Governments.
metcalfe to Bentinck, 11th Oct. 1829* Colchester Papers.
2
See ante p. 349 •
3
Grant’s speech in Parliament. Hansard, Series III, Vol. XIX, 
pp. 512-13.
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Two more personalities pushed the campaign against the Courts 
with great zeal. They were T. B. Macaulay, the Secretary 
of the Board, and James Mill, the Examiner of Company’s corres­
pondence.
Macaulay held a contemptuous opinion of the Court and 
expressed it most forcefully with his magnificent rhetoric.
He regarded the Supreme Courts as unfit to administer justice 
to any class of Indians because the Judges were not familiar 
with their customs and u s a g e s H e  argued that the maintenance 
of the Supreme Courts (apparently considered to be constituted 
by better qualified Judges and applying a superior system of 
laws) for a handful of British subjects in India gave an im­
pression of partiality to the latter. This in effect meant 
that: "We proclaim to the people that there are two sorts of
justice, a coarse one, which we think good enough for them, and
2
another of a superior quality reserved for ourselves."
James Mill questioned the utility of maintaining the Supreme 
3
Courts at all. He argued that the Courts applying English laws
^Macaulay, Essays, Vol. Ill, p. 388.
^Minute of Macaulay" (n.d.), Pari. Papers, 1837-38. Vol. 41, PP* 219--20.
3
Evidence of James Mill before Select Committee of House of Lord.
29th June 1832. Pari. Branch Colls.^1832, Vol. 77, pp. 119-21.
had been originally established to administer justice to a 
small number of Englishmen who settled around the factories 
because it was not consideredsafe to subject them to the 
strange Courts and procedures of the Moghul system. But 
the situation had changed since. A fully fledged structure 
of judicial tribunals was now organised and maintained in 
India by an English administration 'which was under the con­
stant control and supervision of Parliament. Hence it had 
become superfluous to maintain a separate judicial establishment 
for administering justice to a handful of Englishmen. This 
argument was quite plausible.
Replying to a notion that the Supreme Courts could act
*
as a bar to the illegal acts of the Government, Mill stated 
that ihe Courts could offer such protection only to an English­
man. This was because the acts of the Indian Government could 
be judged illegal only in relation to the laws made by a 
superior authority (King and Parliament) upon which the rights 
and liberties of the English settlers still depended. The 
rights of Indian subjects were based solely upon the laws en­
acted by the Indian Governments. Hence there was no question
The Bombay Supreme Court had made this assertion in effect 
by issuing a writ of habeas Corpus for the release of an 
Indian detained under official orders.
of an Indian Government committing an illegal act against
any Indian subject* This point had been more lucidly
analysed by George Uorton, the Advocate General of Madras.
He observed:
MThe duty of the judicial authority is to ad­
minister that as a law, and to declare that 
to be illegal, which the Government has pro­
nounced /to be so7 To bar any acts of a 
Government as illegal, is to assume to be the 
Government .... When the Court would bar any 
acts as illegal it is precisely because they 
are not authorised by Government, though they 
may be under the guise of acts so authorised; 
when the local Government effects to authorise 
an act forbidden by the law of a superior 
paramount Government, the local Government is
Even as regards the British subjects, Mill commented that 
there had beeniery few instances in which the Government had 
been charged, for injury to an Englishman, before the Supreme 
Court. Besides, he said, an Englishman would have abundant 
means of making his complaints known, and for urging his claims 
to redress (in England) if the Supreme Court ceased to exist.
Mill also denied that the Supreme Court, on account of 
their superior legal knowledge and proceedings, had any influence
Norton to Malcolm (Governor of Bombay), 1st Jan. 1830,
Bentinck MSS.
not, in fact, the Government, but thebrgan of 
the Supreme Government/i.e. the SritishJ 
... /when only it7 is subjected to be judged 
of /?or legality/.
in ameliorating the proceedings of the Company’s Courts.
The reason was that the system; followed in the Supreme 
Court was basically different from that followfck; in Com­
pany Courts. Also, only a very small section of the popu­
lation and the Company's judicial officers had the oppor­
tunity of becoming acquainted with the working of the 
Supreme Court. He remarked: nXn my opinion the English
Courts afford more examples of what is to be avoided than 
what is to be followed in the tribunals erected in India.
These were the influences that were brought to bear 
upon the Parliament while they considered their verdict on 
the issues between the Courts and the Indian Government. The 
Charter Act was passed in 1833* One of its main objects 
was to improve the legislature and reform the conflicting 
judicatures.
The Act established & Central legislative authority for 
the whole of India. This was to be the Governor-General-in- 
Council at Calcutta. They were empowered to make or repeal 
laws for all the three Presidencies and for "all persons whether 
British or Native, Foreigners or others, and for all the Courts
of Justice, whether established by His Majesty's Charters or
*■2otherwise, and the jurisdictions thereof....**
;2
"St. 384. Mill. IV. Cap. 85. S. 47.
■•Kill, loc.cit., p. 375*
Until 18331 the laws passed by the Governments of the 
three Presidencies had no effect in the Supreme Courts, It
III, Cap. 70. S. 28) by which a Regulation passed by the Com­
pany's Government could become binding in the Supreme Courts
been left solely to the pleasure of the Judges. The Govern­
ments of the Presidencies had steadily refused to recognise 
this veto (in effect allowed to the King's Courts) by con­
sistently omitting to submit their acts for Registration.
Once a Regulation was refused registration by the Supreme Couivfc* 
its applicability in the Company's Courts even would become 
legally doubtful. The Company's Governments would not take that 
risk. Their legislation had, therefore, not been binding 
on the British subjects and the inhabitants of the Presidency 
towns. Now it became equally binding on all persons 'without
being"
any registrationArequired anywhere, whatever their origins or
cm
place of residence, andAall Courts of law, irrespective of the 
authority by which they were constituted.
This step had become necessary also because of the freedom 
allowed by the CharterT to all Europeans; to settle anywhere 
in India. A large influx of Englishmen into the interior was 
now anticipated. If they were to be subject only to the laws
is true that a provision had been made (under St. 21 ^ Geo.
once it was registered by them.
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made in England, and to a Court controlled from there, the 
local Governments might have to face & tremendous problem 
of maintaining lav and order. Bentinck had already emphasised 
this difficulty, as soon as the discussion on allowing free sett' 
-rikinpAfc to the Europeans in India lad been initiated.^*
The long controversy between the Supreme Court and the 
Government of the Company thus came to an end. The latter had 
emerged decisively victorious. The jurisdiction of the Court 
which formed the theme of the dispute was now put completely 
at the discretion of the Governor-General-in-Council. Only, 
the Governor-General-in-Council were prohibited from abolishing 
the Supreme Courts without the sanction of the Home authorities.^ 
One might ask why the Supreme Courts were not abolished 
and merged into a common judicial system in 1833* The reason 
was that until the common codes suitable for all were framed, 
it was considered prudent to continue administering justice to 
the British subjects according to the English procedure. The 
Judges of the Company, who had no professional traiing, were 
considered unfit to administer justice according to the English 
legal system. The Supreme Courts were, therefore, retained 
pending the foimiation of the Indian Codes.
^Bentinck to Ellenborough, 18th Dec. 1829. Colchester Papers. 
St. 3 4 4. Will. IV. Cap. 85. S. 46.
A Lav Commission had been constituted under the Act of 
1833 for the purpose of recommending a common legal system 
for India. For several reasons its deliberations were unduly 
delayed. It'was only after the Civil Procedure Code was passed 
by the Legislature of India that the existing Supreme Court and 
the S.D.A., and their jurisdictions, were merged into the High 
Courts, established under the Indian High Courts Act of 1861.
SOME CONCLUSIONS
The Company^ judicial structure marked a great ad­
vance over the Moghul system. Uncertain justice according 
to personal discretion was replaced by a more certain 
justice according to the frule of law1, and for the most 
irregularly distributed judicial tribunals acting without 
any coordination were substituted a gradation of Courts 
uniformly distributed, each exercising control over the one 
below, through the revision of its decisions and inspection 
of its periodical reports on the amount of business transacted 
and pending. The former oral proceedings, which left no 
evidence if the Judge made a faulty assessment of testimony 
and passed a wrong decision,-were now replaced by a system 
which required every stage of the trial, from institution to 
termination, to be committed to writing.
But in spite of these revolutionary improvements, the 
judicial structure established in 1793 was not equal to the 
pressure of work imposed upon it. The handful of tribunals 
was unable to cope with the enormous volume of litigation 
which arose. The progressive increase of litigation had an 
inherent cause in the laws of inheritance in India. There 
being no law of primogeniture either among the Hindus or among
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*
the Muslims, each son "being entitled to an equal share of 
the family property, there could he no limit to the 
division of property and to the creation of new titles. 
Individual property rights could now be easily contested 
and legally established through the Courts and an increase 
of litigation naturally resulted. A new element of com­
mercialism which came into operation with the progress of Com­
pany !s rule created new interests and opened fresh avenues 
of litigation. Apart from these general causes, a factor 
responsible ..for a major portion of the litigation was the 
"precipitation with which the Permanent Settlement was 
carried into effect without previously defining the relative 
rights and interests of the Zamindars... and the various 
other classes of the cultivating population."^ While the 
disputes between the Zamindars and the ryots formed the bulk 
of the cases, the lack of recorded documents defining their
respective positions rendered the settlement of such contro-
2
versies complicated and dilatory. The result was the growth 
of a backlog of pending suits and delays in obtaining decisions.
ljudl. Letter from Bengal (Western Province), 22nd Feb. 1827, 
para. 12, Vol. 10.
2Ibid.
In the Courts of European Judges it was impossible to have 
a decision within two or three years of the institution 
of the complaint. Even in the Courts of Indian Judges suitors 
had to wait for five to six months before getting a Decree.
The trials, more particularly in the European Judges* Courts, 
involved a long drawn out process. Sometimes, parties had to 
be prepared to be in attendance at the Courts for months 
at a stretch. But obtaining the Decree was not always the 
end of the suitor*a pursuit of justice. If the judgment 
11 debtor" refused to abide by the Court’s decision or order 
voluntarily-the Decree holder had to apply for an 1 execution *' 
to the District Judge under whose jurisdiction the "debtor*1 
resided or held property. More often than not, the Judge 
was prevented from taking immediate cognizance of the application 
on account of his other pressing duties, and also because he 
already had a waiting list of such applications which deserved 
prior attention. Lord Hastings rightly observed in3820s 
"To pass decrees is unfortunately no test of diligence or 
judgment. But to cause them to be fulfilled, to make them 
effectual to the parties ... /is the ultimate object/...
These operations require the most serious sacrifice of time.11^
^"Resolution of Govn. Gen.-in-Council, 14th Feb. 1820, Civ. Judl. 
Cons., 23rd April 1821, Nos. 8 and 9.
The Decrees of Munsiffs could be executed by the Judge or 
the Register only. Hence, a person who obtained a decisinn 
from the Munsiff of his locality was likely to lose most of 
the advantage of having a tribunal near at hand, if to have 
the decision implemented he had to travel all the way to the 
District headquarters.
Not only was the Company’s judicial system dilatory 
but it turned out to be intolerably expensive for many. In 
all suits of less than Rs. 500/- the expenses of the plaint­
iffs were calculated at 22 per cent of the amount or value 
of the case.^ * For instance, if a ryot had to sue a Zamindar 
for an undue exaction of Rs. 120/-, he would have to pay Rs. 8/- 
as the institution fee and another Rs. 32/- on account of
the subsequent charges on the exhibits and on Pleaders, Wit-
2nesses and Peons. But this amount includes only the ex­
penses required by the Regulations. It does not take into 
account the allowances for private agents (Mokhtears) whom 
the suitors invariably retained during the trial of their case.
^Note of H. Shakespear, Superintendent of Police (n.d.), Bentinck 
MSS., Pw Jf, 2566.
2
Evidence of Holt Mackenzie before Parliamentary Committee of 
enquiry, 3rd April 1832. Pail. Branch Colls., 1832, Vol. 77, PP^I-
Evidence of Mackenzie, 3rd April 1832, Pari. Branch Colls., 1832, 
Vol. 77, pp.^-^3.
The delays and expenses of obtaining justice ruined 
many and often prevented sufferers from seeking redress.
Henry Strachey, the Judge of Midnapur, stated: !,I have
often seen a suitor when stripped of his last rupee and 
called upon for the fee on a document, produce in the Court 
a silver ring or a trinket and beg that it might be re­
ceived as a pledge...’^*
The delay of years before a suit was taken up for trial 
often complicated the issues. For instance, in the interval 
between the institution and the trial of a suit concerning 
the ^ forcible dispossession11 of a piece of land, the land­
marks of the property in dispute might disappear, or the area 
of the land situated on a river bank might increase or de­
crease as a result of the annual inundation.
Mother harmful result of the long gap between in­
stitution and trial was the danger of perversion of the testi­
mony. While the recollection of facts might be weakened in 
the minds of the genuine witnesses due to the lapse of time, 
it gave the contending parties ample leisure to prepare and 
tutor fake witnesses as well as to influence the genuine ones 
to give concocted evidence in their favour. Perjury among
Civ. Judl. Cons., 8th July 1802, No.55.
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Indians was a crime commonly complained of by the contemporary 
Judges. One might wonder whether the operation of the Company*s 
judicial system was not indirectly responsible for it to a 
considerable extent.
Delays in justice also affected the peace of the society. 
Failure to obtain redress expeditiously through the judicial 
Courts often induced the aggrieved parties to take the law 
into their own hands. This was particularly true of cases 
concerning forcible dispossession of lands and crops, which 
might be the only source of livelihood for the dispossessed 
persons. Under such circumstances the dispossessed party tried 
to recover his property, with the help of friends and relatives, 
by physical force. The dispossessor, equally determined to 
retain the possession, resisted with his own army of sup­
porters. Such affrays, often accompanied with grievous injury 
and murder, became exceedingly common during the Company*s ad­
ministration . ^
In 1815, Governor-General Moira assessed the effects of 
Comjjwmy's judicial system as follows:
”1 am reluctantly compelled to confess that its 
/judicial system’s/ operation appears not to 
correspond with what was to be anticipated from
"For example, in 1804, in the District of Jaunpur alone 5,700 
persons had been involved L in affrays over dispossession of lands 
and crops: Vide report of Mcguthrie, Jaunpur J., 20th May, 1812, 
quoted in Judl. Despatch, 9th Nov. 1814, para 47, Vol. 2.
the expectations of those who framed the 
machinery of our judicial administration, 
or from the uprightness of those who exe­
cute its details: we seem to have accom­
plished a revolution in society which by 
an unexpected fatality, proved detrimental 
to general morals, and by no means conducive 
to the convenience of our Government.
The cost of obtaining justice could not be minimised 
without sacrificing the procedure which assured a proper 
investigation before decision, and without incurring the 
danger of overflooding the Courts already in heavy arrears 
of pending litigation. But means must be devised to reduce 
the delays in securing justice. This was the task to which 
the attention of the Bengal Government was constantly rivetted 
throughout the period under reference. After a detailed 
analysis of the reforms made for the achievement of that 
object, it would be worth while noticing the general trends 
influencing their course.
The Bengal Government's approach until the arrival of 
Bentinck was to find a solution within the fold of Cornwallis's 
ideals. Wellesley separated the S.D.A. from the Council for 
the sake of the efficiency of the Court and because the exer­
cise of the highest judicial functions by the Executive body
^Moira's Minute, 21st Sept. 1815, para 108, Papers on the 
judicial system of Bengal, I.O.Reg. (7l) 197.
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seemed highly objectionable in principle. By making this 
important change and withdrawing the preference in favour 
of Zamindars and revenue officers for recruitment as Mun- 
siffs, Wellesley had in fact removed the discrepancy that 
had existed between Cornwallis* s philosophy of ,f separation 
of powers11 and his judicial arrangements of 1793* Wellesley* s 
successor, Minto, further consolidated this principle by 
providing for a complete separation between the judicial 
and other services. In fact, the absolute faith in Cornwallis*s 
principles that was held by Shore, Wellesley and Minto, 
and the advocacy of the S.D.A. after 1812, set up an administrative 
tradition in Bengal which could be shaken only by the con­
tinued pressure from London and the pragmatic approach of 
that reforming Governor-General, William Bentinck. The 
inconveniences of the combination of the Judgeship and the 
Magistracy had been repeatedly pointed out by the judicial 
officers of Bengal. The fifth report of the Select Committee 
of House of Commons emphasised its impracticability in 1812, 
and Governor-General Hastings admitted its incompatibility 
in 1815. The Directors came out in 1814 with a programme 
for relieving the District Judges by transferring all revenue 
suits, along with the Magisterial function, to the Collectors.
In 181© the Directors made their desire imperative on this issue.
Hastings himself was amenable to the proposal but he was 
led to reject it under the influence of the S.D.A.and his 
chief adviser, George Dowdswell. It was only on the grounds 
of the absolute necessity of relieving the overburdened 
District Judges that his successor, John Adam, allowed the 
transfer of Magistracy to a few Collectors, and that only 
as a temporary measure. The following Government of Amherst 
firmly opposed the union of Magistracies with the Collector- 
ships and advocated the appointment of separate officers in 
each District as the Magistrate. The Amherst Government allowed 
the Collectors the authority to decide revenue suits but a 
firm control over their judicial activity was lodged with the 
District Judges, who still held the discretion of referring 
such suits to those officers.
Cornwallis*s scheme of keeping the association of 
Indians with the judicial administration at a very low level
could not be rigidly maintained because the agency of Indians,
could be
unlike that of Europeans,/expanded to any degree demanded by 
the pressure of business without major financial embarrassment. 
Still, the prejudice of the '’founder1' definitely operated to slow 
down the extension of that side of the judiciary. Until 1821 
the jurisdiction of Munsiffs extended to causes up to Rs. 64/- 
only (an insignificant increase over the limit of Rs. 50/- fixed
by Cornwallis), and that of Sad£r Ame^ns up to Rs. 150/-.
In 1821, on account of the shortage of European officers, 
the Government conceded the extension of the power of Mun- 
siffs to cases up to Rs. 150/-, and that of specially 
selected Sad^ Lr Ame^ns to Rs. 500/-. But when the Directors 
suggested the transfer of the entire original jurisdiction 
to the Indian Judges, in 1824» the Amherst Government and 
the S.D.A. both opposed the proposal on the ground of such 
a sweeping change being beyond the scheme contemplated by 
Cornwallis.
During his Madras Governorship (1803-07), Bentinck had 
been impressed by Munro and his advocacy of the ryotwari 
settlement. At the same time he had expressed his faith in 
Cornwallis*s judicial system, which had been introduced into 
the Madras Presidency in 1802. He condemned the previous 
system in which the Collectors were also Judges,^- and stated: 
"The judicial system has answered the expectation formed by
2
the illustrious founder, our late revered Governor-General." 
Bentinckfs above judgment on Cornwallis!s system, which was 
not completely established in Madras until 1806, was premature.
^Bentinck to Sir Thomas Strange, 7th March 1805, Bentinck MSS,- 
(Pw/jb).
2
Bentinck to Charles Grant, 11th May 1806, Bentinck MSS 
(Pw/jb).
It seems to ha\re been founded on his admiration of the 
progressive principles behind it rather than on the ex­
perience of its practical operatinn.
Bentinck came to assume the Governor-Generalship in 
1828, with the memory of his disgraceful recall from Madras 
following the Vellore mutiny in 1807, and with a keen desire 
to acquit himself with credit this time and to restore his 
reputation.^ He had to erase the deficit of 2^ /2 crores and 
set the Company's house in order before the question of re­
newal of its Charter came up before Parliament in 1833*
Under these circumstances it was natural for him to adopt 
a pragmatic approach towards administrative problems rather 
than lean on abstract principles.
The need for making major changes in the existing judicial 
machinery was Immediately appreciated by Bentinck. After com­
pleting an extensive tour of the Bengal Presidency shortly 
after his arrival he wrote to Metcalfe: "Closely connected
with the same subject /happiness and welfare of the people/ 
is the administration of . justice admitted by all to be greatly 
defective, to be slow, expensive and unsatisfactory to the
1This view was expressed by Prof. C. H. Philips in a Seminar 
lecture delivered at the School of Oriental and African Studies, 
London, on 16th March 1965. The present author agrees with it.
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people..."^ In his reforms Bentinck showed no hesitation 
in sacrificing Cornwallis’s principles for the sake of 
practical benefits, but at the same time he avoided the 
opposite extreme of becoming a slave to Munro’s authoritarian 
paternalism, which was pressed upon him by its champions,
Metcalfe and Mackenzie, Bayley’s and Mackenzie’s proposals 
for transferring nearly the entire original jurisdiction 
to the Indian Judges, for abolishing the Provincial Courts 
and the District Registerships, found ready acceptance from 
Bentinck because they coincided with the scheme of achieving 
maximum efficiency with minimum expenses. But the proposal 
for making the decisions of the highest Court subject to 
the approval of the Government advocated by Metcalfe and 
Mackenzie were indignantly rejected by him. Likewise Met­
calfe’s scheme for uniting the functions of Judge, Magistrate 
and Collector in one officer at the District level was refused 
consideration. Bentinck accepted the plan of generally uniting 
the Magistracy with the Collectorship, which had been originally 
recommended by the Directors on the advocacy of Munro, and 
later arguedJfor by Mackenzie and Metcalfe, the leading contemporary
“^Bentinck to Metcalfe, 16th Sept. 1829, Bnntinck MSS.
exponents of Munro’s philosophy in Bengal. In adopting
this reform Bentinck admitted . ■ the influence of Munro’s
doctrines^ but he hastened to justify that measure on
practical grounds as well, by saying: wIt became necessary
to divest the Judges of their Magisterial powers, and there
was no alternative consistent with the dictates of financial
2necessity than to transfer those powers to the Collectors.1
Dr. Eric Stokes, in his celebrated book, The English
Utilitarians and India, has made a brilliant effort to trace
the impact of the Utilitarian movement in England,inspired
by Jeremy Bentham, upon the administrative developments
in India. According to Dr. Stokes the Utilitarian influence
was projected into India through James Mill, who was appointed
Assistant Examiner of the Company’s correspondence in 1819 and
promoted to the office of Examiner in 1830, where he remained
until 1834- la Bengal the Utilitarian banner was carried
forward consciously by Alexander Ross and Holt Mackenzie, and
*
unconsciously by W. B. Bayley. The main features of the
^See Chap. IV. 204*
^Judl. Letter, l^h Sept. 1831, para 17, Vol. 15.
*
This is to be inferred from Dr. Stokes’ remark that Bayley's 
•proposal for multiplication of tribunals agreed with the broad 
outlines of Bentham*s teaching but that his inspiration was 
not Benthamite. - Dr. Eric Stokes, op.cit., p.156.
Utilitarian programme concerning the reform of the judiciary 
were as follows:
1. The number of tribunals was to be multiplied to bring 
justice to the doors of every persons
2. Only one appeal was to be allowed against a decision 
passed by any Judge.
3. Single Judges were to be allowed complete authority to 
dispose of appeals. Joint benches were to be dispensed 
with.
4. Proceedings in the Courts were tobe expedited by doing 
away with the formality of committing the depositions 
and cross examinations in writing.
5. The jurisdiction of tribunals was not to be divided
*
on a pecuniary basis and original and appellate Courts 
were tobe kept entirely distinct,
The above ideas made little headway in the reforms of the
9
Bentinck era, as Dr. Smokes himself seems to agree. The number 
of tribunals was not multiplied (though Dr. Stokes inferred 
that they were’*’ from the implementation of the plan creating a 
new class of Indian Judges and transferring almost the entire
^Dr. Stokes, op.cit., p.1-55-6.
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original jurisdiction to the Indian officers)* The Principal
Sad^r Ame^ns (the new class of Indian Judges) merely filled
the gap created by the abolition of Registers, and the number
of Munsiffs was actually reduced by more than half following
the Government’s decision to abolish those Munsiffships whose
incomes from fees averaged be low Rs. 50/- per month.^ The
system, of allowing two appeals, one "regular11 and one wspecial11,'
was also continued under the arrangements of 1831. In fact
2
Ross, the most "orthodox in the Utilitarian tradition1*; had
been the strongest advocate for retaining the system of
3
special appeals. James Mill and Ross did combine in making 
a strong pplea for allowing all the Judges of the S.D.A. to
4sit separately and decide the appeals entirely on their own.
But what they achieved was only a slight increase in the 
powers of "single*1 Judges. By Regulation IX of 1831, single 
Judges were permitted to admit special appeals and to refer
^See Chap. II, p. 92.
*T)r. Stokes, op.cit. , p. 157.
3
See Chap. VI, pp. 309-10.
4
See Chap. VI, pp. 299-300 •
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an appeal back for retrial to the Court whose judgment was 
appealed against. But no change was made in the previous 
restriction of single Judges not being allowed to reverse a 
decision on appeal.
Neither was any change made in the system of recording 
the depositions and cross examinations. The jurisdiction of 
Courts was still divided on a pecuniary basis, starting from 
the limit of Rs. 300/- for Munsiffs and extending to the limit 
of Rs. 5,000/- for the Principal Sad£r Amb^n. Original and 
appellate jurisdictions were separated but not completely.
The District Judges had the appellate authority over the 
decision of the Indian Judges, but they also had original 
jurisdiction over cases of more than Rs. 5,000/-. Even the 
Principal Sad^ ir Amb^ns were allowed to hear appeals from the 
subordinate Indian Judges under permission from the S.D.A.
Here again the Utilitarian doctrines had little success.
On the issue of the combination of executive and judicial 
powers Bentham1s opinion does not appear to be clear. At one 
stage Dp. Stokes states that Bentham1s political philosophy 
was authoritarian in origin and he was critical of the Whigs 
for their "vauntedprinciple of separation of powers11.^  At another
"4)r. Stokes, op.cit. t p.73.
398
he declares that the union of Collector and Magistrate brought
about by Bentinck commanded no definite support from Bentham*s 
1
teachings, although he adds that Bentham was not averse to
an officer uniting all executive and judicial functions at
the local level, as the powers of the "local Headman" in the
2
Constitutional Code indicate.
In Bengal the Utilitarian ranks were divided on this
3issue. Ross, the "more orthodox in the Utilitarian tradition”, 
vehemently opposed the union cf judicial powers with the exe­
cutive officer of the District, whereas Mackenzie, drawing his 
inspiration from the authoritarian strain in Bentham1s philosophy, 
strongly championed union of Magistracy with the Collectorships.
»James Mill!s opinion is unknown apart from his common rejection 
with Bentham of the divisinn of powers as a constitutional 
principle."^ But if James Mill, the Examiner of Company's 
Correspondence, described by Ur. Stokes as the Company's chief
"Executive", had any influence on the Judicial Despatch to Bengal 
lsl-
of Feb. 1832, which directed the Bengal Government to appoint
jDr. Stokes, op.cit., p.164. 
2Xbid.. p.165. 
3Ibid., p.157. 
4lbid.. pp. 164-5.
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separate Magistrates in each District instead of combining 
that office "with that of Collectors, it can be assumed that he 
too stood against the union,.
After the above analysis the present author is led to 
conclude that the Utilitarian doctrines had very little in­
fluence on the Civil jduicial reforms of the Bentinck era. 
Theoretical considerations had but very little effect. The 
reforms were primarily dictated by the practical need of re­
ducing arrears and delays without increasing expenditure.
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